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Although the settlement and clearing of securities transactions has received
much more attention by economists than by lawyers, recent initiatives of the
European System of Central Banks (ECSB or ‘Eurosystem’) in this field raise
some important and novel questions of law. In an era where we experience the
emergence of a quasi-federal administration at EC level through the prolifera-
tion of Community agencies, does the European Central Bank (ECB) have
power to establish such agencies? If so, which provisions could serve as legal basis
and what powers may it delegate to them? Furthermore, is the ECB bound by
the competition rules of the Treaty? If so, how and to what extent do they
constrain its powers? What is the meaning of the requirement of Article 105 EC
that the ECSB must ‘act in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free competition’? The purpose of this paper is to discuss such
institutional and competition law aspects of Eurosystem action in relation to the
settlement of securities transactions, in particular, the introduction of the Target
2-Securities platform (T2S). It is divided as follows. The first section provides an
overview of the T2S system, examining its development, main features, and
perceived advantages. The second section offers a brief examination of selected
institutional aspects of the ECB and the ESCB, focusing on the principle of
independence and the duty of inter-institutional cooperation. Section III pro-
ceeds to discuss the growth of agencies in Community law, focusing on their
legal basis, the limitations of the Meroni case law, and judicial review of agency
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action. The fourth section turns to examine delegation of powers by the ECB,
concentrating on the possible legal basis of T2S and the possible forms that its
organizational framework may take. Section V explores the question whether the
ECB is bound by the competition rules of the Treaty and discusses the principle
of open market economy. Section VI provides an overview of the application of
EC competition law on financial services, examines issues pertaining to clearing
and settlement, with particular reference to the Clearstream decision, and dis-
cusses competition law aspects of T2S. The final section contains concluding
remarks.
I. Target 2-Securities
A. Origins and Development
Despite progress made towards the integration of financial and securities markets
in the EU, securities transactions occur mostly on a domestic rather than inter-
state level. As a result, clearing and settlement remain largely domestic.1 The
settlement market in the EU is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation as
individual States traditionally developed their own domestic infrastructures.2 The
ECB has identified no fewer than 18 Securities Settlement Systems (SSS) eligible
for Eurosystem credit operations in the euro area alone.3 Such fragmentation and
resulting disparities cause inefficiencies, act as a powerful countervailing force to
integration, and discourage investment from overseas.4 The costs of cross-border
settlement in the EU are estimated to be much higher than those of domestic
settlement in the individual Member States and also those in the United States.5
In recent years, however, there has been an increase in cross-border trade and a
1 See T Schaper, Trends in European Clearing and Settlement Industry—The European Code
of Conduct and Target2-Securities, 15 February 2007, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=965407>. Clearing refers to the process whereby the essential aspects of a securities
transaction, ie the identity and quantity of the securities sold, the identity of the seller and the
buyer, and the price and date of the transaction are confirmed. Settlement refers to the payment of
the agreed price to the seller and the transfer of ownership or other interest in the securities traded
to the buyer. For a general discussion of the process, see H S Scott, International Finance (11th edn,
Foundation Press) ch 10; for international settlement, see M Yates, ‘International Settlement’ in
M Blair and G Walker, Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (Oxford, 2007) 501 et seq.
2 For an extensive bibliography, see R S Steigerwald and C A Johnson, ‘The Financial Services
Lawyer’s Bookshelf: A Selected Bibliography of Payment, Clearing and Settlement Resources’
(October 2006) 2(6) The Journal of Payment Systems Law 485.
3 See ECB, Latest Developments on Target 2-Securities at <http://www.ecb.int/paym/market/
secmar/integr/html/index.en.html>.
4 The problems of arising from the fragmentation of clearing and settlement systems in the EU
were thoroughly examined by the Giovannini Group on which see below.
5 See ECB, ‘A Single Currency—An Integrated Market Infrastructure’ (Frankfurt, 2008) 14. For
references to specific studies, see Schaper, op cit, at 2. Typically, a foreign investor must incur
higher transaction costs and needs to establish a relationship with a local agent in order to obtain
access to the local central securities depository (CSD).
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consequent increase in the demand for an integrated European settlement
infrastructure.6
Target 2-Securities (T2S) is an integrated, pan-European securities settlement
platform which seeks to overcome the drawbacks of the current fragmented
system. The T2S project was launched by the Governing Council of the ECB
on 17 July 2008 following consultations with European Central Securities
Depositories (CSDs) which, in their overwhelming majority, expressed their
support for the continuation of the project.7 The development and operation of
T2S was assigned to the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Banco de Espan˜a, the
Banque de France, and the Banca d’Italia. The launch of the T2S was welcomed
by Commissioner McGreevy as being of major economic significance and hav-
ing the potential to make a strategic and economic contribution to integration
and economic growth.8 As of June 2009, significant progress has been made
towards the completion of the project. The Governing Council of the ECB
has decided on the governance arrangement for the specification phase. This
phase covers the time needed for the development of the General Functional
Specifications (GFS) and of a first version of the User Detailed Functional
Specifications (UDFS), which is expected by the end of 2009.9
6 For example, cross-border collateral for Eurosystem credit operations exceeded domestic col-
lateral in both 2006 and 2007. See ECB, op cit, at 14.
7 The decision to explore in detail the setting up of T2S was taken by the Governing Council on
6 July 2006, following which a legal feasibility study was carried out. For the study, see <http://
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/t2slegalfeasibility0703en.pdf>. On 27 February 2007, the ECOFIN
Council welcomed the ECB’s initiative, subject, inter alia, to the conditions that participation to
the project should not be compulsory, that the principles of competition law should be respected,
and that appropriate governance structures should be set up. Subsequently, following further
consultations with various political actors, including the Parliament, and industry input, the
Governing Council provided information and invited all European CSDs to join the T2S initiative
on 23 May 2008. Subject to certain reservations, almost all euro area CSDs, representing a very
large share of settlement activity in the euro area, expressed themselves in favour of the
continuation of the T2S initiative. They indicated that they would be prepared to use the service
once in operation and enter into a legally binding contractual arrangement by the end of the first
quarter of 2009. In the meantime, on 18 December 2007, the ECB had launched a public
consultation on the methodology for calculating the economic impact of T2S and, following
industry responses, it published the results of its economic impact analysis on 23 May 2008. The
T2S project is also open to CSDs outside the euro area. The Danish CSD has already agreed to
participate in T2S for Danish krone settlement and euro settlement, and the Swedish and Swiss
CSDs have indicated that they intend to participate for euro settlement. See <http://www.ecb.int/
press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080717.en.html>.
8 See Commission Press Release IP/08/1193, Brussels, 23 July 2008.
9 For the governance arrangements, see: <http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2s/pdf/governance_
080523.pdf?30bc7140c6ca41ef1c9802ccc40cb907>. For the user requirements, see <http://www.
ecb.int/paym/t2s/pdf/T2S_URD_V4_080717.pdf?9cba1b27f9f4bb66f41e48bbe85c9bd4>. See
also progress report at <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/t2s-progressreport200710en.pdf?
4c01d680d91ad72efc899c3f9e548c3d>. Note that on 19 March 2009, the Governing Council
of the ECB decided to establish a new governing structure for the T2S project. This is described
in detail in <http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2s/progress/pdf/internal_goverrnance_explanations.pdf?
f55f9b9cb3ccbb012a49a0b2c57f14aa> and, in summary, is as follows. T2S is owned and operated
by the Eurosystem which determines, and is responsible for, its scope, budget, and timely
implementation. Ultimate responsibility and competence for decisions rests with the Governing
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B. Definition and Features
Target 2-Securities10 is a technical, IT-based platform which enables the delivery
versus payment, cross-border and domestic, settlement of securities against
central bank money.11 It is necessary to explain the component parts of this
definition before outlining the basic features of the T2S system. A securities
transaction results in an obligation on the seller to deliver securities and a
corresponding obligation on the purchaser to provide payment. Settlement in
central bank money signifies the provision of payment through entry in the
books of the central bank as opposed to the books of a commercial bank.
The balances of these cash settlement accounts therefore represent an account
holder’s claim on the national central bank.12 Delivery versus payment (DvP)
signifies, in general, a settlement procedure in which the purchaser agrees
to make immediate payment upon delivery of the purchased security. More
technically, it has been defined as:
a link between a securities transfer system and a funds transfer system that ensures that a
delivery occurs if, and only if, another delivery occurs and vice versa. It can be conceived
as a three-step procedure: (1) reserving/blocking securities in the securities accounts, and
sending cash instructions to the central bank money cash accounts; (2) settling, with
finality, the required funds in the central bank money cash account of the seller, and (3)
settling, with finality, the securities in the securities account of the buyer.13
Council of the ECB. The governance structure of the T2S project has internal and external
components. The internal components consist of the Governing Council, the T2S Programme
Board, and the four banks which have undertaken responsibility for developing and operating the
T2S platform, namely Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Espan˜a, Banque de France, and Banca
d’Italia. Representation of external interests occurs, inter alia, through a T2S advisory group and
national user groups. The T2S Programme Board, which consists of eight members, has
responsibility for the management of the project, including the execution of technical tasks and
developing proposals on key strategic issues for the consideration of the Governing Council.
10 The initials ‘TARGET’ stand for Trans European Automated Real Time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer. The T2S initiative follows on from the successful launch of TARGET 2 by the
Eurosystem. TARGET 2 is the Real Time Gross Settlement system for the euro. It is offered by the
Eurosystem and used for the settlement of central bank operations, large-value euro interbank
transfers, and other euro payments. It provides real time processing, settlement in central bank
money, and immediate finality. A real time gross settlement system (RTGS), such as TARGET 2,
is a payment system in which processing and settlement take place continuously (‘in real time’)
rather than in batches. This enables transactions to be settled with immediate finality. ‘Gross
settlement’ means that each transfer is settled individually rather than on a net basis. The difference
between TARGET 2 and its predecessor, known as TARGET, is that TARGET 2 uses a direct
payment platform without intervention by any local RTGS. Under TARGET, by contrast, pay-
ments were processed by the national banks through their local RTGS systems. For further
information, see the official ECB site for TARGET 2, <http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2/html/index.
en.html> and also<http://target2.net/content/view/20/1/>.
11 See the description of the Target 2-Securities in the ECB website at <http://www.ecb.int/
paym/t2s/html/index.en.html>.
12 This definition is taken from ECB, The Use of Central Bank Money for Settling Securities
Transactions, May 2004, p 4. 13 See ECB, op cit, p 10.
Community Agencies, Competition Law and ECSB Initiatives 219
T2S is a settlement platform which is designed to match, through real time link,
the delivery versus payment settlement in euro central bank money of the cash
leg of domestic and cross-border securities transactions over euro-denominated
securities with the settlement of the securities leg thereof on the CSDs’ securities
accounts.14 The platform has a universal character in that it covers all such
settlements irrespective of the location of the securities, their issuer, or the
national CSD through which the relevant transaction is settled.15 Thus,
T2-Securities is intended to provide a single harmonized venue where securities
can be exchanged for euro with standardized communications protocols.16
T2S is a technical solution. It will be administered by the Eurosystem and is
intended to provide services to existing CSDs. It does not entail the creation of a
new settlement system or a new CSD. Existing CSDs which decide to partici-
pate will act as access points for customers to the settlement facilities of T2S.17
The legal relationships between national CSDs and their customers, and
between the various CSDs, will not be affected. Similarly, the legal situation of
the end users (banks and investment firms) and the securities accounts at the
national level will remain unchanged.18 Thus, the introduction of T2S will not
necessitate changes in national law,19 its basic aspects being a settlement engine
and a securities accounts database.20 Since T2S is not as such a CSD, the
14 This definition is provided by P Athanassiou, ‘T2 Securities: An Overview of the Eurosystem’s
Aims and Competence’ (2008) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 585, at
585–586. 15 op cit, 586.
16 See ECB, A Single Currency—An Integrated Market Infrastructure (Frankfurt, 2008) at 14. The
technical aspects of T2-Securities have been described by Athanassiou, op cit, at 586 as follows
(footnotes omitted): ‘T2-Securities will interlink the settlement of book entries, recording the
transfer of title of securities against the transfer of euro-central bank money. To this end, the
T2-Securities technical facility will be processing transfer orders and making entries in the securities
account databases of participating CSDs. Where cross-border transactions are concerned, T2-
Securities will be establishing a link between the transfer of title and the corresponding cash transfers
through the national T2-Cash accounts. Without prejudice to the above, the securities leg of a
(domestic or cross-border) transfer will continue to be settled through a securities account held by
the parties to the securities transfer with the relevant national CSD (or by participating CSDs with
one another), while the cash leg will be settled through a T2-Cash account held by a national CSD,
or its customers, with their respective National Central Bank.’
17 For a more detailed description, see See ECB, A Single Currency – An Integrated Market
Infrastructure (Frankfurt, 2008) at 14 and the ECB website: <http://www.ecb.int/paym/market/
secmar/integr/html/index.en.html>.
18 See Athanassiou, op cit, at 586 and the ECB feasibility study, op cit, at 7. The relationship
between a CSD and its participants will continue to be governed by the contractual or other legal
arrangement governing the participation in, and holding an account with, the CSD.
19 As Athanassiou observes, op cit, 586, for the purposes of the Settlement Finality Directive
(Directive 98/26, [1998] OJ L166/45), T2S will be subject to the finality regime applicable to the
participating CSDs. The finality of transfer orders processed in T2-Securities will be guaranteed
through the national rules implementing the Directive while the proprietary aspects and the finality
of the transfer itself will be determined in accordance with the law applicable to the CSD where the
relevant securities account is located in accordance with Article 9(2) of the Directive. See for more
details ECB feasibility study, op cit, 4–5.
20 These are explained by the ECB feasibility study as follows, op cit, 3: ‘The purpose of the
settlement engine is to support the processing of transfer orders placed by the CSDs’. It is envisaged
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European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement21 does not apply
directly to it but the ECB has declared its intention to comply with the Code
and, more generally, competition law.
T2S will be fully owned and operated by the Eurosystem and, as such, it is
intended to have the character of a universal service. This is based on the
underlying premise that the availability of central bank liquidity for settling
security transactions is a ‘public good service’ and should be available to all
participants on the basis of uniform contractual arrangements.22 Thus, the dis-
tinct feature of T2S in comparison to national CSDs is that it will not be profit
making but run on a full costs recovery basis. Furthermore, it is intended to be
optional. CSDs will not be made subject to a general requirement to use T2S
when accessing central bank money for settlement purposes and it is for them to
decide whether to participate.23
Although T2S is primarily intended to provide settlement for all securities
(such as equities, debt instruments, investment funds, and warrants) held in the
accounts of participating CSDs which are denominated in euro, it could also
provide settlement for securities denominated in other EU currencies, subject to
the consent of the respective central bank. It may also cover securities which are
denominated in foreign currencies but settled in euro provided that they are held
through a participating CSD.
Thus, it may be said that T2S involves a minimalist intervention seeking to
assist the integration process of securities markets through as little interference
as possible with the laws of the Member States. This appears to fit in with the
overall approach of the ECB which sees its role in this area not as spearheading
that ‘this single technical platform will be operated and owned by the Eurosystem, and will provide
a technical infrastructure to support the CSDs in performing all the tasks that are part of the full
cycle of a settlement transaction (eg the receipt and verification of transfer instructions, system
verification regarding available stocks and funds, queue management, optimisation mechanisms,
debits and credits on securities accounts and settlement-related reporting, etc.). The CSDs will
continue to provide services associated with the custody function as well as asset-servicing and
added-value services. As part of the settlement process, the single technical platform will make
entries in the database and arrange for the required cash transfer orders in TARGET2. The secu-
rities accounts database will electronically compile and store data regarding securities accounts, i.e.
the positions of account holders in respect of securities held in such accounts. Although from a
technical viewpoint the database will be part of the T2S technical environment, from a legal
perspective, the CSDs will continue to maintain securities accounts for their participants, thus
retaining legal responsibility for them regarding the entering, maintaining and cancelling of records
on their respective participants’ accounts, as well as regarding the accuracy of the information
processed.’ According to the feasibility study, neither the specific physical location of the technical
infrastructure nor the fact that accounts data are to be processed in such a common technical
database is a determining criterion when it comes to establishing the legal location of an account,
given that CSDs will continue to maintain the securities accounts of their participants from a legal
point of view. The common technical location of the technical infrastructure will therefore have
no impact on determining which national law is applicable.’
21 See European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement issued on 7 November 2006 by
the Federation of European Securities Exchanges. The Code is a voluntary self-commitment by
the organizations belonging to FESE. For a discussion, see below.
22 Athanassiou, op cit, 586. 23 Athanassiou, op cit, 586 but see n 11.
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uniformity or substituting the free market but rather as seeking to pursue a
threefold objective, namely to remove obstacles to integration by cooperating
with public authorities and the private sector; to establish standards for securities
settlement systems; and to promote the establishment of an integrated regulatory
framework;24 In this context, the ECB has received the support of the other
Community institutions and it is notable that, following the launch of the T2S
project, the Commission indicated that it would abstain from direct legislative
intervention in the area of clearing and settlement.25
C. Perceived Advantages
T2S is expected to contribute to the elimination of settlement disparities between
domestic and cross-border transactions and thus promote the integration of
securities markets. Also, by providing a single platform to all participating CSDs
irrespective of their place of location, it will aid price transparency, lower costs,
and increase competition. As the ECB puts it, market users will be able to
transact and access their assets through participating CSDs in a way which
accommodates rather than perpetuates national and regional differences.26
As the ECB observes, the fragmentation of the market infrastructure in the
euro area causes inefficiencies. Many buyers and sellers in different countries
have to use some form of intermediation to carry out their trades. As long as
settlement remains fragmented, transfers between separate systems—operating
under different legal and regulatory regimes—will remain more complex and
therefore more expensive, than domestic transfers.27 The following may be
identified among the principal expected benefits of T2S.28
Cost effectiveness. The expectation is that the more efficient post-trading envir-
onment promoted by T2S will generate larger trading volumes thus leading to
lower processing costs.
Liquidity. The pan-European character of the platform will lead to greater
liquidity and access to a wider investor base thus lowering cost of capital. At the
same time, increased market liquidity, together with cheaper portfolio diversi-
fication, can be expected to lead to higher investor returns.
Simplicity. The simplified form of processing is expected to lead to lower failure
rates thus increasing certainty in transactions and further cost reduction.
Stability. The integrated model of the system and greater liquidity will increase
efficiency and stability. Stability is further enhanced by the neutrality guaranteed
by the ECB and the public good character of the service.
24 See <http://www.ecb.int/paym/market/secmar/integr/html/index.en.html>.
25 See the European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum, Briefing Paper on Target 2 secu-
rities, 5 June 2007, at <http://epfsf.org/meetings/2007/briefings/briefing_5jun2007_more.htm>.
26 See ECB presentation of T2S at <http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080717.en.
html>. 27 See <http://www.ecb.int/paym/market/secmar/integr/html/index.en.html>.
28 See ECB, A Single Currency—An Integrated Market Infrastructure (Frankfurt, 2008) at 16.
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It may be noted that there is a fundamental tension inherent in the T2S project.
On the one hand, participation of CSDs is optional and not compulsory. On
the other hand, T2S can only bring its expected benefits and guarantee econo-
mies of scale if a sufficiently large number of market actors decide to join. The
success of the project therefore depends on it generating sufficient momentum
among market participants. As has been observed,29
One of the ECB’s central commitments is to deliver (cross-border) settlement at a cost
per transaction which is lower than the cost of any national (domestic) transaction today.
Such fees would be charged by T2S to its direct users, the CSDs. Only if these CSDs will
be able to reduce their overall costs significantly through the outsourcing process, can the
project be seen as commercially favourable by the CSDs and their end-users. The eco-
nomic feasibility calculations presented so far indicate that costs below the lowest level of
today’s national costs may be achievable only if (almost) all major European national
CSDs join and link up.
It is worth noting that the ECB is intending to facilitate direct connectivity to
T2S for banks and is willing to extend the T2S platform to other non-euro
currencies (with the agreement of the relevant national central bank). This may
be termed the self-fulfilling prophesy conundrum, a situation often present in
financial markets.
Among the legal issues that arise in relation to the setting up of T2S are the
following: its governance structure, the legal basis for its establishment, its
institutional form, and its compatibility with the rules of competition law. We
will focus here on the institutional form of T2S and issues of competition law.30
In exploring the problems arising, however, it is also necessary to look at its
possible legal bases. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to recall briefly the
basic principles governing the ECB and the ECSB.
II. Institutional Attributes of the ECSB and the ECB
A. Overview
According to the system established by the EC Treaty, the ESCB (Eurosystem)
is composed of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs).31 Under Article
29 See, in this context, the comments made by the European Parliamentary Financial Services
Forum, Briefing Paper on Target 2 securities, 5 June 2007, at <http://epfsf.org/meetings/2007/
briefings/briefing_5jun2007_more.htm>.
30 For the other legal problems arising, see the ECB feasibility study, op cit, and the ECB Legal
Assessment, op cit.
31 See Article 107(1) EC. There is no intention here to discuss in detail the institutional fra-
mework of the ECB but simply to highlight some basic features. For a detailed discussion, see,
among others, C Zilioli and M Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Hart, 2001);
Zilioli and Selmayr (1999–2000) 19 YEL 347; R Smits, The European Central Bank (Kluwer,
1997); R Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford, 2006) ch 7 et seq.
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8(1) EC, the ECB and the ECSB must act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon them by the Treaty. They are thus bound, as are all EC insti-
tutions and bodies, by the principle of conferred powers. Under the peremptory
terms of Article 105(1) EC, the primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain
price stability. Article 105(1) also identifies as a secondary objective, to be
pursued without prejudice to the maintenance of price stability, to support the
general economic policies of the Community with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the general Community objectives as laid down in Article 2 of
the Treaty. The paramount importance of price stability owes its existence to
German influence. Article 105 is heavily based on Article 12 of the German
Bundesbankgesetz of 1957, as Germany saw the adoption by the Community of
the hierarchy of objectives provided for therein as a quid pro quo for the sur-
render of monetary sovereignty. In fact, as has been pointed out,32 price stability
is elevated to a fundamental objective not only of the ESCB but also of the
Community itself since Article 2 EC expressly refers to sustainable and non-
inflationary growth and Article 4(2) EC includes, as an integral part of Com-
munity activities, the conduct of a single monetary and exchange rate policy, the
primary objective of both being price stability.
The main tasks of the ESCB are the following:33 (a) to define and implement
the monetary policy of the Community; (b) to conduct foreign exchange
operations; (c) to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member
States; and (d) to promote the smooth operation of payment systems. These
functions correspond to the functions traditionally assigned to a central bank
within a sovereign polity. To carry out these tasks, the ECB is vested with wide-
ranging legislative powers and has a number of instruments at its disposal. Such
instruments may regulate legal relations among the component parts of the
ESCB or produce external effects vis-a`-vis third parties. Article 110 in fact grants
the ECB extensive regulatory and legislative functions resembling in certain
respects the instruments provided for in Article 249 EC. Thus, the ECB may
make regulations, adopt decisions, and also adopt non-binding recommenda-
tions and opinions.34 It also has power to impose fines or periodic penalty
32 See Lastra, op cit, at 215.
33 See Article 105(2) EC and Articles 2 and 3 of the ESCB Statute.
34 Article 110(1) and (2) EC. For an extensive discussion of the rule-making powers of the ECB,
see Zilioli and Selmayr, (1999–2000) 19 YEL at 388 et seq. These authors favour an extensive
construction of ECB normative powers in the monetary field. They argue that the ECB’s powers
are not limited to cases in which a specific power to adopt regulations is granted by the ECSB
Statute or by a Council act but extends to all cases in which it is necessary to implement the tasks
assigned to it by the Treaty. The authors conclude that in the field of monetary policy, the ECB has
powers ‘similar in quality’ to that given to the Council under Article 308 EC. Although an
extensive interpretation of the powers of the ECB may well be justified in certain circumstances, the
above line of argument appears to blur the distinction between implied powers and the residual
competence granted by Article 308 which are, in fact, separate. A broad understanding of ECB
powers is also favoured by J V Louis, ‘A Legal and Institutional Approach for Building a Monetary
Union’ (1998) CML Rev 33 at 58 et seq.
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payments on undertakings, subject to authorization and within the limits pro-
vided by the Council.35
The ECB is a ‘special institution’36 provided for by the EC Treaty. Its special
status is attributable to a number of features which distinguish it from the other
institutions of the Treaty. First, whilst it is an integral part of the institutional
structure of the Community, Article 7 EC does not refer to it as one of the
institutions of the Community. Instead, the ECB is dealt with separately in
Article 8.37 As it will be argued below, however, this does not place the ECB
in an inferior hierarchical position vis-a`-vis the institutions proper.38 Secondly,
in contrast to the other institutions, the ECB enjoys separate legal personality
both in the international sphere and vis-a`-vis the Member States.39 Thirdly, in
carrying out its tasks, the ECB enjoys independence from the Community
institutions and the Member States.
In relation to the Member States that have adopted the euro, the competence
assigned to the Community in the field of monetary union is exclusive. This is
expressly recognized by the aborted Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of
Lisbon40 but it also reflects the position under the current treaties since, by
definition, it would not be possible for monetary union to coexist with shared
Member State competence. A ramification of competence exclusivity is institu-
tional exclusivity in the sense that the tasks assigned to the ESCB can only be
performed by the institutions and in accordance with the processes established in
the Treaty to the exclusion of other actors.41
B. Institutional Balance and the Duty of Cooperation
The EC Treaty does not draw any order of hierarchy among the institutions of
the Community. All institutions and bodies have been assigned different tasks
and vested with powers to promote the objectives of the Community. They are
35 Article 110(3). 36 See R Lastra, at 223.
37 Notably, the present juxtaposition between Articles 7 and 8 is not maintained by the Treaty of
Lisbon which refers to the ECB as an integral part of the institutional framework of the Union: see
Article 13 TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon is
different from the aborted Constitutional Treaty Article I-19 of which, in line with current Article
7, did not mention the ECB as one of the main institutions of the Union. 38 See below
39 Article 107(2): this provision appears to refer to the international legal personality of the ECB,
its legal personality vis-a`-vis the Member States being dealt with in Article 19.1 of the ESCB
Statute. See C Zilioli and M Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Hart, 2001) at 180.
Zilioli and Selmayr point out that the international legal personality of the ECB, as is normally the
case with central banks, is derivative, meaning that it is limited to the specific tasks assigned to
them, and relative in the sense that its existence in the international sphere depends on recognition
by other subjects of public international law: See op cit, 181–182. For the non assignment of legal
personality to the ESCB see Fernandez Martin, op cit, 2. Note that the European Investment Bank
(EIB) also has separate legal personality: see Article 266 EC.
40 See TFEU, Article 3(1)(c); Constitutional Treaty, Article I-13(1)(c).
41 Fernandez Martin, op cit, 52. This is not to say, however, that the competence of the ECB on
payment systems under Article 22 of the ESCB is exclusive. See below.
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part of the same institutional family42 and can be said to have been placed in a
position of ‘different but equal’. More specifically, inter-institutional relation-
ships are governed by the following principles. First, each institution must act
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty.43 This serves
to underline that the institutions, as the Community itself, do not have any
self-executing powers and may only act within the mandate granted to them,
expressly or implicitly, by the founding Treaties. Secondly, according to the
principle of institutional balance, each institution must respect, and not
encroach upon, the powers of the other institutions.44 In relation to the ECB,
the principle of institutional balance has been expressly recognized by the EC
Treaty which places the Bank, together with the Court of Auditors, in the
position of a prerogatives-based applicant for the purposes of judicial review.45
Thirdly, all institutions, including the ECB, are bound by the duty of sincere
and loyal cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC.
Although this provision appears to impose duties only on Member States,
the case law makes it clear that it also imposes mutual duties on the Com-
munity institutions to conduct inter-institutional dialogue in a spirit of sincere
cooperation.46 Owing to its all embracing character,47 this duty also applies
both in favour of and against the ECB. The potential importance of Article 10
in this context should not be underestimated. Although Article 10 cannot by
itself create new duties and only applies in the absence of more specific pro-
visions of Community law,48 it has been used by the Court with creativity.
The following have been identified, among others, as general obligations
flowing from Article 10: the duty to abstain from measures which could
hinder the internal functioning of the Community institutions; the obligation
to abstain from measures which could hinder the development of the inte-
gration process; and the obligation to ensure the protection of rights stemming
from primary and secondary Community law.49 In recent years, the duty of
sincere cooperation has found fruitful application particularly in the field of
42 See J M Fernadez Martin, ‘The Competition Rules of the EC Treaty and the European
System of Central Banks’ (2001) European Competition Law Review 51 at 53.
43 See Articles 7(1) for the institutions proper and Article 8 for the ECB and the ESCB.
44 For the principle of institutional balance, see Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council (Chernobyl
case) [1990] ECR I-2041 and the cases referred to below. 45 See Article 230(3) EC.
46 See eg Case C-65/93 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-643, para 23; Case 204/86 Greece v
Council [1988] ECR 5323, para 16.
47 Notably, the duty of cooperation has been applied as a general principle of EU law, trans-
cending the specific provision of Article 10, in the third pillar, and has been held to be especially
binding in the field of Justice and Home Affairs: see Case C-105/03, Judgment of 16 June 2005;
Case T-228/02 OMPI v Council [2006] ECR I-4665, paras 122–123.
48 See Case C-84/04 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I-9843, para 40; Case C-392/02
Commission v Denmark [2005] ECR I-9811, para 69.
49 L W Gormley, ‘The Development of General Principles of Law within Article 10 (ex Article
5) EC’ in U Bernitz and J Nergelius, General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer,
2000) at 114–115. See further Durand (1990) CML Rev 645.
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competition law50 and also lies behind the obligation of the Community
institutions themselves to observe the fundamental freedoms.51
The ECJ has applied Article 10 in combination with Article 81 EC to place
Member States under an obligation not to give legislative effect or encourage the
adoption of anti-competitive agreements.52 This is of importance since
although, as it will be argued, the ECB is not directly subject to the competition
rules of the Treaty, it is under an obligation to observe the principle of free
competition under Article 105(1) EC and arguably, in this context, a duty to
cooperate with the Commission in the observance of competition law and also
by the analogical application of the case law on Member States not to encourage
the adoption of anti-competitive agreements.
C. Independence
The independence of the ECB and the national central banks is enshrined in
Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ECSB and of the
ECB (hereinafter ECSB Statute).53 It should be understood as functional,
institutional, and financial independence54 but not as complete institutional
autonomy. Article 108 EC55 provides that, when exercising their powers and
carrying out their duties, the ECB, the national central banks, and members of
their decision-making bodies must not seek or take instructions from Com-
munity institutions or bodies, from any national government, or from any other
body. The Community institutions and bodies and the Member States under-
take to respect that principle and not to seek to influence the members of the
decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the
performance of their tasks.
On the basis of this provision, the ECB has defended its independence for-
cefully choosing to stress its distance from the political institutions rather than
see itself as another branch of the Community government. This generated a
degree of inter-institutional competition which culminated in the OLAF case,56
where the ECJ had the opportunity to pronounce on the status and the
50 See J Temple Lang, ‘Article 10 EC – The Most Important General Principle of Community
Law’ in U Bernitz, J Nergelius, and C Cardner, General Principles of EC Law in a Process of
Development (Kluwer, 2008) 75 esp at 101 et seq.
51 See Gormley, op cit, at 117. For this obligation, see in more detail, below.
52 Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi and Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del
Mercato [2003] ECR I-8055, para 45 et seq.
53 See Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank annexed to the EC by the TEU as subsequently amended.
54 Lastra, op cit, 225. 55 See also Article 7 of the ESCB Statute.
56 Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB [2003] ECR I-7147. For an extensive discussion, see Zilioli
and Selmayr, op cit; R Goebel, (2006) 29 Fordham Int’l LJ 610. For central bank independence
and its affinity to judicial independence, see, among others, G. Tridimas, ‘A comparison of Central
Bank and Judicial Independence’ in Alain Marciano (ed) Constitutional mythology: theory and facts
(Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
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independence of the ECB in the context of an inter-institutional dispute with
the Commission.
The ECB adopted Decision 1999/726 with a view to combating fraud and
other illegal activities detrimental to its financial interests.57 The decision made
the Directorate for Internal Audit responsible for conducting administrative
investigations within the ECB and established an independent anti-fraud com-
mittee to which the Director of Internal Audit was accountable. The Commis-
sion took issue with that decision arguing that it infringed Regulation 1073/
1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF)58 because it negated both the investigative powers conferred on OLAF
and the applicability of the Regulation to the ECB.59
The basic findings of the judgment may be summarized as follows. The
Court firmly reiterated that the ECB is a Community body which falls within
the framework of the Treaty and is bound to contribute towards the attainment
of Community objectives.60 The fact that it has its own separate budget does not
mean that it is beyond the scope of Article 280 EC on the basis of which OLAF’s
powers of investigation were established. The expression ‘financial interests of
the Community’ in Article 280 must be interpreted as encompassing not only
revenue and expenditure covered by the Community budget but also those
covered by the budget of other bodies, offices, and agencies established by the
EC Treaty.61 The ECJ took a functional, but not unduly narrow, view on the
requirement of consultation. It held that the failure to consult the ECB on
the adoption of the OLAF Regulation did not infringe its prerogatives because,
under Article 12.3 of the ESCB Statute, consultation is required only in areas
where ‘by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, [it] is particularly
well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged’.62 It follows
that the ECB must be consulted only in relation to proposals which fall sub-
stantively within the sphere of the tasks assigned to it by the Treaty, ie monetary
policy. Although the specific scope of the requirement of consultation remains
to be ascertained, it is submitted that it should receive a wide interpretation
and the ECB must be consulted on all matters which may have a reasonably
incidental effect on monetary policy.
57 [1999] OJ L291/36. The decision was adopted on the basis of Article 12.3 of the ESCB
Statute which mandates the Governing Council to adopt rules of procedure which determine the
internal organization of the ECB and its decision-making bodies.
58 Regulation 1073/1999 ([1999] OJ L136/1) was adopted by the European Parliament and the
Council on the basis of Article 280 EC. OLAF was established by Commission Decision 1999/
352, [1999] OJ L136/20, its task being, inter alia, to conduct both internal and external admin-
istrative investigations with a view to combating fraud, corruption, and other illegal activities
adversely affecting the Community’s financial interests.
59 Under Articles 1(3) and 4 of Regulation 1073/1999, OLAF has power to conduct internal
fraud investigations ‘within the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by, on the basis
of, the Treaties’. Such investigations may be opened by OLAF acting on its own initiative or
following a request by the Community body where the investigation is to be conducted.
60 See paras 91–92 of the judgment. 61 Para 90 et seq. 62 Para 110.
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The most important aspect of the judgment lies in the examination of the
concept of independence. The ECB argued that the system of administrative
investigations provided for by the Regulation conflicted with its independence,
as guaranteed by Article 108 EC. In its view, the guarantee of independence
covered not only the performance of the ESCB’s basic tasks as set out in Article
105(2) EC but, more generally, the exercise of all the ECB’s other powers,
including those pertaining to its internal organization, which included the
adoption of anti-fraud measures. The ECJ did not find this argument persuasive.
It drew a distinction between, on the one hand, functional independence and,
on the other hand, institutional autonomy in establishing control procedures,
and held that the guarantee of independence from political control does not
bring with it regulatory independence. Article 108 EC seeks, in essence, to shield
the ECB from all political pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue the
objectives and tasks assigned to it. By contrast, such independence does not have
the consequence of separating it entirely from the European Community and
exempting it from every rule of Community law.63 The ECJ based this on three
considerations.64 First, the fact that the ECB is subject to the principle of con-
ferred powers. Secondly, the fact that it is also subject to various kinds of
Community controls, notably review by the Court of Justice and control by the
Court of Auditors. Finally, a series of Treaty provisions from which it was evi-
dent that it was not the intention of the Treaty draftsmen to shield the ECB
from any kind of legislative action taken by the Community legislature.65
The Court found that subjecting the ECB to OLAF’s investigation powers
did not undermine its independence. OLAF itself was independent from the
Commission and had to operate within a strict statutory framework. The system
of checks and balances provided for by the Treaty had sufficient safety valves.
OLAF’s remit was limited and subject to strict observance of the rules of
Community law, including, in particular, the Protocol on the privileges and
immunities of the European Communities, and human rights. The ECJ also
attributed particular importance to two considerations. Fraud investigations
carried out by OLAF are distinguishable from other forms of control, such as
financial control, which are more rigid. Secondly, OLAF’s internal investiga-
tions have to be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in
decisions adopted by each institution. The ECB therefore had the chance to
protect its independence.
The judgment appears correct. The Court drew, in effect, a distinction
between the ECB as an institution assigned constitutional tasks in the perfor-
mance of which it must act independently and the ECB as a bureaucracy which
is subject to transversal provisions applicable to all institutions. Although it may
not be possible to draw this distinction safely in all cases, the ECB had not
63 Paras 134–135. 64 Para 135.
65 See eg Article 105(6) EC, Article 107(5) and (6) EC, and Article 110(1), first indent, and (3) EC.
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shown how OLAF’s powers of investigation would in abstracto prejudice its
institutional and operational independence.66
III. Community Agencies
A. Growth and Overview
One of the distinct features of the Community’s institutional architecture has been
the unprecedented growth in the number of independent agencies established at
Community level since the 1990s.67 Whilst there were just two Community
agencies in the 1970s68 and only four in 1993, there are currently 24 decentralized
66 The approach of the ECJ accords with previous case law. In Case 85/86 Commission v EIB
[1988] ECR 1281, the ECJ made similar findings in relation to the European Investment Bank. It
held that the EIB’s operational and institutional autonomy did not mean that it was totally separate
from every rule of Community law since it was intended to contribute to the attainment of
Community objectives and formed part of the framework of the Community. On that basis, the
ECJ rejected the EIB’s submission that the proceeds of the Community income tax paid by EIB’s
servants were not part of the Community budget and could be transferred to the reserves of the
Bank. See also Case C-370/89 SGEEM v EIB [1992] ECR I-6211 where the ECJ held that,
since the EIB is a Community body, the ECJ has jurisdiction to hear actions based on the non-
contractual liability of the EIB under Article 178 (now 235) of the Treaty.
67 Bibliography on agencies abounds. See, among others, P Craig, EU Administrative Law, ch 5;
M Aglietta and L Scialom, ‘The Challenge of European Integration for Prudential Policy’, Special
Paper—LSE Financial Markets Group (2003); M Bovens, ‘New Forms of Accountability and
EU-Governance’, Comparative European Politics (2007) 5, 104–120; E Chiti, ‘The emergence of a
Community Administration: The case of European Agencies’ (2000) CML Rev 309–343; D Curtin,
‘Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public Accountability’ in
Damien Geradin, Rodolphe Mun˜oz, and Nicolas Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU: a
new paradigm of European governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005); R Dehousse, ‘Misfits: EU
Law and the transformation of European Governance’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/02, available
at: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020201.rtf>; M Everson, G Majone, L Metcalfe,
and A Schout, ‘The Role of Specialised Agencies in Decentralising EU Governance’, Report
presented to the Commission, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/
contribution_en.pdf>. E Fisher, ‘The European Union in the Age of Accountability’ (2004) 24(3)
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 495–515; D Geradin and N Petit, ‘The Development of Agencies at
EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform’, Jean Monnet Working
Paper 01/04, available at: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040101.pdf>; K Lenaerts
and A Verhoeven, ‘Institutional balance as a guarantee for democracy in EU governance’ in C Joerges
and R Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford MA: Oxford
University Press, 2002) 35–88; K Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the regulatory process: “delegation of powers”
in the European Community’ (1993) 18(1) EL Rev 23–49; G Majone, ‘The Agency Model: The
Growth of Regulation and Regulatory Institutions in the European Union’ (1997) 3 EIPASCOPE
1–6 (also available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/786/01/ scop97_3_2.pdf>). G Majone, ‘Ideas, Interests and
Institutional Change: The European Commission Debates the Delegation Problem’, available at:
<http://www.portedeurope.org/IMG/pdf/cahier_4_2001.pdf>; R Nickel, ‘Participatory Governance
and European Administrative Law: New Legal Benchmarks for the New European Public Order’,
EUI Working Papers, Law No 2006/26; E Vos, ‘Agencies and the European Union’ in T Zwart and
L Verhey (eds), Agencies in European and Comparative Perspective (Intersentia, 2003); X Yataganas,
‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union, The relevance of the American model
of independent agencies’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/01.
68 These were the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training and the
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
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agencies.69 This number does not include the so-called executive agencies, estab-
lished under Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003,70 nor the European Institute of
Innovation and Technology (EIT), which is currently being set up.71 In addition
to first pillar agencies, a number of agencies have been established under the
Common Foreign and Security Policy72 and also under the Third Pillar.73
69 These agencies are the following (see <http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/>):
Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA)
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA)
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
(FRONTEX)
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop)
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)
European Environment Agency (EEA)
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
(EUROFOUND)
European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)—previously EUMC
European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA)
European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (Fusion for
Energy)
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
European Medicines Agency (EMEA)
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
European Railway Agency (ERA)
European Training Foundation (ETF)
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT)
European Institute for Gender Equality (under preparation).
70 Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003, [2003] OJ L11/1. For these agencies, see below.
71 Regulation (EC) 294/2008, [2008] OJ L97/1.
72 Currently, there are three agencies under the second pillar (for details, see <http://europa.eu/
agencies/security_agencies/index_en.htm>): The European Defence Agency (EDA), the European
Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). EDA was
established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004, its main objectives being to
improve the EU’s defence capabilities especially in the field of crisis management, promote EU
armaments cooperation, strengthen the EU defence industrial and technological base, and create a
competitive European defence equipment market, and promote research, with a view to strengthening
Europe’s industrial and technological potential in the defence field. ISS was set up in 2002 based on a
Council Joint Action on 20 July 2001, ([2002] OJ L200), its aim being to contribute to the generation of
a common European security culture and support the strategic debate by providing the best possible
interface between European decision-makers and the diverse circles of non-official specialists. ISS
performs mainly data analysis and frames recommendations necessary for EU policy-making. It organizes
research and debate on key security and defence issues bringing together officials, experts from within the
EU and beyond, and developing a transatlantic dialogue on security issues with the US and Canada.
EUSC was established by a Council Joint Action on 20 July 2001, ([2001] OJ L200, 25.07.01). It is an
Agency of the Council dedicated to the exploitation and production of information deriving from
the analysis of earth observation space imagery and is designed to support decision-making in CFSP.
73 There are three third pillar agencies (for details, see <http://europa.eu/agencies/pol_agencies/
index_en.htm>). Eurojust is governed by Council Decision of 28 February 2002 No 2002/187/
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Community agencies do not find a direct legal basis in the Treaty. They are
established by Community legislation in order to accomplish specific technical,
scientific, or managerial tasks. They perform specific functions and objectives
and typically work under the monitoring of the Commission. The growth of
Community agencies began in the 1990s and was associated with the comple-
tion of the internal market. At that time, consensus emerged at the political level
that a number of scientific and technical tasks should be allocated to specialized
agencies to enable the Commission to cope with the increasing regulatory
demands of the maturing internal market. Those demands coupled with a desire
for geographical devolution of the Community’s centres of power, led the Heads
of State and Government of the Member States meeting in Brussels on 29
October 1993, to take a decision fixing the headquarters of seven agencies.
These commenced their operations in 1994 or 1995 although in the case of
some of them the regulations on which they were founded had been adopted
some years before.74 A third wave of agencies came into existence in the 2000s.
The seats of those agencies were decided by the Heads of State and Government
of the Member States in December 2003.
In parallel to the development of Community agencies, the 1990s also
experienced a considerable growth of independent regulatory authorities at the
national level. The establishment of such authorities was, to a considerable
extent, the result of the process towards the liberalization of State monopolies
pursued by the Commission. Thus, national independent authorities have been
established in the telecommunications, energy, and railway sectors as well as in
the general field of competition law under Regulation 1/2003.75 It will be noted
that these national authorities are different from Community agencies in a
number of respects.76 First, whilst the main motivation behind the growth of
JHA (OJE L63/1, 6.3.2002) as amended by Council Decision of 18 June 2003 No 2003/659/JHA
(OJE L245/44, 29.9.2003). Its mission is to enhance the development of Europe-wide cooperation
in criminal justice cases, especially in serious cross-border and organized crime. To this end, it is
designed to improve the coordination of investigations and prosecutions and support national
investigations. Europol was set up in 1992 and is designed to assist Member States to cooperate
more closely and effectively in preventing and combating organized international crime, including
drug trafficking, immigration networks, and terrorism. Europol offers a supporting but important
service, inter alia, by facilitating the exchange of information, providing expertise and technical
support for investigations and operations, and maintaining a computerized system to allow the
input, access, and analysis of relevant data. Finally, CEPOL, the European Police College brings
together senior police officers across Europe by organizing seminars and conferences. See Council
Decision 2005/681/JHA of 20 September 2005.
74 See the Europa agencies website <http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/history/
index_en.htm>.
75 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition law laid down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1.
76 See Geradin and Petit, op cit, at 9–10.
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Community agencies has been the need for specialization and expertise, the
growth of national agencies has been dictated by the need to provide for inde-
pendence. The objective of dismantling State monopolies in key sectors of the
economy could only be achieved if regulatory tasks could be removed from
politicians and be assigned to independent regulators, hence the development of
national public agencies. A second difference flows from the first. Whilst
Community agencies are typically assigned well circumscribed tasks and have
limited executive powers, national authorities enjoy considerable discretion in
the regulatory field.
The number of Community agencies remains low in comparison to that in
the United States where there are about 87 major federal regulatory agencies.77
Still, this comparison is unfair. The European Community is not a federal State
and has had a much shorter life than the US. The proliferation of Community
agencies illustrates the growth of technocracy. As already stated, the main reason
for their development can be found in the quest for expertise and specialization.
Some issues are so complex, technical, or specialized that sensible decisions on
them can only be taken by, or at least with the input of, experts.78 The need for
such expertise has become all the more important given that the Community has
moved beyond negative integration, ie dismantling obstacles to trade, and into
the field of positive integration, in fields as varied as consumer protection,
environment, and health. The more the Community moves into the field of risk
regulation, namely ‘the assessment and management of risks that may result
from natural events or human activities’,79 the greater the need for specialist
input. From this perspective, the proliferation of Community agencies can be
seen as the natural progress of Community governance and as mirroring the
growth of the administrative State in national polities. It is also associated with a
shift of emphasis from legislation to regulation and implementation in the field
of the internal market. As Dehousse has noted, following the completion of the
internal market project, there has been a notable decline in the number of leg-
islative measures adopted by the Community but an increase in administrative
rulemaking, ie regulatory measures of general application which take the form of
regulations or directives.80 This multi-tier model of Community governance has
been formalized in the field of financial services following the implementation of
the Lamfalussy process.81 So far, the process has been considered to be a success
and it has been decided to extend its application beyond the field of securities
77 Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, and Spitzer, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, at 147.
78 See Dehousse, op cit, at 1–2.
79 See R Dehousse, ‘Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance’, p 1,
Jean Monnet Paper, available at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020201.html>.
and S Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle. Towards Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard University
Press, 1993). 80 See for the data, Dehousse, op cit.
81 See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of the European Securities
Markets, 15 February 2001 (Lamfalussy Report), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf>.
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markets in the neighbouring areas of insurance and banking.82 In formal terms,
the distinction between legislation and administrative rule-making in the
Community is more difficult to draw than at national level since the range of
instruments provided for in Article 249 EC do not establish a clear hierarchy of
norms.83
The perceived advantages of agencies is that they provide the expertise
necessary to deal with highly complex assessments in technical and specialized
fields, lighten the workload of the Community institutions,84 reduce transaction
costs by streamlining the decision-making process, provide independence from
political interests, and even enhance citizens’ understanding of the mission and
tasks of the EU. By contrast, the main criticisms commonly associated with
administrative agencies are that they add a layer of bureaucracy, make the
decision-making process less transparent, encourage blame shifting, lead to
unaccountable government, and detract from democracy, becoming effectively a
‘headless fourth branch of government’85. Agencies create problems of
accountability and legitimacy. They are not elected by the citizens and may not
be subject to the strict requirements of independence that constrain the judi-
ciary. They also pose a threat to personal liberty as they often combine the
powers of legislating, taking individual decisions, managing and judging, powers
which under the principle of separation of powers should be entrusted to dif-
ferent organs of government.86 In the light of such criticisms, the role of the law
is to strike a balance facilitating efficient and optimum decision-making in the
public interest with respect to fundamental democratic principles. It is pertinent
to recall here the principles outlined in the Commission’s White Paper on Good
Governance, namely independence, accountability, transparency, and partici-
pation which provide essential yardsticks vis-a`-vis which the organization,
structure, and conduct of Community agencies must be assessed.87
82 Note that, following the de La Rochiere Report and as part of its financial institutions reform
package, the Commission proposes the transformation of the three existing Level 3 committees
under the Lamfalussy process to fully fledged independent agencies. See EC Commission Com-
munication for the Spring 2009 European Council, Driving European Recovery, Brussels, COM
(2009) 114 final, 4 March 2009, p 6. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/
president/pdf/press_20090304_en.pdf>.
83 Cf Articles 288–292 of the TFEU as provided by the Lisbon Treaty. For a discussion of the
hierarchy of norms under these provisions as provided by the aborted Constitutional Treaty, see P
Craig, ‘The Hierarchy of Norms’ in Tridimas and Nebbia (eds), European Union Law for the
Twenty-First Century, Vol 1, 75 et seq.
84 This is expressly recognized, for example, in the preamble to Regulation 58/2003 on executive
agencies, op cit: see recital 4.
85 The expression was coined by President Franklin Roosevelt’s Committee on Administrative
Management, see Breyer et al, op cit, at 146.
86 For a more detailed analysis, see Breyer et al, op cit, 146–147.
87 For a recent critique, see A Renda, ‘Advancing the EU better regulation agenda: selected
challenges for Europe’, Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2008, available at SSRN,
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291030>.
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Finally, it should be noted that the establishment of agencies is but one form
of delegation recognized in the Community legal order. The other forms of
delegation will be examined in due course insofar as relevant to our inquiry.88
B. The Agencies Landscape: Typology and Common Features
The aims and tasks of the various Community agencies are defined by their
respective constitutive instruments. They are diverse and vary in nature, subject-
matter, and scope so that a general typology of agencies is not easy to undertake.
In general, it is stated that the general aims of Community agencies, which
transcend their specific objectives, are the following:89
1) they introduce a degree of decentralisation and dispersal to the Community’s
activities;
2) they give a higher profile to the tasks that are assigned to them by identifying
them with the agencies themselves;
3) some answer the need to develop scientific or technical know-how in certain
well-defined fields;
4) others have the role to integrate different interest groups and thus to facilitate
the dialogue at a European (between the social partners, for example) or
international level.
As will be explained below, an important limitation on agency powers under the
Meroni case law is that Community agencies cannot enjoy extensive discre-
tionary powers. Subject to this caveat, one may distinguish the following types of
agencies in accordance with the functions allocated to them: regulatory agencies,
quasi-regulatory agencies, decision-making agencies, executive agencies, and
agencies that have principally a role of cooperation and coordination.90
The term regulatory agency is here used to signify a body that has power to
promulgate rules of general application. The growth of such agencies in Com-
munity law has been prevented as a result of the Meroni principle.91 A quasi-
regulatory agency is one which has ‘strong recommendatory power’.92 The
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is perhaps the most striking example
of such an agency in the Community. It drafts detailed rules which are passed by
the Commission to implement the basic regulation. It is also empowered to
publish codes which are treated as binding by the industry.93 The European
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),
and the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) also belong to the category of
88 See below.
89 This description is taken from the official europa website: see <http://europa.eu/agencies/
community_agencies/history/index_en.htm>
90 This classification follows the typology suggested by Craig, op cit, at 154 et seq.
91 See below. 92 Craig, op cit, 155. 93 Craig, op cit.
Community Agencies, Competition Law and ECSB Initiatives 235
quasi-regulatory agencies. A decision-making agency is one which has the power
to take individual decisions applying the law which are binding on third parties.
A prime example of such an agency is the Trademarks Office (OHIM). EASA
and EFSA also belong to this category as they combine quasi-regulatory func-
tions with decision-making ones. In Community law, the term executive agency
refers formally only to one type of agency namely those established under
Council Regulation 58/2003.94 These agencies are entrusted with specific tasks
related to the management of Community programmes and are established for a
fixed period. There are currently six such agencies.95 Executive agencies are
discussed further below in relation to T2S.96 Finally, some agencies have only a
coordinating and supporting role, under which they facilitate the operational
cooperation between, or provide services to, national authorities. This applies
for example to FRONTEX, Eurojust, and Europol.
The above typology, however, is unable to capture the true extent of powers and
responsibilities that agencies may possess. For one thing, an agency may have been
assigned more than one of the roles outlined above; for another, the use of terms
such as ‘regulatory’ or ‘executive’ may give rise to more questions than they answer.
Even agencies which bear only a coordinating or supporting role may retain dis-
cretion in setting their priorities. Also, insofar as the role of an agency is to carry out
an evaluation or a risk assessment, its expertise by necessity puts it in a preferential
position to influence the decision-making process. This is the case, for example,
with EFSA, EASA, and EMEA. It is also the case with the Border Agency,
FRONTEX, which on the basis of its constitutive measure appears to have fewer
powers. The key tasks of FRONTEX include identifying key threats to border
security, pointing out the need for joint operations, and providing Member States’
border guard services with early warnings. The statutory setup of an agency may
not, in some cases, give an accurate picture of its power and contribution to
decision-making. Political actors may have different understandings and expecta-
tions as to the mission of an agency and seek to influence its direction.97 A lot may
thus depend on the political dynamic generated by the institutional setup.
Despite the diversity of their objectives and tasks, Community agencies are
characterized by certain common organizational features. These have been
identified to be the following.98 As regards their management structures,
94 Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be
entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes [2003] OJ L11/1.
95 These are the following: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA);
European Research Council Executive Agency (ERC); Executive Agency for Competitiveness
and Innovation (EACI); Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (EAHC); Research Execu-
tive Agency (REA); Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-T EA). The
seat of such agencies must be that of the Commission, namely Brussels or Luxembourg. See
further <http://europa.eu/agencies/executive_agencies/index_en.htm>. 96 See below.
97 See in this respect the analysis of FRONTEX by the House of Lords EU Committee:
FRONTEX: the EU external borders agency (9th Report of Session 2007–08, HL Paper 60).
98 See <http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/function/index_en.htm>.
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agencies typically have an administrative or management board, an executive
director, and one or more technical or scientific committees. The membership of
the administrative or management board is laid down by the regulation estab-
lishing the agency. Agency boards invariably include representatives from the
Member States and one or several Commission representatives, and may also
include members appointed by the European Parliament or representatives of
the social partners. In the case of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the
European Union, the board also includes representatives of the users, namely
other agencies. With the current European Community including 27 countries,
the size of each board varies from 16 to 78 members (quadripartite Agencies).
Non-member countries may also take part in certain cases, but they are not
entitled to vote.
The executive director acts as the agency’s legal representative. The dis-
tribution of powers between the administrative or management board and the
executive director is laid down by the constitutive regulation and may be spelled
out in its rules of procedure. The technical or scientific committee(s) are made
up of experts specializing in the relevant field. They may also assist the board (in
the case of budgetary committees) and the executive director by drafting opi-
nions on questions put to them or by acting as information relays, as is for
example the case with the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products,
managed by the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products or
the advisory college of the European Training Foundation. In the majority of
cases an agency’s internal audit is carried out either by the Commission’s
Financial Controller or, if so stipulated in the rules of procedure, by an auditor
appointed by the agency. In either event, however, the agencies are subject to the
external control of the Court of Auditors.
Finally, most of the agencies are financed from a Community subsidy set
aside for the purpose in the EU general budget. Some agencies, however, are
partially or entirely self-financed. This is the case with the European Agency for
the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, the Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Market, the Community Plant Variety Office, and the European
Aviation Safety Agency, all of which are able to charge fees. It is also the case
with the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, which
receives financial contributions from its clients, in particular, the other Com-
munity agencies which use its services.
C. Legal Basis
The EC Treaty does not provide for an express legal basis for the setting up of
agencies. Since, under the judgment in Meroni, the institutions may create
independent bodies where that is necessary for the performance of their tasks,
agencies can be established under the specific Treaty provisions which authorize
the institutions to pursue the task in question. In practice, most agencies have
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been established under Article 308. This has been the case, notably, with
executive agencies under Regulation 58/2003. This is also the case with the
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA),99 and the Eur-
opean Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).100 The use of Article 308
for the establishment of agencies, especially FRA, shows that that provision has
been invoked with creativity and, in some respects, pushed to its limits. It will be
recalled that the European Union is not a human rights organization and that in
Opinion 2/94 the Court refused to sanction the use of Article 308 to facilitate
the accession of the Community to the ECHR.101
In recent years, there has been a tendency to rely on specific Treaty provisions
for the founding of agencies. Thus, EASA was based on Article 80(2) EC
(transport). Similarly, EFSA was founded on the joint legal basis of Articles 37,
95, 133, and 152(4)(b) EC,102 whilst the European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), in view of its
subject matter, was based on Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC pertaining to freedom,
security, and justice.103
In UK v Council and Parliament (ENISA case),104 the ECJ upheld the use of
Article 95 EC as the legal basis for the establishment of the European Network
and Information Security Agency (ENISA). The mission of ENISA is to support
the Member States, the institutions, and the business community in preventing
and resolving network and information security problems. To this end, ENISA
can advise and assist the Commission and the Member States on information
security, collect and analyse data on security incidents in Europe, promote risk
assessment exchange of best practices, and track the development of standards
for products and services. The UK government was alone in voting against the
adoption of Regulation 460/2004 which established the Agency. Before the
Court, it argued that Article 95 could be used solely for the adoption of har-
monization instruments, namely to achieve a result which could be attained by
the simultaneous enactment of identical legislation in each Member State but
not to establish a new entity existing alongside national legislation. The ECJ
however rejected a narrow interpretation of Article 95. It held that that provision
may be used as the legal basis for the setting up of a separate body provided that
the tasks conferred on it are closely linked to the subject-matter and the
99 See Council Regulation 1654/2003 amending Regulation 2062/94 establishing a European
Agency for Safety and Health at Work [2003] OJ L245/38.
100 See Council Regulation 168/2007 [2007] OJ L53/2.
101 Opinion 2/94 on the Accession of the EC to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759. Note however
that that ruling appears to be something of aberration in the light of subsequent case law. Most
recently, the ECJ endorsed a particularly inventive interpretation of Article 308 to found Com-
munity competence to impose economic sanctions against individuals: see Joined Cases C-402/05
P & C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Counciland Commission, Judg-
ment of 3 September 2008. 102 See Regulation (EC) 178/2002, [2002] OJ L31/1.
103 See Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, [2004] OJ L349/1.
104 Case C-217/04 UK v Council and Parliament (ENISA case), Judgment of 2 May 2006.
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objectives of harmonization legislation.105 This would be the case where the
body in question ‘provides services to national authorities and/or operators
which affect the homogenous implementation of harmonizing instruments and
which are likely to facilitate their application’.106
In upholding the use of Article 95, the ECJ pointed out that ENISA was part
of a normative context circumscribed by Community directives on electronic
communications, and its establishment was an appropriate means of preventing
the emergence of disparities likely to create obstacles to the smooth functioning
of the internal market. The agency was charged with collecting information,
enhancing cooperation among the actors involved, and providing independent
technical advice. It was thus designed to contribute to the harmonized trans-
position and application of the technical requirements laid down in the direc-
tives in the laws of the Member States.107
The importance of the ECJ’s ruling in the ENISA case lies in the fact that it
extends the remit of Article 95 beyond harmonization legislation strictly
understood, and also recognizes that independent agencies may have a useful
role to play in the achievement of core Community objectives. The ECJ pro-
vides in effect the green light for a multi-stage model of internal market
governance.
Notably, Kokott AG took a much more nuanced approach and came to the
conclusion that ENISA could not be established on the basis of Article 95. She
agreed that the use of Article 95 was not confined to measures which themselves
approximate the laws of the Member States and included measures which effect
approximation indirectly, for example by providing for procedures that bring
about approximation. He came however to the conclusion that the ENISA
Regulation could not be considered such an intermediate step. He agreed that
ENISA’s advisory function could support the legislative activity of the Com-
munity institutions and encourage approximation. However, its contribution to
the harmonization process remained potential and unpredictable. The questions
whether and in what form ENISA would contribute to the approximation of
laws depended on all sorts of factors including the cooperation of institutions,
bodies of the Member States, and representatives of the industry. Even where
ENISA contributed to the approximation of laws, the corresponding measures
would not necessarily be based on Article 95(1) EC. ENISA’s establishment was
therefore not so much an intermediate step on the way to the approximation of
laws as ‘a step into the uncertain’.
105 Para 44. 106 Para 45.
107 The ECJ also took into account that it was a temporary agency. Under Regulation 460/2004,
ENISA was established for a period of five years and the Commission was required to assess its
impact in the light of its objectives and its working practices. It thus followed that, before making a
decision on the fate of the Agency, the Community considered that it was appropriate to carry out
an evaluation of its effectiveness and the contribution to the implementation of Community
Directives on electronic communication services.
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The Advocate General’s view appears unduly narrow. The scope of Com-
munity powers under Article 95 should be determined by reference to the
substantive content of the measures adopted and not by the instrumentalities of
approximation. The power to harmonize includes the power to experiment with
the instrumentalities of harmonization. ENISA does not have any decision-
making powers but rather fulfils a coordinating and advisory function. As such,
it can legitimately be viewed as an intermediate step in the process of harmo-
nization and the fact that its contribution to that process depends on other
actors is simply a reflection of its limited powers. The Opinion of the Advocate
General in fact forecloses institutional experimentation of which we need more
rather than less. By requiring certainty of result, it leaves in fact little room for
innovation and hinders the quest for optimum structures of government.
The legal basis of a Community agency may give rise to political tensions
where the agency operates in an area covered by opt-outs. This is aptly illustrated
by UK v Council (FRONTEX case).108 The case concerned Regulation 2007/
2004 establishing the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX).109
The main tasks of the Agency are inter alia to coordinate operational coopera-
tion between Member States in the field of management of external borders,
assist them in training of national border guards, including the establishment of
common standards, and provide them with the necessary support in organizing
joint return operations. The Agency is also to evaluate, approve, and coordinate
proposals for joint operations and pilot projects made by Member States, and
may itself launch such initiatives in cooperation with Member States. Further-
more, it is to set up and keep centralized records of technical equipment for
control and surveillance of external borders belonging to Member States.
The Regulation was adopted on the basis of Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC. As a
measure, the Regulation was a development of the provisions of the Schengen
acquis within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol and, as such,
it was adopted without the participation of the UK. The UK government wished
to participate in the adoption of the Regulation and notified the Council to this
effect on the basis of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol. Having been refused
participation, it sought the annulment of the Regulation. Dismissing the action,
the ECJ held that, under Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol, the United King-
dom and Ireland cannot be allowed to take part in the adoption of a measure
under Article 5(1) of the Protocol without first having been authorized by the
Council to accept the area of the acquis on which that measure is based. The ECJ
held that the interpretation proposed by the United Kingdom would have the
consequence of depriving Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol of all effectiveness,
in that the United Kingdom and Ireland could take part in all proposals and
108 Case C–77/05 UK v Council, Judgment of 18 December 2007.
109 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, [2004] OJ L349/1.
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initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis, under Article 5(1), even though
they had not accepted the relevant provisions of that acquis or had not been
authorized to take part in them under Article 4. The Court also dismissed the
United Kingdom’s argument that a distinction should be drawn between
‘Schengen-integral’ measures and merely ‘Schengen-related’ measures. Such
distinction had no basis either in the EU and EC Treaties or in secondary
Community law.110
The ECJ further held that the Regulation had been adopted on the correct
legal basis. The Regulation was intended to improve checks on persons at the
external borders of the Member States and, as such, it was a measure designed to
build upon the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the
Schengen Protocol. It therefore fell within the Schengen Protocol and could not
be adopted merely as a Title IV measure.
D. Limits on the Power to Delegate
As Craig observes111 the setting up of agencies is subject to both legal and
political limits. We will examine those in turn and then focus on the question
whether the same limitations may be said to apply to the ECB.
(i) Legal Limitations
The legal limitations on the power to delegate derive from the judgment in
Meroni112 which was decided under the ECSC Treaty. The High Authority had
set up two private law entities with separate legal personality and assigned to
them the responsibility of administering the financial arrangements for the fer-
rous scrap scheme, which had been introduced with a view to stabilizing
Community prices. The ECJ found that the delegation of powers was unlawful.
In its judgment, the Court set out a number of constraints on the authority of
the Community institutions to delegate their powers which have been reiterated
in subsequent case law. These constraints apply equally to the ECB even though
it may not, strictly speaking, be classified as a Community institution. There
seems to be no reason why the delegation of powers by the ECB should be
examined within a framework other than that established by Meroni. These
limitations will now be examined in turn.
1. The delegation of powers to an agency must be necessary for the performance of
tasks assigned to the delegating institution by the Treaty.113 This condition
flows from the principle of conferred competences. Since, under Article 7(1)
EC, the Community institutions may only act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon them by the Treaty, an institution may not establish an
agency unless this is in furtherance of its constitutionally assigned tasks. This
110 See para 73. 111 Craig, at 160.
112 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957-58] ECR 133. 113 Meroni, op cit, 151.
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condition, however, does not appear particularly onerous. In fact, Meroni
does not require an express legal basis as a prerequisite of allowing an insti-
tution to delegate its powers. A general power to legislate appears, in prin-
ciple, to encompass the authority to delegate powers, subject to the
conditions of lawful delegation being fulfilled. In fact, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) and Le´ger AG have taken the view that, under Community
law, delegation is lawful unless expressly prohibited,114 although such dicta
have been made in the context of staff cases and may not necessarily reflect
the general posture of the case law. Implied restrictions on the power to
delegate may also exist and the extent of the power to delegate will depend on
the area in question and the nature of the tasks assigned.
2. The delegating authority cannot confer on the agency powers different from those
which it itself possesses.115 This condition serves to avoid abuse since, in its
absence, the delegating authority would be able to extend its powers or avoid
legal constraints simply by conferring its powers to a delegate.
3. The exercise of the powers conferred on the agency must be subject to the same
conditions as those to which it would be subject if the delegating authority was
exercising them directly.116 The rationale of this condition is the same as that
of the previous one. It applies in particular in relation to process rights and
requirements such as the requirement to give reasons, publish administrative
acts, respect the rights of the defence, etc. One of the main concerns of the
Court in Meroni which led it to annul the contested decision was that the
exercise of the powers conferred on the private agencies was not subject to
the conditions to which it would have been subject, if the High Authority
had exercised them directly.117 This condition has particular importance not
only as a prerequisite of the validity of delegation but also as a rule of
interpretation. It may lead to the imposition of implied limits on the powers
of the authority to which a delegation has been made. In an administrative
system which recognizes that delegation can validly be made, one would be
prepared to accept, wherever possible, that limitations which would constrain
the delegating authority are also applicable by implication to the authority
receiving the delegation even in the absence of express provision to that
effect. This is in accordance with the general rule of construction that,
wherever possible, a provision should be interpreted so as to comply with a
higher-ranking rule of law.
4. The delegation of powers cannot be presumed but must be expressly provided.118
Thus, to the extent that the delegating institution can delegate its powers, it
114 See Case T-333/99 X v ECB [2001] ECR II-3021, para 102. Le´ger, op cit, para 29.
115 Meroni, op cit, 150 and Le´ger, op cit, para 31.
116 Meroni, op cit, 149–150; and Le´ger, op cit, para 31. 117 Meroni, ibid.
118 Meroni, op cit, 150; and Case C-301/02 Tralli ECB, Judgment of 26 May 2005 per Le´ger
AG at para 31 of the Opinion.
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must take an express decision to that effect and implied delegation is not
valid. This was recently reiterated in FMC Chemical SPRL v European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA),119 where in rejecting the argument that the Com-
mission had delegated its powers to adopt binding decisions to EFSA, the
CFI stated that powers cannot be presumed to have been delegated and that,
even when empowered to delegate its powers, the delegating authority must
take an express decision to that effect.
5. The powers delegated may only involve clearly defined executive powers, the use of
which must be entirely subject to the supervision of the delegating institution.120
By contrast, discretionary powers involving a wide margin of discretion and
involving a real transfer of responsibility cannot be delegated. This is by far
the most important limitation set by Meroni and will be examined in detail in
the next section.
(ii) Discretionary Powers
In Meroni, the ECJ drew a distinction between, on the one hand, delegation
of clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can be subject to
strict review on the basis of objective criteria determined by the delegating
authority and, on the other hand, delegation of discretionary powers
implying a wide margin of appreciation which may make possible the
execution of economic policy. Whilst the former is permitted under the
Treaty, the latter is not. The reason for this restrictive approach is to ensure
observance of the principle of institutional balance. Under the Treaty, each
institution must act within the limits of its powers. If it were possible for an
institution to delegate its discretionary powers, that would render the Treaty
guarantees ineffective, since it would replace the choices of the delegator by
the choices of the delegate and ‘bring about an actual transfer of
responsibility’.121
Since, under Meroni, an institution may not delegate discretionary powers
entailing a wide margin of discretion, it follows that institutions may not dele-
gate their core functions. The case law however provides little guidance as to the
distinction between clearly defined executive powers and powers which entail
the exercise of wide discretion. In Tralli,122 Leger AG appeared to suggest that
this distinction can learn by analogy from the distinction drawn in the context of
Articles 202 and 211 EC between essential rules which the Council cannot
delegate to the Commission and implementing rules which can be so delegated.
This analogy however is not without problems.
119 Case T-311/06 FMC Chemical SPRL v European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Judgment of
17 June 2008, para 66. 120 Meroni, op cit.
121 Meroni, op cit, 152. 122 op cit.
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Article 202 provides that, in adopting legislation, the Council may confer
on the Commission implementing powers in respect of the rules which it lays
down. This delegation is subject to certain requirements and the Council may
also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise the implementing powers
directly itself. On the basis of this provision, the Court has laid down a dis-
tinction between rules which are essential to the subject-matter envisaged and
which cannot be delegated by the Council and rules which, being merely of an
implementing nature, can be delegated to the Commission.123 In general, the
Court has endorsed a broad concept of delegation both as regards the specificity
of the Council’s mandate and as regards the scope of delegation. It has under-
stood narrowly the powers which are essential and cannot be delegated by the
Council, thus empowering the Commission to exercise considerable discretion
in adopting implementing measures. In certain fields, such as the common
agricultural policy, it has held that the concept of ‘implementation’ must be
given a wide interpretation, having regard to the scheme of the Treaty and
practical considerations.124 Whilst essential rules include provisions which are
intended to give concrete shape to the fundamental guidelines of Community
policy, the same cannot be said about rules introducing penalties which can
validly be adopted by the Commission.125 Furthermore, once the Council has
laid down in its basic regulation the essential rules governing the matter in
question, it may delegate to the Commission general implementing power
without having to specify the essential components of the delegated power; for
that purpose, a provision drafted in general terms provides a sufficient basis for
the authority to act. Nor can secondary legislation require the Council to be
more specific. General implementing powers within the confines of Article 202
may be delegated to the Commission.126
The power of delegation under the Meroni principle appears narrower than
the Commission’s powers of implementation under Article 202. In any event,
the two types of delegation may be said to differ from each other in a number of
respects. First, Article 202 refers to the delegation of specific powers concretizing
legislation and it entails par excellence the transfer of regulatory powers. Meroni
refers to the establishment of a new agency and appears to exclude transfer of
rule-making power. Secondly, in the context of implementing powers exercised
by the Commission, the interests of the Council as the delegating authority are
safeguarded by the comitology procedures. Thirdly, the Commission’s powers
of implementation are specifically provided for in the Treaty whilst an
123 See, inter alia, Case 25/70 Ko¨ster [1970] ECR 1161, para 6, and Case C-240/90 Germany v
Commission [1992] ECR I-5383, paras 36 and 37.
124 See, eg Case 23/75 Rey Soda [1975] ECR 1279 and Joined Cases 279/84, 280/84, 285/84,
and 286/84 Rau and Others v Commission [1987] ECR 1069, para 14; Joined Cases T-64/01 and
T-65/01 Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie and Internationale Fruchtimport Weichert v Council and
Commission [2004] ECR II-0000, para 118.
125 Germany v Commission, op cit, para 37. 126 op cit, paras 41–42.
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institution’s power to establish agencies is self-generating and thus more limited.
Fourthly, the broad understanding of implementing powers in the context of
Article 202 promotes the federalization of Community government by
expanding the powers of the Commission. The same does not apply in relation
to granting broad discretionary powers to Community agencies.
In short, a broad understanding of delegation of powers from the Council to
the Commission is encouraged by an instrumental rationale of integration and,
in any event, there is in place a system of checks and balances which serve to
keep the Commission under control and which the Council can utilize against
any attempt to have its authority usurped. By contrast, neither of these attributes
is necessarily present where it comes to delegation of powers to new Community
agencies.
This is not to say that Meroni should necessarily be interpreted restrictively.
As already discussed, there are powerful arguments in favour of allowing agen-
cies greater scope of manoeuvering and Leger AG’s Opinion may reflect this
approach. Meroni should not be treated as an unmovable signpost. The case
itself related to a situation where the High Authority had delegated a task falling
within its core activities in the field of economic policy. As the Court observed,
the ECSC Treaty provided a number of objectives which were generally defined
and, to some extent, irreconcilable and thus could not all be pursued at the same
time. It was for the institutions to give priority to one or other of them. Dele-
gation of such a fundamental balancing exercise, especially in a novel interna-
tional organization, appeared to amount to an abrogation of responsibilities.127
For a case decided before the primacy and direct effect of Community law were
established, Meroni has shown an unusual degree of endurance. The truth is,
however, that, although reiterated several times, the ruling has not been tested.
Post-Meroni the ECJ has not in fact articulated any standards on the basis of
which it can be ascertained whether a given delegation of Community powers
may avoid the condemnation of incompatibility with the Treaty. It appears,
however, that the ECJ has relaxed the principle in relation to delegation of
powers pertaining to the internal organization and management of an institu-
tion.128 Also, a condition that must be fulfilled in order for delegation to be
lawful is that the agency must be subject to an effective system of supervision
and control by the delegating institution.129 In short, on the one hand, dele-
gation must not be too restrictive: the Constitution cannot be interpreted ‘to
127 It is difficult to see how Meroni could have been decided differently. The Court was faced
with a new and as yet untested international experiment: the establishment of a supranational
institution in the form of the High Authority to which Member States had delegated discretionary
powers the exercise of which entailed the making of value judgments in the field of economic policy
and compromising conflicting objectives. Allowing such a body to establish another body and
delegate to it some of its powers would be not only an abrogation of its responsibilities but a
threat to national sovereignty. 128 See eg Tralli, op cit.
129 See Meroni, op cit, 151.
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demand the impossible’.130 On the other hand, the delegation of powers must
not be ‘vagrant’ but ‘canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing’.131
In Meroni, the ECJ saw the prohibition of the delegation of discretionary
powers as being a fundamental guarantee not only of the rules which govern the
powers of the Community institutions vis-a`-vis each other but mainly as a
guarantee of the undertakings and private actors affected by the decisions made
by the institutions. Thus, at a broader level the underlying rationale of the
judgment is not only to guarantee the rule of law in inter-institutional rela-
tionship but to protect the citizen vis-a`-vis the administration.
(iii) Political Limitations
The enduring character of the Meroni doctrine is underpinned by political
considerations.132 The Commission, whilst acknowledging the benefits of
expertise and specialization that agencies carry, has traditionally favoured a
unitary conception of executive function. In the Commission’s model of
Community governance, delegation of powers to agencies must be seen in the
light of, and be limited by, the need to respect ‘the unity and integrity of
the executive function’.133 This function should continue to be vested to the
Commission for reasons of accountability and legitimacy. Under this model, the
delegation of true regulatory powers would not be compatible with the Com-
mission’s required responsibility vis-a`-vis the citizens, the Member States, and
the other Community institutions.
In this respect, the conservatism of the ECJ as illustrated in Meroni and the
executive’s reluctance to let go have been self-reinforcing, leading in effect to a
considerable degree of centralization in administrative decision-making and,
arguably, being to the benefit of integration. Such centralization has helped the
Commission to keep more control of the policy agenda than it would otherwise
command since the expansion and strengthening of independent committees
would be likely to change the balance of political powers giving more control to
Member States through representation in agency structures.134
Still, this model, based on the unity of a broadly conceived executive func-
tion, has come under stress for a number of reasons. First, the broader the
powers the Community acquires in the field of risk assessment, the more it
becomes necessary to rely, at least de facto, on specialist decision-making bodies.
Secondly, a number of factors have contributed to greater multi-polarity in
decision-making. These include the increase in the number of Member States,
the rise in the powers of the Parliament, the emergence of the ECB as a powerful
independent actor, and the more vocal representation of the industry in certain
130 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v Connally 337 F. Supp. 737 (DDD 1971).
131 Justice Cardozo in ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v US 295 US 495 (1935).
132 See, for more detail, the analysis of Craig, op cit, at 162–164.
133 Communication from the Commission, The Operating Framework for the European Reg-
ulatory Agencies, COM (2002) 718, at p 1. 134 Craig, op cit, at 164.
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areas, such as financial services. These developments have made for a more
dispersed decision-making model in which Community agencies may be seen as
a source of unity rather than a source of repatriating competences to the
Member States.
E. Judicial Review of Agency Action
The case law in this area seems to have evolved significantly. Whilst earlier
judgments refused to accept that applications for review of agency action were
admissible on the ground that the action was attributable to the Commission
and not the agency, more recently, there has been a growing judicial and poli-
tical recognition that agencies may adopt reviewable acts.
Where an agency is vested only with advisory powers, an action for annul-
ment should be directed against the Commission which takes the final decision
and not against the agency since its advice does not have binding force.135 Also,
where agency action is imputable to the Commission, for example, because in
practice any decision of the agency in question is subject to the Commission’s
prior agreement, the proper defendant would be the Commission. This point is
illustrated by DIR v Commission.136 The Commission had concluded agree-
ments with EFDO, a private association based in Germany, concerning the
financial implementation of the MEDIA programme for the promotion of the
European audiovisual industry. EFDO administered a fund granting pre-
ferential loans to film distributors. The criteria on the basis of which the loans
were granted were laid down in guidelines drawn up by EFDO and approved by
the Commission. The applicants were film distributors whose request for
funding had been rejected by EFDO on the instructions of the Commission.
The CFI held that, in accordance with Council Decision 90/685 which made
the Commission responsible for the implementation of the MEDIA pro-
gramme, and the Meroni principle, which prohibited the delegation of wide
discretionary powers, the agreement between the Commission and EFDO made
a funding decision subject ‘in practice’ to the prior agreement of the Commis-
sion’s representatives. Before each meeting of the EFDO selection committee,
the Commission’s services were informed by EFDO of all the applications
lodged and, after examining the applications, the Commission officials respon-
sible made their views known.137 In those circumstances, the decisions of the
agency were imputable to the Commission since it was responsible for their
content and could be called upon to defend them in court.138 DIR stands
135 Case T-133/003 Schering-Plough v Commission and EMEA, unpublished CFI order of 5
December 2007 challenging an act of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Pro-
ducts.
136 Joined Cases T-369/94 and T-85/95 DIR International Film and Others v Commission [1998]
II-357. 137 op cit, para 52.
138 op cit, para 53.
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therefore as authority that an agency does not exercise discretionary power if its
decisions are subject to the prior agreement of the Commission.
Actions against agencies have been rejected in other cases,139 and the general
posture of the case law is in keeping with the principle that acts adopted on the
basis of a delegation of powers ‘are ordinarily imputable to the delegating
institution’,140 with the result that the action against the act of the body to
which power has been delegated is admissible as being brought against the
delegating institution.141
139 In Case C–160/03 Spain v Eurojust [2005] ECR I–2077, the ECJ dismissed an action
brought by Spain against an act of Eurojust. The application was based on Article 230 EC and
challenged calls for applications for recruitment of Eurojust staff. The ECJ held that the contested
acts were not included in the list of acts the legality of which the Court may review under Article
230 EC. It also held that Article 41 TEU did not provide for the application of Article 230 EC to
third pillar provisions, the jurisdiction of the Court in such matters being defined in Article 35
TEU. It concluded however that the contested acts were not exempt from judicial review. Under
Council Decision 2002/197/JHA setting up Eurojust, its staff was to be subject to the Community
staff regulations and it followed that candidates for recruitment had access to the Community
courts under the conditions laid down in Article 91 of the Staff regulations. The judgment leads to
the odd result that individuals but not Member States may challenge a measure under Article 230
EC. The reasoning is pragmatic but by no means uncontroversial. If the jurisdiction of the ECJ on
third pillar matters is governed exclusively by Article 35 TEU, it is not clear how its jurisdiction
under Article 230 can be extended to third pillar issues through an act of an Agency set up under
the third pillar. In Case T–148/97 Keeling v OHIM [1998] ECR II–2217, the CFI rejected as
inadmissible an action based on Article 230 brought against a decision of the President of the
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market by a member of its Board of Appeal. The CFI
held that OHIM was not a Community institution nor was it mentioned as a potential defendant
in Article 230 EC. The CFI also observed that other remedies were potentially available against the
contested decision, including staff actions (Article 236 EC).
140 See, to this effect, Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council and Commission, Judgment of 12 July
2006, para 59; Joined Cases 7/56 and 3/57 to 7/57 Algera and Others v Common Assembly of the
ECSC [1957] ECR 39, at 58; Joined Cases 32/58 and 33/58 SNUPAT v High Authority [1959]
ECR 127, at 127.
141 In some cases, an action can be directed against both the delegating institution and the
institution to which power has been delegated. An example is provided by Council Regulation 881/
2002 imposing economic sanctions against persons associated with the Al-Qaeda network. The
Regulation provided that all funds and economic resources held by persons and entities listed in the
Annex must be frozen. Article 7(1) empowered the Commission to amend or supplement the
Annex on the basis of determinations made by the UN Securities Council or the UN Sanctions
Committee on the findings of which the Annex was originally based. The Commission adopted
Regulation 2049/2003 amending Council Regulation 881/2002 and added the applicant’s name in
the list. The applicant brought proceedings against the Council and the Commission and the CFI
held that it was admissible to challenge both regulations. The claim for annulment of Regulation
881/2002 could not be regarded as out of time given that it was not directed against Regulation
881/2002 in its original form, but rather against the version of that regulation as amended by
Regulation 2049/2003. The claim for annulment could be brought against the Commission since
it was the author of Regulation 2049/2003. The claim for annulment of Regulation 881/2002
could validly be directed against the Council as the author of that Regulation as amended by the
Commission. The CFI held that that solution was in keeping with the principle that acts adopted
on the basis of a delegation of powers are ordinarily imputable to the delegating institution, with
the result that the action against the act of the body to which power has been delegated is admis-
sible as being brought against the delegating institution.
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By contrast, where an agency itself takes a binding decision, such decision is
subject to annulment under Article 230 EC even if the regulation setting up the
agency does not expressly provide for the possibility of challenging its decisions.
In Sogelma v EAR,142 the CFI was concerned with review of decisions taken by
the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). The Agency was set up with
independent legal personality and, under Regulation 2667/2000, was respon-
sible for administering programmes for the reconstruction of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, including the preparation and evaluation of invitations to tender and
the awarding of contracts. Sogelma, who had submitted a tender following a
procurement notice published by EAR, sought to annul EAR’s subsequent
decision to cancel the tender. Regulation 2667/2000 granted the CFI jurisdic-
tion in disputes relating to compensation in the case of the EAR’s non-con-
tractual liability and in relation to EAR decisions relating to access to documents
but did not grant it jurisdiction to hear actions for annulment against other
decisions taken by the EAR. Referring to Les Verts143 the CFI held that:144
The general principle to be elicited from that judgment is that any act of a Community
body intended to produce legal effects vis-a`-vis third parties must be open to judicial
review. It is true that Les Verts, paragraph 24, refers only to Community institutions and
the EAR is not one of the institutions listed in Article 7 EC. None the less, the situation
of Community bodies endowed with the power to take measures intended to produce
legal effects vis-a`-vis third parties is identical to the situation which led to the Les Verts
judgment: it cannot be acceptable, in a community based on the rule of law, that such
acts escape judicial review.
The CFI pointed out that the cancellation of a tender procedure was an act
which adversely affected the applicant and brought about a distinct change in his
legal position, since he could no longer expect to be awarded the contract. EAR
had been delegated decisions which the Commission itself would have taken.
Such decisions could not cease to be acts open to challenge solely because the
Commission had delegated powers to the EAR. The opposite solution would
give rise to a legal vacuum.
The Court also rejected an argument based on the existence of alternative
remedies. EAR had argued that the rights of tenderers were protected by the
procedure laid down in the instructions to tenderers. They could have recourse
to procedures established by the Commission, whose acts are open to challenge
under Article 230 EC. The CFI however held that the instructions to tenderers
did not provide for the Commission to adopt, in the course of the procedure, a
decision which was open to judicial review. Further, the Commission had not
set up any specific procedure to deal with any complaints.
142 Case T-411/06 Sogelma—Societa´ generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v European Agency
for Reconstruction (EAR), Judgment of 8 October 2008.
143 Case 294/83 ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 144 Para 37.
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Sogelma v EAR is an important judgment because it recognizes an indepen-
dent course of review against agency action and, by implication, it confirms that
agencies do not necessarily act as the alter ego of the delegating institution and
may have decision-making powers of their own. It also confirms the limits of the
alternative remedies argument. An instrument setting up an agency may provide
for alternative remedies or a procedure to be followed by the aggrieved party
before recourse to the court can be made; such steps however must provide full
and effective remedy and must not detract from the right to judicial review as
specified in Article 230 of the Treaty.145
F. Latent Discretion
Whilst, in terms of formal reasoning, the judgments in DIR and Sogelma are
correct, they may not give an accurate picture of the extent of the powers
enjoyed by agencies. Where agency action is formally subject to Commission
approval, it may not be possible to determine in the abstract the actual degree of
control exercised by the Commission. In terms of judicial protection this may
not be a great problem. Insofar as an aggrieved party can have recourse against
the entity to which the action is imputable, the requirements of the right to a
remedy are complied with. Indeed, in the light of the judgment in Sogelma, there
appears to be no remedial gap. The rights of the persons concerned are the same
whether the action is attributable to the Commission or the agency.146 In terms
of governance, however, the recognition of latent or de facto discretion to
agencies is important.
In FMC,147 a manufacturer of plant protection products sought the annul-
ment of an opinion taken by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) by
which it recommended to the Commission that carbosuflan, a substance used in
the making of such products, should not be authorized. On the basis of EFSA’s
opinion, the Commission adopted a decision withdrawing authorization for
products containing that substance. The applicant argued that EFSA’s opinion
was a binding act which expressed the culmination of a special procedure. The
CFI however rejected that argument. It held that, under Article 8 of Regulation
451/2000, the procedure for the evaluation of active substances comprised three
successive stages: (i) the drawing-up of a draft assessment report by the rap-
porteur Member State; (ii) the adoption by EFSA of an opinion on whether the
145 Some regulations setting up agencies provide for the possibility of administrative proceedings
before the Commission against prejudicial acts of agencies. An action for annulment before the
ECJ may then lie only against the final decision taken by the Commission to reject the appeal: see
eg Regulation 58/2003 on executive agencies, Article 22.
146 The applicant, however, would be well advised to bring an action against both the Com-
mission and the agency in question. This would avoid the possibility of the action being rejected as
inadmissible on the ground that it was directed against an improper defendant and, subsequently,
the applicant having a new action against the correct defendant being rejected as inadmissible on
the ground that the time limit of Article 230(5) has expired. 147 op cit.
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active substance can be expected to meet the safety requirements; and (iii) the
preparation by the Commission of a finalized review report, which was sub-
mitted to the comitology committee together with a draft directive or decision.
Only the directive or the decision produced binding legal effects capable of
affecting the interests of the parties concerned. The CFI held that neither Article
5 of Directive 91/414, which described the conditions to be fulfilled in order for
an active substance to be included in the Directive, nor Article 8 of Regulation
451/2000 suggested that the Commission was obliged to comply with EFSA
opinions in substantive terms.
FMC stands as authority for the proposition that, where an agency is charged
with providing an opinion to the Commission from which the latter can depart,
the Commission has not delegated to the agency the power to take binding
decisions since only the Commission’s final decision has binding effects vis-a`-vis
third parties.148
The judgment is correct but it does not provide an accurate portrayal of the
extent of the powers that EFSA enjoys. Notably, under Article 8(8) of Regula-
tion 451/2000, where the Commission decides to withdraw authorization from
a substance, it must give reasons. Given, however, the technical expertise of
EFSA, if the Commission decides to withdraw authorization despite EFSA’s
advice, the requirement to give reasons imposes a high burden on the Com-
mission. Given the level of expertise required, the Commission may find it
impossible to discharge the requirement to give reasons unless it can somehow
recreate the technical assessment. This however may be impossible to do since
the Commission itself lacks the expertise.
EFSA’s crucial input in the decision-making process becomes clearer when
one looks at its role under Community legislation. It is designed to act as an
‘independent scientific point of reference in risk assessment’.149 Article 7 of
Regulation 1935/2004, which describes EFSA’s role, states that provisions liable
to affect public health must be adopted after consulting EFSA. Under Article 11
(2) of the Regulation the Commission must provide an explanation where it
does not follow the opinion of EFSA. It is clear that, to a substantial degree,
effective control over decision-making has been transferred from the
148 Notably, in FMC, in rejecting the action for annulment against EFSA, the CFI distinguished
the Vitamins case (see below). In its judgment in Vitamins, in response to criticisms made by the
applicant with regard to the powers of EFSA, the ECJ appeared to suggest that (para 88) such
criticisms could be advanced in support of an action for annulment of a final decision or an action
for damages against EFSA. In FMC, the applicant saw this statement as a judicial acknowledgment
of the possibility of bringing an action against a final decision of EFSA refusing an application for
modification of a positive list of vitamins under Directive 2002/46/EC. The CFI however
understood the Vitamins judgment differently. It held that the ECJ had merely mentioned the
possibility of an action for the annulment of a final decision refusing an application for mod-
ification of positive lists without specifying that that decision would actually be adopted by EFSA
and in no way confirmed that an action for annulment may be brought against a final decision of
EFSA. It is submitted that the CFI’s narrow understanding of the Vitamins dicta is correct.
149 See Regulation 1935/2004, Preamble, recital 15.
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Commission to EFSA. Save in the case of conclusive scientific evidence, the real
discretion lies in the hands of EFSA rather that the Commission since the latter
can hardly disagree unless it recreates fully the decision-making process which is
unable to do as it lacks expertise. This does not transform EFSA into a reg-
ulatory authority since its powers under the Regulation are well-circumscribed.
It serves to underline however that agencies, especially in the field of risk
assessment, enjoy considerable discretion. It is submitted that this is compatible
with Meroni and, indeed, necessary. It would make little sense to provide for the
establishment of agencies if they could enjoy no discretion whatsoever. The
concern of judicial intervention is to ensure that political accountability goes
hand in hand with sensible and expert decision-making.
G. The Lisbon Treaty
It will be noted that judicial review of agency action receives specific mention in
the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 263(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU,150 which is the successor to current Article 230 EC, states as follows:
Acts setting up bodies and agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions and
arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these
bodies or agencies intended to produce legal effects in relation to them.
This in fact reflects existing practice and does not appear to make a substantive
amendment to current Treaty arrangements. It was included as an umbrella
provision to cover the cases where means of redress are provided for by Union
measures. Currently, EC measures which set up agencies or bodies may provide
for one of the following.151 They may grant to the ECJ jurisdiction to hear
actions for judicial review against acts adopted by those agencies or bodies under
the terms of Article 230(4).152 They may provide that acts of such bodies are
referable to the Commission for verification of their legality, in which case the
Commission’s decision can be challenged under Article 230(4).153 Finally, they
may be silent as to the possible means of redress.154 Article 263(5) does not
restrict those options. It makes it clear, however, that acts of such agencies or
bodies which produce legal effects are amenable to judicial review in accordance
with the fundamental principle of judicial protection provided for in Article 47
of the Charter. Two points may be made in relation to Article 263(5). First, acts
150 This was originally Article III-270(5) of the aborted constitutional Treaty.
151 See the Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice which submitted
evidence to the Constitutional Convention, 25 March 2003 CONV 636/03, para 24 of the Report.
152 See eg Council Regulation 1035/97 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia, [1997] OJ L151/1.
153 See Council Regulation 2062/94 establishing a European Agency for Safety and Health at
Work, [1994] OJ L216/1.
154 See Regulation 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a
European Maritime Safety Agency, [2002] OJ L208/1.
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setting up agencies or bodies may specify the means of redress but, in any event,
they cannot make access to justice subject to stricter conditions than those
specified in Article 263(4) (currently Article 230(4)). Secondly, the provision
does not necessarily apply to agencies or bodies established by Union acts
adopted under the CFSP, since these have special characteristics.155
H. Other Forms of Delegation of Powers
It should be noted that the establishment of agencies is only one form of dele-
gation recognized in the Community legal order. The principal forms of
delegation may be said to be the following.
1. Delegation of power to amend primary legislation (passerelle provisions).
2. Delegation of regulatory powers by the Council to the Commission via the
comitology procedure.
3. Delegation of powers to Community agencies.
4. Delegation by a Community institution to its own internal decision-making
bodies.
The first type of delegation is beyond the scope of this inquiry and need not
detain us for long. Suffice it to say that, in some cases, provisions of the
founding treaties allow the Council to amend Treaty provisions without
recourse to the ordinary procedure for constitutional revision provided for in
Article 48 TEU. Such passerelle provisions are included on specific and mainly
technical matters in the TEU,156 the EC Treaty157 and, typically, in the Treaties
of accession for new Member States. Notably, heavy use of passerelle clauses is
made in the Treaty of Lisbon.158 Such transition from primary to secondary
Community law leads to an enhancement of Community decision-making
methods and a corresponding decline of inter-governmental ones.
The third and the fourth types of delegation can occur by the ECB as will be
discussed below.159 The second type of delegation, which is subject to the dis-
ciplines of comitology, was briefly examined above. In view of its affinity with
delegation of powers to agencies, it is pertinent to examine here the judgment of
the ECJ in the Vitamins case160 where the ECJ drew parallels with Meroni.
155 See also here the comments of the Circle, op cit, 10.
156 See Article 42 TEU (passerelle from the third pillar to Title IV of the EC Treaty).
157 See eg Article 107(5) (amendment by the Council of the ESCB Statute), Article 245 EC
(amendment of the ECJ Statute by Council decision).
158 See eg Article 48(7) TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (passerelle from unanimity to
qualified majority voting.
159 For the establishment of agencies by the ECB, see the following section.
160 Joined Cases C-154 and C-155/04 The Queen on the application of Alliance for Natural
Health v Secretary of State for Health, Judgment of 12 July 2005. For a further example, see BAT,
op cit, discussed below.
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Private parties challenged Directive 2002/46 which introduced a positive list
of food supplements.161 The Directive provides essentially that only vitamins
and supplements listed in its annexes may be used and, from 1 August 2005,
trade in substances not listed therein is prohibited. The Advocate General found
the Directive deficient in three respects:162 first, it made no mention of the
substantive criteria which the Commission must follow in deciding to permit
the inclusion of new substances in the positive lists. Second, it did not make
clear whether the Directive allows private parties to submit substances for eva-
luation with a view to having them included. Third, on the assumption that
private parties were able to do so, there was no clear procedure for that purpose
which provided minimum guarantees for protecting their interests. Geelhoed
AG viewed the first shortcoming as a particularly serious one. Given the
restrictive effects of the positive list on commercial freedom, he considered it
indispensable that the Directive must itself prescribe the substantive parameters
governing the Commission’s power to make additions. Although the Advocate
General structured his reasoning on the basis of the principle of proportionality,
he read it as incorporating elements of legal certainty, good administration, and
the right to judicial protection. The ECJ, by contrast, rescued the validity of the
Directive by employing the following technique: it shifted the obligation to
observe the above requirements to the Community administration, and read
implied administrative duties in the Directive. It unequivocally recognized the
importance of process rights. The introduction of a positive list must be
accompanied by a procedure designed to allow a substance to be added and that
procedure must respect the general principles of Community law, in particular,
the principle of sound administration and legal certainty. The Court laid down
the following substantive requirements:163
• The procedure must be accessible in the sense that it must be expressly
mentioned in a measure of general application which is binding on the
authorities concerned.
• It must be capable of being completed within a reasonable time.
• An application to have a substance included in the list may be refused only
on the basis of a full assessment of the risks posed to public health.
• That assessment must be made on the basis of the most reliable scientific
data available and the most recent results of international research.
• Finally, if the procedure results in a refusal, the refusal must be open to
challenge.
The ECJ pointed out that Article 4(5) in combination with Article 13(2) of the
Directive made applicable for the purposes of adding vitamins or minerals to
161 Directive 2002/46 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
food supplements, [2002] OJ L183/51. 162 Opinion of Geelhoed AG, paras 68–69.
163 op cit, para 73.
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the positive lists the comitology procedure provided for in Council Decision
1999/468.164 The Court viewed that procedure as satisfying the above require-
ments although it criticized the Directive as being less than perfect in terms of
transparency and completeness and charged the Commission with ensuring
transparency and prompt action.165
The Court also took the view that the Commission had power to modify the
positive lists only on the basis of objective criteria connected exclusively with
public health. This derived from statements in the preamble to the Directive,
which ‘ideally’ should have been included in the provisions of the Directive, in
combination with their concrete expression through the positive lists.166 Thus
the Court concluded that the legislature had done just enough to pass the
threshold of validity but only at the expense of shifting the standards of good
governance to the Community administration and leaving the door wide open
to a second round of litigation against concrete administrative decisions refusing
addition of substances.167
The judgment may be seen as an acknowledgment, and the natural consequence,
of the maturity of Community government. Ample discretion for the legislature to
roam in the field of public health and restrict economic freedom must be accom-
panied, as a quid pro quo, by high standards of administrative competence.168
The Vitamins case also confirms that, when the Community legislature
wishes to delegate its power to amend aspects of the legislative act at issue, it
must ensure that that power is clearly defined and that the exercise of the power
is subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria.169 This requirement
was derived from Meroni and applies equally to agencies.
The ECJ has taken a more liberal view in relation to delegation of powers
pertaining to the internal organization and management of the Community
institutions. This more liberal approach is justified for two reasons. First,
according to settled case law, the Community institutions and bodies have a
wide discretion as regards their internal organization on the basis of the
responsibilities entrusted to them.170 Secondly, within the internal organization
of Community bodies, the principle of institutional balance is of lesser impor-
tance. The ECJ has held, in fact, that the principle is intended to apply only to
relations between Community institutions and bodies.171
164 [1999] OJ L184/23. 165 Alliance for Natural Health, op cit, paras 81–82.
166 Ibid, para 92. 167 Ibid, para 88.
168 Note that the case was distinguished in FMC, op cit.
169 See Vitamins case, op cit, para 90.
170 See, inter alia, Case C–15/00 Commission v EIB [2003] ECR I–7281, para 67, and Pflugradt
v ECB, op cit, above, para 43.
171 See, inter alia, Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I–2041, paras 21 to 23. This
is not to say however that a more liberal approach to the delegation of powers within the Euro-
system, ie between the ECB and the NCBs, is necessarily justified. In this context, any possible
delegation may take place subject to full respect of the powers of the Governing Council and the
Executive Board.
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IV. Delegation of Powers and the ECB
A. Internal Organization
The Court has had the opportunity to examine the delegation of internal
organization powers in relation to the ECB in Tralli v ECB.172 It held that a
Community institution is entitled to lay down organizational measures dele-
gating powers to its own internal decision-making bodies, in particular as
regards the management of its own staff.173 In such a case, the conditions gov-
erning the valid delegation of powers are those specified in Meroni, namely, the
following.174 First, a delegating authority cannot confer upon the body in
question powers different from those which the authority has itself received.
Secondly, the exercise of the powers entrusted to the body to which the powers
are delegated must be subject to the same conditions as those to which it would
be subject if the delegating authority exercised them directly, particularly as
regards the requirements of reasoning and publication. Finally, even when
entitled to delegate its powers, the delegating authority must take an express
decision transferring them and the delegation can relate only to clearly defined
executive powers.
In Tralli, the Court held that the Governing Council of the ECB, which is
entrusted by the ESCB Statute with laying down the conditions of employment
of the ECB staff, had validly delegated the adoption of staff rules implementing
the conditions of employment to the executive board of the Bank. Delegation
was express. Also, the delegated powers in question which related to the pro-
bation of new employees remained within the limits of the executive powers
conferred on the Executive Board by Article 21.3 of the Rules of Procedure.
Tralli involved also a different type of delegation. The Rules of Procedure of
the Executive Board provided that the Board may authorize one of its members
to take under its responsibility clearly defined management or administrative
measures. The appellant, an employee who had been dismissed for misconduct
before the end of his extended probationary period, argued that the decision to
extend his probationary period belonged to the Executive Board and could not
be delegated to the Vice-President of the ECB. The ECJ disagreed, applying to
ECB the principles of the case law developed in relation to the collegiality of
Commission action. The Commission may, without undermining the principle
of collegiate responsibility which governs its functioning, authorize its members
to adopt certain decisions in its name. That system of delegation of authority
does not have the effect of divesting the Commission of its decision–making
power since the decisions taken by the Member are adopted in the name of the
172 Case C-301/02 P Tralli v ECB, Judgment of 26 May 2005.
173 Tralli, op cit, para 42; See also Case C–409/02 P Pflugradt v ECB [2004] ECR I–0000,
para 34. 174 Tralli, op cit, para 43.
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Commission, which is fully responsible for them. The Court has based that
assessment, inter alia, on the need to ensure that the decision-making body is
able to function, which corresponds to a principle inherent in all institutional
systems.175 The same principle was applied in Tralli. The delegation of powers
within the ECB did not have the effect of divesting the Executive Board of its
rule-making power. Decisions to extend the probationary period were adopted
by the Vice-President in the name of the Executive Board, which remained fully
responsible for them. The delegation of authority at issue was limited to indi-
vidual decisions and did not in any way cover matters of a general nature.
B. Agencies and the ECB: Possible Legal Basis of T2S
The determination of the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of T2S is
of obvious importance. According to the principle of conferred powers, a
Community measure cannot be adopted unless the authoring institution has
power to promulgate it. The legal basis of a measure cannot depend on the
subjective intentions or preferences of the institution which authors it but must
rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. It must be
determined, in particular, by reference to the aim and the content of the mea-
sure.176 These principles which have been developed in the case law in relation
to acts adopted by the political organs of the Community apply equally to the
ECB and the ESCB.
The identification of the appropriate legal basis is also important because it
determines the possible form and structure that the T2S facility may take. There
are conceivably three possibilities within the current structure of the Treaties. A
legal basis may be found within Title VII of the Treaty or the ESCB Statute
which would enable the ECB to act as the sole author of the measure. Alter-
natively, a measure may be adopted with the assistance of another Community
institution on the basis of a Treaty provision outside Title VII. This might
require empowerment by the Council, eg on the basis of Article 308 of the
Treaty, which may then be followed by more specific, implementing action by
the ECB. Another option might be the establishment of an executive agency on
the basis of Regulation 58/2003. The possibility of adopting a measure jointly
by the ECB and another institution appears to be foreclosed by the Treaty as
none of its provisions empowers the ECB to act in that way.
This section discusses the issue of legal basis. The possible legal forms that the
T2S facility may take are discussed in the next section.
175 See eg Case 5/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 2585, paras 35 to 37.
176 See eg Case C–300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I–2867 (‘Titanium dioxide’), para
10; Case C–176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I–7879, para 45; and Case C–440/05
Commission v Council [2007] ECR I–0000, para 61.
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The most obvious legal basis for the adoption of a measure introducing T2S
appears to be Article 22 of the ESCB Statute which, under the heading ‘clearing
and payment systems’, states as follows:
The ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make
regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the
Community and with other countries.
This provision grants the ECB power to carry out one of the tasks assigned to it
under Article 105(2) of the Treaty, namely to promote the smooth operation of
payment systems.177 Article 22 appears to provide for two separate types of
power. First, it empowers the ECB and the national central banks to provide
facilities. Secondly, it bestows regulatory powers on the ECB. This second aspect
enables the ECB to assume a regulatory role in order to sustain the sound
operation of clearing systems and money transfer mechanisms and ensure
liquidity and avoid systemic risks.178 The two aspects, namely the provision of
facilities and the oversight role, can coexist and be exercised by the adoption of
the same measure but this need not be the case. They are separate but com-
plementary powers which appear to enable the ECB to act both in the sphere of
public and private law. At least the first type of power, ie the establishment of
facilities, is not an exclusive ECB competence.
Article 22 is sufficiently wide to enable the ECB to adopt the instruments
necessary for the introduction and running of T2S. Such a project comes within
the language of the Article. In fact, the text itself provides few limitations
although, in accordance with the principle of conferred powers, it should be
interpreted in the light of the objectives and tasks assigned to the ESCB and the
principle of proportionality. A literal interpretation suggests that Article 22
authorizes the ESCB to establish facilities relating to payment and clearing open
to the banking industry and other financial institutions. Such facilities may
relate to clearing and payment systems in money markets or securities markets,
and may involve setting the conditions for the use of such systems.179 The
intervention of the ESCB and the ECB in that sphere is subject to the condition
of efficiency, which is expressly laid down in Article 22, the condition of
soundness and stability, deriving from Articles 105(1) and (5), the requirement
to respect the principle of the open market with free competition, which also
derives from Article 105(1), and the requirement of proportionality, which
derives from Article 5(3) of the Treaty. Subject to those, the ECB may adopt
measures conferring rights or imposing obligations on economic agents.180
177 See Article 105(2), fourth indent, EC and Article 3(1), fourth indent of the ESCB Statute.
178 See R Smits, The European Central Bank (Kluwer, 1997) at 297–298.
179 op cit, at 298.
180 See Zilioli and Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, op cit, at 39 and 93 who,
overall, favour a broad interpretation of ECB and ESCB powers.
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Although this is not beyond doubt, Article 22 also appears to authorize the
ESCB to establish an agency for the purposes of running T2S. As a general rule, it
is submitted that the power of ECB to set up agencies should be subjected to the
same conditions as those laid down in Meroni in relation to the Commission.
Whatever the precise status of ECB, there appears to be no reason why its capacity
should be differentiated in this respect from that of the other Community insti-
tutions. In Tralli the CFI already applied to ECB the same methodology as that
applied to the other institutions in relation to internal delegation of powers. The
Meroni conditions in this respect are sufficiently strict to guard against the pos-
sibility of abuse. More specifically, Article 22 appears sufficiently broad to allow
for agency creation, provided that the conditions for its application discussed
above are fulfilled. Article 22 does not specify the addressees of ESCB action.181 It
is rather results-driven. It enables the ESCB and the ECB to offer a facility and
therefore to establish the mode for its administration, including an agency with a
separate legal personality, subject to the Meroni principles.
Finally, it will be noted that under Article 22, the ECB may act either by
means of direct regulation or by means of ‘indirect implementation’182 as it
proceeded in relation to the adoption of TARGET, ie through a guideline and
agreements with the national central banks. This system would also appear more
appropriate for the introduction of T2S.
Another possibility might be to establish an executive agency under Regula-
tion 58/2003.183 It will be recalled that, under Community law, the term
executive agency bears a specific meaning signifying agencies established by the
Commission under the aforementioned Regulation. This is an umbrella reg-
ulation which authorizes the Commission to set up agencies with independent
legal personality for the purpose of managing Community programmes. The
term ‘Community programme’ is defined widely to mean any activity or
initiative which the relevant basic instrument or budgetary authorization
181 Cf the reasoning of the Court in the ENISA case, discussed above. Although the ECJ’s
reasoning referred to Article 95 and cannot be transposed to the present situation, it may be
instructive. In fact, Article 95 is narrower than Article 22 ESCB because the former relates to
harmonization of national laws whilst the latter has no such limitation. In ENISA the ECJ took a
broad view of the instrumentalities of coordination. It stated that nothing in the wording of Article
95 EC implies that the addressees of the measures adopted by the Community legislature on the
basis of that provision can only be the individual Member States. The legislature may deem it
necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body responsible for contributing to
the implementation of a process of harmonization in situations where, in order to facilitate the
uniform implementation and application of acts based on that provision, the adoption of non-
binding supporting and framework measures seems appropriate (see para 44). It also stressed that
the tasks conferred on such a body must be closely linked to the subject-matter of the acts
approximating the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States. Such is
the case in particular where the Community body thus established ‘provides services to national
authorities and/or operators which affect the homogenous implementation of harmonising
instruments and which are likely to facilitate their application’ (emphasis added) (para 45).
182 See Zilioli and Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, op cit, at 127.
183 [2003] OJ L11/1.
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requires the Commission to implement for the benefit of one or more categories
of specific beneficiaries and which requires the commitment of expenditure.184
The decision to set up such an agency rests with the Commission and is subject
to a detailed cost–benefit analysis.185 The decision is taken under the regulatory
comitology procedure.186
It would appear that the mandate granted to the Commission by Regulation
58/2003 is sufficiently broad to enable the establishment of an agency to run
T2S. In particular, the development of a settlement platform can fall within the
definition of a Community programme as defined in the Regulation and can
meet the cost-effectiveness analysis required under Article 3(1) of the Regula-
tion. The objectives and tasks of the platform also appear to fall under the tasks
of executive committees as set out in Article 6 of the Regulation. Recourse to
Regulation 58/2003 seems prima facie to offer some advantages. The existing
institutional and structural framework already provided therein can be used; the
cooperation of the Commission is assured; and any tensions regarding the
application of competition law on T2S are neutralized since the agency will
operate under the auspices of the Commission, which will ensure compatibility
with the competition rules of the Treaty.
There are however significant disadvantages, if not insuperable obstacles. It is
not clear how the ECB can be accommodated within a structure which is fun-
damentally designed for the performance of tasks assigned to the Commission.
If the development of settlement facilities falls within the ambit of the powers
given to the ESCB, in terms of legal basis, Regulation 58/2003 provides an
unlikely home. The representation of the ESCB can only be secondary since
both the director and the members of the steering committee of the agency are
to be appointed by, and be accountable to, the Commission.187 The agency will
also be physically remote from Frankfurt since it will have to be based in the seat
of the Commission, ie Brussels or Luxembourg.188 Finally, it will be under the
budgetary control of the Commission.
The problems mentioned above make the vehicle of an executive agency
under Regulation 58/2003 an unsuitable instrument for T2S. They also risk
prejudicing the independence of the ECB.
Still, an element of Regulation 53/2008 may be salutary here. The cost-
effectiveness exercise which must be carried out by the Commission as a
184 Regulation 58/2003, Article 2(b).
185 Under Article 3(1) of the Regulation, the cost-benefit analysis must take into account, inter
alia, the following factors: the identification of the tasks justifying outsourcing, the costs of coor-
dination and checks, the impact on human resources, possible savings within the general budgetary
framework of the European Union, efficiency and flexibility in the implementation of outsourced
tasks, simplification of the procedures used, proximity of outsourced activities to final beneficiaries,
visibility of the Community as promoter of the Community programme, and the need to maintain
an adequate level of know-how inside the Commission.
186 Regulation 58/2003, Article 24(2).
187 See Regulation 58/2003, Articles 8, 10, and 20. 188 op cit, Article 5.
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condition for the establishment of an executive agency would be very useful and
arguably essential, also as a condition for choosing the optimum administrative
structure of T2S. This will also serve to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity
is complied with. In this context, it will be recalled that, although Article 22 may
serve as the legal basis for the provision of a settlement platform, the ECB’s
competence in this field, in contrast to monetary policy, is not exclusive and
therefore the principle of subsidiarity is applicable.189
In conclusion, the best way forward for the development of T2S seems to be
the establishment of an independent agency at Community level by the ECB on
the basis of Article 22 of the Statute. Such an agency will not be strictly speaking
an ‘executive agency’ as it will not be governed by Regulation 58/2003 but it will
operate under the constraints of the Meroni case law and, in effect, it cannot
exercise true regulatory powers although it may have decision-making powers,
carry out executive functions, and play a wider advisory and recommendatory
role within the Meroni constraints.190
C. Possible Forms of T2S Structure
The institutional structure of T2S may conceivably take one of the follow-
ing forms:
1. the establishment of an independent agency at Community level;
2. the setting up of an EEIG;
3. the setting up of a European Company (Societas Europae);
4. the establishment of a corporate entity governed by private law under one of
the laws of the Member States.
We will examine the form of a European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)
as being the most credible alternative to an independent Community agency. By
contrast, a European Company,191 or a body governed by national law, seems a
189 Argument for this is derived also from Article 3 TFEU, as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty,
which grants to the Community exclusive competence in relation to ‘monetary policy’.
190 In effect, the term ‘executive agency’ has two meanings. First, in terms of general adminis-
trative law, it means an agency which has only executive as opposed to legislative powers, eg power
to execute decisions taken by another body or power to take binding decisions in application of
general rules adopted by another body. Secondly, in the specific context of Community law, it
means an agency governed by Regulation 58/2003. This means that (a) it must be set up by the
Commission; (b) it must have as its purpose to run a specific Community programme; (c) it must
comply with the requirements of Regulation 58/2003. The present article submits that the best way
for running the T2S project is not through an executive agency set up under Regulation 58/2003
but by an independent agency set up by the ECB under Article 22 of the Statute which will be
assigned powers within the Meroni constraints. In view of its objectives, it is very likely that such an
agency will be assigned executive functions and thus be an ‘executive agency’ within the generic
meaning of that term.
191 See Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company, [2001] OJ
L294/1.
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less suitable vehicle for running T2S. In contrast to an EEIG, a European
Company is a corporate form designed for the carrying out of profit making
activities and, as such, inappropriate for the T2S system. A private entity gov-
erned by national law would make the exercise of public functions by the ECSB
subject to national law, thus giving rise to legal uncertainty and lessening sub-
stantially the control that ECSB can exercise over it.192
The EEIG was established by Regulation 2137/85193 to facilitate transna-
tional cooperation among European businesses and especially, but by no means
exclusively, small and medium enterprises. Its distinct feature is that it is a
corporate form established on the basis of Community law rather than on the
basis of a national legal system. It was modelled on the French groupement d´
inte´reˆt e´conomique (GIE) which has found widespread use as a form of corporate
cooperation in France. A notable example of the groupement in France in the
sphere of financial services is the credit card organization Carte Bleue. In
Community law, owing to its flexible nature, the EEIG has proved a success
with more than 1,200 groupings currently existing for widely diverse
purposes.194
An EEIG must be formed by at least two members coming from two separate
Member States.195 Members of an EEIG may be individuals, companies, or
firms within the meaning of Article 48 EC, and other legal bodies governed by
private or public law which have been formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State and which have their registered or statutory office and central
administration in the Community.196 Thus, the EEIG offers the possibility of a
mixed composition, ie to give a somewhat improbable example, a grouping may
be formed by a French tax consultant, a German university, a Greek limited
company, and a British local authority.
Although Regulation 2137/85 does not envisage the possibility of a Com-
munity body being a member of an EEIG, a purposive interpretation of Article
4(1) is not inconceivable. The purpose of the Regulation is to offer a flexible
192 For the same reasons, it would be inappropriate to entrust the running of T2S to a national
public authority. Furthermore, the establishment of a national public body would require a legal
basis under national law and give rise to further complications resulting from the application of
national administrative laws pertaining, inter alia, to agency powers, control procedures, budgetary
matters, etc.
193 Regulation 2137/85 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), [1985] OJ
L199/1.
194 In addition to facilitating classic forms of interstate cooperation among companies, entrepre-
neurs, universities, and professional associations, the form of EEIG has been used for example, by
groups of nuclear power companies, regional airports, German and French national technical
inspection services to carry out environmental impact studies, the French—German cultural TV
station ARTE, Belgian Trappist monks in relation to beer producing activities, and the European
Federation of Harley-Davidson clubs. See The European Economic Interest Grouping, memorandum
by Libertas—European Institute GmbH, European EEIG Information Centre, Stuttgart, <http://
www.libertas-institut.com>, version of 1 October 2001, p 8.
195 Regulation 2137/85, op cit, Article 4(2). 196 Article 4(1).
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legal vehicle so as to facilitate cooperation. Since bodies governed by the public
law of the Member States may be members of a grouping and, according to
Community law, Community institutions and agencies with separate legal
personality must typically be recognized ‘in each of the Member States the most
extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under its law’,197 it may be
argued that a Community body can also be a member of an EEIG.198
There is no limit to the number of members that an EEIG might have except
under the laws of France and Greece where, in exercise of the discretion given to
Member States by Article 4(3) of the Regulation, the maximum number of
persons has been restricted to 20.199
The formalities for the establishment of an EEIG are easy to fulfil. It requires
a contract and registration in the Member States where the grouping will have its
official address.200 Certain information must be disclosed to the public to ensure
certainty of commercial transactions.201 Under the influence of the continental
sie`ge re´el doctrine, the official address of an EEIG must be fixed either (a) where
the grouping has its central administration or (b) where one of the members of
the grouping has its central administration or, in the case of a natural person, his
principal activity, provided that the grouping carries on an activity there.202
Once formed, a grouping has the capacity to have rights and obligations,
enter into contracts or make other legal acts, and sue and be sued in its own
name.203 The issue whether a grouping has separate legal personality is deter-
mined by the State of its registration.204 In practice, with some notable excep-
tions, such as Germany and Italy, national laws bestow groupings with separate
legal personality.
The law applicable to the contract for the formation of a grouping and its
internal organization is the internal law of the State of its registration.205
The purpose of the EEIG is to facilitate the development of the economic
activities of its members on a trans-border basis whilst they retain their eco-
nomic and legal independence. Its activities are of an ancillary nature and its
purpose cannot be to make a profit for itself.206 As a result, its activities are
197 See eg for the ECB, Article 9 of the ESCB Statute and for Community executive agencies,
Article 4(2) of Regulation 58/2003.
198 Note however that, under Article 4(4), a Member State may, on grounds of public interest,
prohibit or restrict participation by certain classes of natural or legal persons.
199 See Libertas memorandum, op cit, at 3. 200 Regulation 2137/85, Articles 5–7.
201 op cit, Articles 8–9.
202 Regulation 2137/85, Article 12. For restrictions on the cross-border transfer of the official
address, see Article 14(4). 203 Article 1(2).
204 Article 1(3).
205 Article 2(1). This choice of law rule applies except with regard to matters relating to the
status or capacity of natural persons and to the capacity of legal persons, which presumably are to
be determined not by the internal law of the State of registration but by its conflict of law rules. In
the event of a Community body being a member of an EEIG, their legal capacity is determined
directly by Community law, as stated above: see note
206 See Article 3(1) and Preamble, recital 5.
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subject to a number of express limitations. Under Article 3(2) of Regulation
2137/85, a grouping may not:
(a) exercise, directly or indirectly, a power of management or supervision over
its members’ own activities or over the activities of another undertaking, in
particular in the fields of personnel, finance, and investment;
(b) directly or indirectly hold shares of any kind in a member undertaking; the
holding of shares in another undertaking is possible only in so far as it is
necessary for the achievement of the grouping’s objects and if it is done on
its members’ behalf;
(c) employ more than 500 persons;
(d) be used by a company to make a loan to a director of a company, or persons
connected with him, when the making of such loans is restricted or con-
trolled under the Member States’ laws governing companies;
(e) be a member of another EEIG.
It is submitted that, although there is no concrete authority on the point, it
would not be impossible for the ESCB to take part in the formation of an EEIG.
As stated above, Community bodies should be placed on an equal footing with
bodies governed by the public laws of the Member States. If the ECB may not
itself participate, the possibility might exist for the national central banks to take
part.207 The fact that the purpose of an EEIG is to facilitate or develop the
‘economic activities’ of its members208 is not necessarily a barrier to such par-
ticipation. According to the preamble of Regulation 2137/85 the concept of
economic activities must here be understood in its ‘widest sense’.209 Clearly, the
ESCB may not exercise any of its core activities (eg monetary policy) via the
establishment of an EEIG but the running of a settlements facility is an eco-
nomic activity within the meaning of competition law210 which, arguably, can
be legitimately undertaken through the vehicle of a grouping.
Despite the possibility of establishing an EEIG, it seems preferable for the
institutional structure of T2S to take form of a separate agency established at
Community level. This is for the following reasons.
First, a Community agency will be more in keeping with the public law
nature of ECB’s intervention and the overriding principle of independence.
Secondly, although the view has here been expressed that the ECB may be
able to participate in the formation of an EEIG, this remains an untested point
and appears to entail higher risks than asserting the capacity of ECB to set up an
independent agency.
207 An issue which arises in this context is whether national law might prohibit the participation
of a central bank in the formation of an EEIG on grounds of public interest under Article 4(4) of
Regulation 2137/85. Since however national central banks within the eurozone form part of the
ESCB, national autonomy in this context is restricted. 208 Article 3(1).
209 See recital 5. 210 See below.
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Thirdly, a Community agency will be less dependent on national law. The
possibility, for example, exists that an EEIG may be sued before national courts.
A Community agency, on the other hand, will be governed by the jurisdiction of
the Community courts in relation to its extra-contractual liability and any
binding acts that it may be authorized to adopt. Also, in view of its status as a
Community body, it will be possible to specify by an arbitration clause that the
Community courts will have jurisdiction in disputes arising from contracts
entered by it.211 On the assumption that the best location of the entity
responsible for running T2S is Frankfurt, the fact that German law does not
bestow an EEIG with separate legal personality may lead to practical incon-
veniences and make this form less suitable. Fiscal considerations may also need
to be taken into account. For example, an EEIG would be liable to VAT as well
as employment taxes under national law. Furthermore, various formalities under
national law will have to be complied with.
Fourthly, the establishment of an agency will enable the ECB to retain a
greater degree of control over the agency’s management structures and greater
flexibility to make the necessary adjustments during its operation. Issues
pertaining to capital participation and shareholder liability are, arguably, more
efficiently dealt with under the form of an agency than under the form of
an EEIG.
Finally, the competition law dimension will be different. As will be explained
below, the ECB and any Community agency established under its aegis will be
under an obligation to respect the substantive competition rules of the Treaty.
Nonetheless, the setting up of an EEIG rather than an agency will complicate
matters in this respect. Whilst an agency will be bound by the principle of an
open market economy with free competition, an EEIG will be bound directly by
the competition rules of the Treaty and be subject to the enforcement powers of
the Commission. It will also be subject to competition procedures of national
law and, potentially, face litigation before national courts.
V. EC Competition Law and the ECB
A. Is the ECB Subject to the Provisions of the Treaty on
Competition Law?
The possible application of the competition rules of the Treaty on action
undertaken by the Eurosystem has not received much attention. It first came to
the fore at the time of the introduction of TARGET, the real time gross
payments settlement system administered by the ESCB. TARGET was put
into place by the European Monetary Institute, the predecessor to the ECB,
211 See Article 238 EC and, for the ECB, Article 35.2 and 35.4 of the Statute.
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and became operative at the beginning of stage three of EMU. The Com-
mission provided a preliminary assessment of the TARGET system distin-
guishing among three categories of payments:212 payments directly related to
monetary policy and involving the ESCB, interbank payments, and payments
involving bank customers. The first category of payments was beyond the
scope of Article 81 EC since the parties involved were not undertakings. By
contrast, interbank and customer payments fell within the scope of Article
81.213 In relation to those two categories, the Commission expressed two
concerns. The first related to fixed charges, ie the plan to charge all parties
involved in a transaction a standard rate for payments effected through TAR-
GET. The Commission however acknowledged that the system would facilitate
the establishment of an effective mechanism for managing cross-border inter-
bank transactions which was likely to bolster the reliability of the money
market within the euro zone. The second concern related to the level of the
charge. The Commission stressed that the rates charged had to cover all costs,
including operating costs.214
In short, although the Commission did not adopt a formal decision, it
appeared to take the view that Eurosystem action fell within the bounds of
Article 81(1) but could be exempted under Article 81(3). It also declared its
determination to ensure that monetary union takes place in accordance with the
competition rules of the Treaty.215 By contrast, the ECB has taken the view that
Articles 81 to 87 EC do not apply directly to central bank activities of the
Eurosystem. It considers, however, that it is bound to act in accordance with the
principle of an open market economy with free competition under Article 105
(2) EC and that aspects of Articles 81 and 82 may apply to it by analogy through
that provision.216
The view expressed by the ECB appears to be more in line with the scheme
and the institutional system set up by the EC Treaty. The ECB is a Commu-
nity body which is entrusted with public law tasks and is bound by the
objectives, the scheme, and the institutional structure of the Treaty. It carries
out a public function and is entrusted with the exercise of tasks traditionally
assigned to a national central bank. It ‘falls squarely within the Community
framework’.217 To the extent therefore that the ECB and the ESCB perform
212 EC Commission, XXVII the Report on Competition Policy—1997 SEC (98) 636, Lux-
embourg 1998, para 95. 213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 EC Commission, XXVIIthe Report on Competition Policy—1997 SEC (98) 636, Lux-
embourg 1998, para 95.
216 See ECB, Legal Assessment of Legal Aspects of Target 2 Securities, 21 May 2008, at p 12.
The document is available from <http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/html/index.en.html>. This view is
articulated further by J M Fernandez Martin, The Competition Rules of the EC Treaty and
the European System of Central Banks (2001) European Competition Law Rev 51.
217 See OLAF case, op cit, above, n 57, para 92.
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public functions, they are not subject to the rules of competition law.218 For
example, it would be odd, to say the least, if the ECB was subjected to the
provisions of competition law when setting interest rates. There are additional
reasons why the ECB should not be directly subject to the Articles 81 to 89. If
the ECB was subject to the enforcement powers of the Commission, that would
be incompatible with the principle of institutional balance and also prejudice
its independence. It thus appears that, in view of the institutional structure
established by the Treaty, the ECB is not subject directly to Articles 81 and 89
in relation to the powers exercised by it under Chapter II of Title IV of the
Treaty on monetary policy.
This is not to say, however, that the ECB is free to undermine competition
law. The Community institutions themselves are not above the Treaty. They are
bound to respect the principle of free competition just as they are bound to
respect the fundamental freedoms. According to this view, the ECB is bound
pursuant to Article 105(1) EC and Article 2 of the ESCB Statute to respect the
principle of open market economy with free competition. This principle also
imposes the obligation to avoid anti-competitive conduct but account has to be
taken of the fact that the ECB intervenes in the market as a public authority.
Furthermore, the case law on Articles 81, 82, and 86 suggests that a public body
may exercise public power, and thus be exempt from the application of Com-
munity law, in relation to some of its operations, but carry out other activities,
which are economic in character and thus subject to the disciplines of compe-
tition law. This case law does not apply directly to the ECB since, as already
stated, it is not subject to Articles 81 to 89 as such but it is relevant to our
inquiry because it may inform the interpretation of the general duty of the ECB
to respect the principle of open market economy.
There are, in fact, two aspects to this argument, one substantive and one
procedural. Under the first, the substantive prohibitions of anti-competitive
conduct, as provided for in the Treaty, do not apply directly to the ECB. This
has procedural implications. It means that the Commission cannot exercise its
powers in the field of competition law over the ECB. Also, market actors who
might feel that they are disadvantaged as a result of anti-competitive conduct by
the ECB would not have the normal remedies available under the Treaty,
Regulation 1/2003, or national law. Instead, the only way to hold the ECB
accountable would be via an action for judicial review before the ECJ or via the
preliminary reference procedure. If the Commission, as the guardian of the
Treaty, or any other institution considered that the ECB had acted in breach of
the principle of free competition or, more generally, beyond its powers, it could
initiate an action before the ECJ.219 Thus, as far as inter-institutional relations
218 See eg Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43.
219 The ECB is also subject to actions for damages: See Article 288(2) EC.
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are concerned, the main procedural implication of placing the ECB beyond the
direct application of Articles 81–89 is that it disables the enforcement powers of
the Commission in the field of competition law, making Article 230 the
exclusive route for questioning ECB conduct.220 A further, wider, implication is
that restrictions on competition resulting from ECB action in the performance
of its tasks will be assessed bearing in mind the wide discretion that the ECB
enjoys as a public actor.
Although the ECB is beyond the direct application of the Commission’s
powers in the field of competition law, one should recall here the duty of sincere
cooperation provided for in Article 10 EC. As discussed above, this duty binds
not only the Member States but also the institutions in their mutual relations
and here it may be of particular importance in ensuring compliance with the
principle of free competition by the ECB and the ESCB and any public or
private entities constituted by them. It will be recalled that Article 10 imposes,
inter alia, the duty to abstain from measures which could hinder the internal
functioning of the Community institutions; the obligation to abstain from
measures which could hinder the development of the integration process; and
the obligation to ensure the protection of rights stemming from primary and
secondary Community law.221
The duty of the Community institutions to respect competition law, the
open market economy principle and discretion in the field of economic policy
will now be analysed in more detail.
B. Obligation of Community Institutions to Respect the Fundamental
Freedoms and Competition Law
Although the primary addressees of the Treaty provisions on free movement are
the Member States, these provisions also bind the Community institutions.
Thus, the ECJ has held that the institutions must exercise their powers to
establish a common organization of the market in agriculture so as to cause the
least possible disruption to the internal market.222 It has also held that Article 28
binds not only Member States but also the Community institutions.223 However,
where Community measures restrict fundamental freedoms, the Court is more
readily prepared to defer to the discretion of the institutions. It tends to allow
220 Martin Fernadez, op cit, 55. 221 See above.
222 Case 61/86 UK v Commission [1988] ECR 431, at para 9; Joined Cases 80 and 81/77
Les Commissionaires Reunis and les Fils de Henri Ramel v Receveur des Douanes [1978] ECR 927,
para 24.
223 See, for example, Case 37/83 Rewe-Zentrale v Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland [1984]
ECR1229, para 18; Case C-39/90 Denkavit Futtermittel [1991] ECR I-3069. See P Oliver, Free
Movement of Goods in the European Community (4th edn) 62 et seq.
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them greater latitude with regard to justification for restrictions on trade224 and
implied as much in its judgment in Meyhui.225
By contrast, the case law has not examined the question whether the Com-
munity institutions themselves are subject to the provisions of the Treaty on
competition law. At first sight, an affirmative answer to this question would
appear odd. Little support for this can be found in the text of the Treaty articles.
Articles 81 and 82 are not expressly directed to the Member States much less to
Community institutions. Within the scheme of the Treaty, competition law is
not a freedom but a policy. Although Articles 81, 82, and 86(2) are directly
effective, there are fundamental distinctions between free movement and com-
petition law. The primary addressees of the free movement of provisions are the
Member States whilst the primary addresses of the competition law provisions are
businesses. Competition law is backed by a distinct system of enforcement which
grants the Commission extensive latitude to articulate policies, set priorities, and
focus on sectors. This is not to say that prioritization may not take place in the
field of free movement. Agenda setting there occurs through the normal decision-
making channels which apply on the adoption of Community legislation. But
there is a qualitative difference: whilst free movement is built through the process
of adjudication before the ECJ and the ordinary process of Community law-
making, competition law is subject to the overwhelming influence and policy
discretion of the Commission which, in exercising its enforcement powers, may
adopt decisions finding violations, exonerate undertakings, or exempt agree-
ments. If the enforcement panoply of the Commission applied vis-a`-vis other
institutions, that might disturb the principle of institutional balance and suggest
that there is a hierarchical relationship among the institutions.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Community institutions may not
undermine the objectives and the rules of the Treaty. They may only act within
the scope of the powers conferred upon them by the Treaty and must act in
furtherance of the Community interest as concretized by the specific provisions
224 See eg Joined Cases C-154 and C-155/04 The Queen on the application of Alliance for Natural
Health v Secretary of State for Health, Judgment of 12 July 2005; Case C-51/93 Meyhui v Schott
Zwiesel Glaswerke [1994] ECR I-3879; Cf Case 27/80 Fietje [1980] ECR 3839 and Case C-369/89
Piageme v Peeters [1991] ECR I-2971; Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech Srl v S & T Srl [1998] ECR
I-4301, para 62. For a discussion of the proportionality standard in such cases, see T Tridimas, The
General Principles of EU Law, 193–194.
225 See Meyhui, op cit, at para 21. For a more lax proportionality test, see also Case C-114/96
Kieffer and Thill [1997] ECR I-3629, para 27 et seq and further Alliance for Natural Health,
op cit. Thus, in upholding the discretion of the Community legislature, the Court takes into
account that the Community provisions which impose some restrictions on free movement may
replace otherwise justifiable diverse national provisions with a single set of rules: Case 46/76
Bauhuis v Netherlands [1977] ECR 5, at 16–18; for further case law, see Kapteyn op cit, 639–640.
For the annulment of a Community measure, see Joined Cases C-363 etc/93 Lancry v Direction
Generale des Douanes [1994] ECR I-3957. On the basis of the case law, Gormley, op cit, at 117,
concludes that the Council may not introduce obstacles to the free movement of goods in the
absence of a clear and specific authorization in the Treaty.
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of the various chapters of the Treaty. Also, to the extent that these rules apply to
Member States, it would be odd to exempt Community institutions and other
bodies from them. In recent years, the Court has increasingly stressed that both
Community and national authorities should be subject to equivalent standards
as different tiers of the same government structure. This is the case, for example,
in relation to the conditions of liability for breach of Community law and also,
in some respects, in relation to the standards judicial review. One may therefore
suggest that a middle road must here be followed where the following para-
meters must be taken into account. First, Community institutions must be
afforded a degree of discretion commensurate with their public law responsi-
bilities; Secondly, they must respect the principle of institutional balance and the
duty of cooperation laid down in Article 10 of the Treaty. Thirdly, and no less
importantly, in discharging their public responsibilities, they must respect the
substantive rules of the Treaty, including the fundamental freedoms as well as
the rules on competition. In particular, the Community institutions must
respect both the principle of competition for the market, concretized mostly
through public procurement principles, and the principle of competition in the
market, expressed through Articles 81 and 82. These obligations apply mutatis
mutandis also to the ECB irrespective of the fact that it is not mentioned as one
of the institutions proper of the Community in Article 7 EC.
C. The Principle of Open Market Economy
The principle of open market economy is mentioned in the Treaty and its
protocols no fewer than five times, thus being one of the most oft-professed
principles by EU primary law. Article 4(1) EC states that, for the purposes of
attaining the objectives of the Community, the activities of the Member States
and the Community must include the adoption of an economic policy which is
based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic policies, on the
internal market, and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competi-
tion. The same principle also underpins monetary union (Article 4(2)) and the
coordination of national economic policies (Article 98(1)). Furthermore, Article
105(1) which specifies the objectives of the ESCB, commits the Eurosystem to
act ‘in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free
competition, favouring the efficient allocation of resources and in compliance
with the principles set out in Article 4 of this Treaty’.226
The principle of open market economy may be approached at several levels. It
is one of the fundamental underpinnings of economic and monetary policy and,
226 This is repeated in Article 2 of the ESCB Statute. A further, now obsolete, reference is made
in Article 4.1 of the Statute of the European Monetary Institute, see Protocol No 19 annexed to the
EC Treaty.
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more generally, the economic constitution227 of the Community. It thus has a
general programmatic and constitutional value. By virtue of Article 4, it becomes
a fundamental postulate and a mechanism through which the underlying objec-
tives of the Community laid down in Article 2 EC are to be achieved. The Treaty
recognizes that the rule of law and monetary stability are the twin pillars on the
basis of which a market economy may thrive.228 Historically, the open market
economy principle can be seen as the ideological dividend resulting from the end
of the cold war. It was included in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Maastricht. It
can be said that, since then, the Community has formally ceased to be politically
neutral as Article 4 appears to reject a model of centrally planned economy.
The principle has a directional value in that it mandates the actors involved,
ie the Community institutions, the Member States, and the ECSB, each within
its sphere of competence, to discharge their responsibilities and exercise their
powers subject to certain constraints.229 The precise legal implications of the
open market economy principle however are more difficult to determine. It
serves to strengthen and support other provisions and principles underlying the
Treaty both in relation to intra-Community policies and the external relations of
the Community. Thus, the free market concept underpins the provisions on
internal market, competition, and also countenances the pursuance of a liberal
common commercial policy.230
Articles 4, 98 and 105(1) may be used as an aid to the interpretation of
other Treaty provisions.231 The Court however has resisted attempts to derive
specific rights from the general provisions of Articles 2, 3, and 4 EC and, in
227 According to Streit and Mussler, the concept of economic constitution refers to all legal rules
which constrain the conduct of economic agents and are constitutive for or conducive to a specific
type of economic system. For further discussion, see P Brentford, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the
Independence of the European Central Bank’ (1998) ICLQ 75 at 80.
228 For the link between the rule of law and monetary stability, see further G Tridimas, ‘A
Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence’, School of Economics and Politics,
Research paper, University of Ulster, 2008.
229 Notably, Articles 4(1) and (2) refer to the principle of an open market economy with free
competition whilst Article 105(1) directs the ESCB to act ‘in accordance with the principle of
an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources’
(emphasis added). The same addition appears in Article 98(1) in relation to the conduct of eco-
nomic policy by the Community and its Member States. This formulation may be interpreted to
have an additional substantive meaning, ie as requiring the public actors concerned in discharging
their functions to use public resources as efficiently as possible. It is however doubtful whether a
literal interpretation of Articles 98(1) and 105(1) supports such an interpretation. It is better to
interpret the reference to the efficient allocation of resources as clarifying the open market economy
principle of which, in economic terms, it constitutes an integral part. See further for an analysis and
references to the bibliography: Kapteyn and VerLoren Van Themaat, op cit, at 964 and fn 66.
230 For the link between the open market economy principle and the common commercial
policy, see P J G Kapteyn and P VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities (3rd edn, Kluwer, 1998) 963.
231 The ECJ has recognized the interpretative value of Articles 2 and 3 EC: see eg Case 126/86
Zaera v Instituto Nacionale de la Seguridad Social [1987] ECR 3697; Case 6/72 Europemballage and
Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215; Case C-341/95 Bettati [1998] ECR I-4355,
para 75.
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Echirolles Distribution SA,232 it held that the principle of open market economy
as specified in Articles 4 and 98 is not directly effective. It is, rather, a general
principle whose application calls for complex economic assessments which are a
matter for the legislature or the national administration. This appears to suggest
that the lack of direct effect is also an attribute of the principle as included in
Article 105(1).
One can hardly take issue with the findings of the Court in Echirolles Dis-
tribution. The principle of open market economy with free competition is not in
itself an objective but a commitment, in broad terms, to a mechanism through
which the Community objectives are to be pursued. It is an ideological posture
honoured by historical experience which provides a constraining power but does
not dictate specific outcomes. The Treaty seeks to pursue simultaneously and
reconcile several objectives and it does not follow from Articles 4 and 98 that the
Community places greater value on the principle of free competition than on the
objectives listed in Article 2 EC.233 The Treaty strikes a middle path, leaving
ample discretion to the political actors. It takes as a starting point that market
forces rather than the State should allocate resources and favours a liberal eco-
nomic system but, to reflect political consensus across Europe, seeks inevitably
to accommodate the market economy with a developed welfare State.234 Thus,
for example, open market economy principles need to be balanced with Article
16 EC on services of general economic interest which may be seen as a coun-
tervailing force.235 Where the limits of State action lie is a moot point. Some
commentators, for example, view the inroads on contractual freedom made by
various consumer protection directives as being incompatible with the open
market economy principle.236 The bottom line is that Articles 4 and 98 do not
impose on the Member States clear and unconditional obligations which may be
relied on by individuals.
The same applies to the open economy market principle as enshrined in
Article 105(1). It has been suggested that it was included in Article 105(1) with
two considerations in mind. First, in order to prevent the imposition of quan-
titative limitations on the provision of credit by financial institutions, which
has traditionally been a favourite instrument of French monetary policy and,
secondly, to protect the ESCB from undertaking rescue operations as a lender of
232 Case C-9/99 Echirolles Distribution SA v Association du Dauphine [2000] ECR I-8207,
para 25.
233 Joined Cases C-49, 50, 52–54, and 68–71/98 Finalarte and others [2001] ECR I-7831 per
Mischo AG at para 46 of the Opinion.
234 See for a recent discussion, F G Jacobs, ‘The State of International Economic Law: Re-
thinking Sovereignty in Europe’ (2008) JIEL 5, esp at 27.
235 See Case C-147/97 Deutsche Post AG v Gesellschaft fur Zahlungssysteme [2000] ECR I-825 per
La Pergola AG, at para 52 and further L Flynn, Review of Article 90 EC Case-law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (contribution to the conference on Postal Services, Liber-
alisation and EC Competition Law, Brussels, 12 June 1998) at 27.
236 See the critique of B Heiderhoff and M Kenny, ‘The Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the
Consumer Acquis: Deliberate Deliberation?’ (2007) ELRev 740.
Tridimas272
last resort.237 The principle of open market economy, however, does not contain
precise legal obligations238 and cannot be approached in isolation from the
provisions of the Treaty governing the various freedoms and policies.239
The meaning of Article 105(1) is that the ESCB is not beyond market forces
but there to support them. However, in pursuance of its primary objective which
is to maintain market stability, it enjoys vast discretion. More generally, the
maintenance of confidence in the market may, depending on the circumstances,
require intrusive intervention by public authorities since without confidence
there can be no market system. In this sense, the obligatory content of Articles 4,
98 and 105(1) may vary depending on market conditions and the economic
outlook. It is thus difficult to derive precise judicially enforceable standards from
Article 105(1) other than the prohibition of unjustified and particularly severe
central planning. It may thus be conceivable to envisage in extremis a concrete
minimum legal obligation flowing from the Article, such as, for example, the
prohibition of complete nationalization of the services industry. There is no
denying that the ECB and the political actors at Community and national level
enjoy a large margin of discretion in the conduct of economic and monetary
policy and neither Article 4 nor Article 105(1) prohibit them from imposing
quantitative controls on credit, deposit taking, or portfolio choices of banks
within the limits of their respective competences.
References to the principle have occasionally been made in the case law,
mostly as embodied in Articles 4 and 98. Notably, in CIF, the ECJ saw the
principle as complementing the competition rules of the Treaty and under-
pinning the obligation of Member States not to require or favour anti-
competitive agreements.240 In Ospelt, Geelhoed AG saw the free movement
of capital not only as a condition for the establishment of the internal market
but also giving expression to the principle of an open market economy with
free competition as embodied in Articles 4 and 105 EC.241 In Echirolles
237 See J V Louis in Stuyck (ed), Financial and Monetary Integration in the European Economic
Community: Legal, Institutional and Economic Aspects (Deventer, 1993) at 18.
238 R Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford, 2006) at 216 con-
cludes that, in view of the generic nature of the principle, it is difficult to hold the ECB accountable
for its performance in the pursuit of that principle.
239 Similarly to Article 3, the principle of open market economy is to be applied in conjunction
with the respective chapters of the Treaty which concretise its requirements. See eg Case C-341/95
Bettati [1998] ECR I-4355, para 75; Echirolles Distribution, op cit, para 22.
240 Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorita Garante della Concorrenza
e del Mercato [2003] ECR I-8055, paras 46–47.
241 Case C-452/01 Ospelt v Unabhangiger Verwaltungssenat des Landes Vorarlberg [2003] ECR I-
9743, Geelhoed AG, at para 34. In Case C-275/92 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Schindler
[1994] ECR I-1039, Gulmann AG at paras 123–124 rejected the suggestion that the principle as
established in Article 98 requires the opening of the market in lotteries services. References to the
principle have also been made by English courts but with little impact on the outcome of the
proceedings, see eg R (on the application of Vallaj) v Special Adjudicator [2002] Imm AR 16; R (on
the application of BT3G Ltd) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] Eu LR 325.
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Distribution242 Alber AG viewed the principle more in the context of the
Community’s economic and monetary policy than as a factor in defining the
internal market.
The principle of open market economy as laid down in Article 105(1)
imposes a general obligation on the ECB and the ESCB to respect the compe-
tition rules of the Treaty and avoid the imposition of unjustified restrictions on
competition in its regulatory or operational interventions. As we saw above, the
Court itself has indicated the affinity between the principle of open market
economy and the provisions on competition and there is no denying that they
share the same underlying objectives, along with promoting the Lisbon agenda.
Two aspects may be highlighted in this context. First, although the provisions of
competition law aim to catch primarily the behaviour of private actors, they
apply also to public undertakings and to Member States themselves. In parti-
cular, a Member State may be in breach of Articles 10 and 81 EC where it
requires or favours the adoption of anti-competitive agreements or concerted
practices or reinforces their effects, or where it divests its own rules of the
character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsi-
bility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.243 Secondly, the
principle of open market economy, just as the objectives of competition rules,
requires the Community institutions to have regard to the interests of consumers
and increase consumer benefit.244
It is reasonable to suggest that the requirements of the principle do not go
beyond the requirements of Articles 81 and 82, namely that conduct which is
compatible with the latter is also compatible with the former. In this respect,
Articles 81 and 82 provide a maximum threshold. Furthermore, in carrying out
its statutory tasks, the ECB enjoys wide discretion commensurate with its
responsibilities. The exercise of its discretion is subject to review but, as in the
case with the other Community institutions, where it comes to economic policy
decisions, the Court is likely to recognize considerable latitude applying the
standard of manifest error. This standard is flexible and allows the Court itself to
employ varying degrees of scrutiny but serves to highlight the tenor of judicial
intervention. Under this standard, the ECJ does not approach a measure as
being ‘suspect’ in the way it would approach, for example, a measure which
provides for a difference in treatment on grounds of nationality, sex, or age or a
private agreement that restricts competition. At this juncture, it may be helpful
to look more closely at judicial review of economic policy decisions as carried
out by the ECJ.
242 op cit, Alber AG, at para 47. 243 See eg CIF, op cit, paras 46–47.
244 See eg Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969 and, on
appeal, Joined Cases C–501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C–519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline
Services Unlimited v Commission, Judgment of 6 October 2009.
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D. Discretion and Economic Policy
Although the Court is prepared to assess whether a measure is appropriate and
necessary in view of all relevant circumstances and to scrutinize the way the
institution concerned has exercised its discretion, where it comes to the adoption
of legislative measures involving economic policy choices, it will defer to the
expertise and the responsibility of the adopting institution exercising only
‘marginal review’.245 In Fedesa,246 it held that the lawfulness of the prohibition
of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures
are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately
pursued by the legislation. Where there is a choice between several appropriate
measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages
caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. The Court qualified
that principle, however, by stating:247
with regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions it must be stated that
in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a
discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by
Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that
sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to
the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue. . .
The expression ‘manifestly inappropriate’248 delineates what the Court perceives
to be the limits of judicial function with regard to review of measures involving
choices of economic policy. The test grants to the Community institutions ample
discretion and applies to both aspects of proportionality, ie suitability and
necessity. Although in a number of cases the suitability and effectiveness of a
measure has been contested,249 argument concentrates usually on the require-
ment of necessity. Necessity is more important because, in applying the principle
of proportionality, the Court does not act as an appellate body exercising review
of the merits but is concerned primarily with the restrictive effects of the measure
on the freedom of the individual. The enquiry whether such restrictive effects are
justified centres on their necessity to achieve the objective in view. In practice,
review of suitability is closely linked to review of necessity and a measure which is
clearly unsuitable to achieve its objectives cannot be justified and will be struck
245 See H G Schermers and D Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (6th edn,
Kluwer, 2001) 397, paras 806 et seq. 246 op cit, para 13.
247 Ibid, para 14. See also Case 265/87 Schra¨der v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237,
paras 21–22; Case 179/84 Bozzetti v Invernizzi [1985] ECR 2301, para 30.
248 In other cases the Court has stated that the measure must not be ‘patently’ or ‘manifestly
unsuitable’ to achieve its objectives. See Case 138/78 Sto¨lting v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas
[1979] ECR 713, para 7; Case 59/83 Biovilac v EEC [1984] ECR 4057, para 17.
249 See eg Sto¨lting, op cit; Schra¨der, op cit; Crispoltoni, op cit, note also Case C-11/00
Commission v ECB [2003] ECR I-7147, above, where the ECB unsuccessfully questioned the
suitability of OLAF to investigate its activities.
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down by the Court.250 In assessing whether a measure is suitable to achieve its
objectives, it is relevant to consider the actual effects of the measure. But the fact
that a measure has failed to attain its objectives in practice does not mean that it
is manifestly inappropriate. The Court has held that the legality of a Community
act cannot depend on retrospective considerations of its efficacy.251 Where the
Community legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be
adopted and these effects cannot be foreseen with accuracy, its assessment is open
to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information
available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question.252
According to the case law, the discretion of the decision-maker does not
apply only to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also to some
extent to the findings of the basic facts.253
The manifestly inappropriate test applies not only in relation to agricultural
measures but in any area involving decision of economic or social policy where
the Community legislature enjoys wide discretion. According to standard case
law,254
Where the evaluation of a complex economic situation is involved, the Community
institutions enjoy a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing the legality of the exercise of
such discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether that exercise dis-
closes manifest error or constitutes a misuse of powers or a clear disregard of the limits of
its discretion.
The test has been applied, inter alia, in the following areas: agricultural
policy,255 fisheries policy,256 transport policy,257 social policy,258 health
250 See eg Case C-368/89 Crispoltoni I [1991] ECR I-3695. In that case the Court held that a
measure which retroactively fixed maximum quantities was incapable of achieving its objective of
limiting production since production decisions had already been taken by producers before its
adoption. See also Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 Omega Air and Others [2002] ECR
I-2569, discussed later in this section.
251 Case 40/72 Schroeder v Germany [1973] ECR 125, para 14. See also Crispoltoni II, op cit;
Joined Cases C-267–285/88 Wuidart and Others [1990] ECR I-435, para 14.
252 See the cases referred in the previous footnotes and, for more recent confirmation, Case
C-189/01 Jippes and others [2001] ECR I-5689, para 84; Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council
[1998] ECR I-7235, para 49. Note however that the Community institutions may be under an
obligation to adapt existing measures following a fundamental change of circumstances: see, in
relation to currency fluctuations, Case 248/80 Glunz v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1982]
ECR 197, para 23, and Joined Cases T-177 and T-377/94 Altmann and Casson v Commission
[1996] ECR II-2041.
253 Case 138/79 SA Roquette Freres v Council [1980] ECR 3333; Case C-122/94 Commission v
Council [1996] ECR I-881; OMPI II, op cit.
254 Case T-180/00 Astipesca v Commission [2002] ECR II-3985, para 79; Omega Air, op cit, para 64;
Joined Cases C-248–9/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf v Germany [1997] ECR I-4475, para 23.
255 Fedesa, op cit.
256 Astipesca, op cit, para 79; Case C-179/95 Spain v Council [1999] ECR I-6475, para 29; Case
C-120/99 Italy v Council [2001] ECR I-7997, para 44; Joined Cases C-296/93 and C-307/93
France and Ireland v Commission [1996] ECR I-795, para 31.
257 SAM Schiffahrt, op cit; Omega Air, op cit.
258 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, para 58.
Tridimas276
protection,259 and measures to combat fraud against Community finances.260
In those areas, the test applies both to internal Community measures and the
conclusion of international agreements.261 A similar test has also been applied
in relation to the Commission’s discretion whether to follow a complaint and
conduct investigations for breach of competition law,262 whether to exempt
agreements under Article 81(3) EC,263 and whether to find that State aid is
compatible with the common market under Article 87(3) EC.264 Although the
language used by the Court in some of the above areas may be different, the
emphasis remains on the discretion of the decision-maker.
It would be incorrect, however, to give the impression that the Court’s
examination is one-sided. In fact, there seems to be an inherent contradiction
between the Court’s emphasis on the concept of ‘manifest error’, on the one
hand, and the general posture of the case law that ‘as a general rule the Com-
munity judicature undertakes a comprehensive review’ of the case, on the other
hand.265 The above equivocation reflects the delicate nature of judicial inter-
vention and strives to ensure that the judicature remains ‘master of its tasks’
keeping control of the degree of scrutiny that it exercises in each case.266 As a
general rule, it may be said that, in recent years, the CFI has been more willing to
enter into the merits of economic assessments made by the Commission in the
field of competition law267 and the ECJ has, to some extent, been more critical of
the exercise of Community competence.268 This however has not been achieved
through a more rigorous application of the principle of proportionality but rather
259 See eg Jippes, op cit; Case C-419/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex p British
American Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453; Upjohn op cit.
260 Commission v ECB, op cit, n 38 above, para 157.
261 See Case T-572/93 Odigitria v Council and Commission [1995] ECR II-2025, para 36–38;
confirmed on appeal: C-293/95 P [1996] ECR I-6129.
262 Case T-7/92 Asia Motor France v Commission [1993] ECR II-669.
263 See eg Case T-395/94 Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-875,
para 257: Case T-86/95 Compagnie Ge´ne´rale Maritime and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-
1011, paras 339–340.
264 The manifest error test also applies in relation to decisions pertaining to the Community
civil service in areas where the Community administration enjoys wide discretion, eg recruitment
and promotion. See Schermers and Waelbroeck, op cit, 399–400, and for recent confirmation:
Case T-144/02 Eagle v Commission, Judgment of 5 October 2004, para 113.
265 See eg, on competition law, Case C-7/95 Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, para 34.
266 Case C-83/98 P France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission [2000] ECR I-3271, at 3278 per
Cosmas AG at fn 3.
267 This is illustrated, in particular, by the 2002 merger cases where the CFI annulled decisions
prohibiting mergers finding that the Commission had committed manifest errors of assessment in
its economic analysis. See the CFI judgments in Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002]
ECR II-2585; Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071; and Cases
T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381.
268 See the annulment of the Tobacco Advertisement Directive in Case C-376/98 Germany v
Parliament and Council (Tobacco case) [2000] ECR I-8419. Note however that in subsequent cases
the ECJ has refused to extend the application of its reasoning in that case and has cleared important
harmonization measures: see C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079
and British American Tobacco Ltd, above.
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through an exhaustive examination of the institutions’ reasoning, a re-creation of
the decision-making process and, in the case of competence, a stricter inter-
pretation of Treaty provisions that empower Community legislative intervention.
In order to determine whether a measure is necessary, the Court is receptive
to argument that the same objective may be attained by less restrictive means.
The case law suggests however that, in relation to policy measures, the Court
does not apply the less restrictive alternative test scrupulously relying instead on
some notion of reasonableness or arbitrary conduct. In Fedesa269 it was claimed
that the prohibition of certain hormones on health protection grounds was not
necessary. The Court stressed that the Council enjoyed discretion and held that
since it had made no manifest error in considering that the prohibition was
appropriate, it was also entitled to take the view that the objectives pursued
could not be achieved by less onerous means. The less restrictive alternative
argument has been unsuccessfully submitted in a number of other cases270 and
recent case law suggests that, in fact, the Court pays lip service to it.271
It is submitted that the same general standard is also applicable mutatis
mutandis to the ECB. It is true that the ECJ did not follow this standard in its
judgment in OLAF but this can be explained by the circumstances of the case
which involved excess of authority in the context of an inter-institutional con-
flict and not the scope of the ECB’s substantive powers in the field of monetary
policy.272 It is also true that the ECB is not a democratically accountable
institution. This may indeed be a factor which influences the level of judicial
scrutiny;273 it should however be borne in mind that democratic accountability
is not the only consideration which accounts for judicial deference.274 Thus, the
perceived democratic deficit is a consideration which will be taken up in the mix
of factors determining the level of judicial scrutiny in a particular case but does
not in itself suggest that the manifest error test will not be applied.
On the basis of these considerations, it may be said that ECB action which
restricts free trade is lawful where it satisfies cumulatively the following
requirements:
(a) it must be justified in the general Community interest. The definition of the
Community interest must be guided by the tasks and objectives of the
269 op cit, n 18 above.
270 See eg the cases referred to above (Crispoltoni, Wuidart, etc) and also Case C-280/93
Germany v Council (Bananas case) [1994] ECR I-4973; Case C-8/89 Zardi [1990] ECR I-2515;
Case 138/79 Roquette Fre`res v Council [1980] ECR 3333, per Reischl AG, at 3380 et seq.
271 See Omega Air, op cit; BAT Case, op cit, Jippes, op cit. 272 See above.
273 See eg Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation
v Council and Commission, Judgment of 3 September 2008.
274 For the debate surrounding the accountability of the ECB, see Lastra, op cit, 226–227,
and F Amtenbrink and R Lastra, ‘Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory
Agencies—A Theoretical Framework’. R V De Mulder, Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety
and Security—How Relevant is a Rational Approach? (Rotterdam: OMV, 2008) 115–132.
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330309>.
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ESCB and, ultimately, the Community. It should be recognized in this
context that the ECB enjoys discretion in defining what is appropriate
action in pursuance of the objectives assigned to it by the Treaty.
(b) it must be proportionate, ie must not restrict market freedom beyond what
is necessary to achieve its objectives;
(c) it must be intended to promote competition;
(d) it must satisfy the requirements of equality, objectivity, and transparency.
VI. Competition Law Aspects of Clearing and Settlement
A. Competition Law and Financial Services: An Emerging Agenda
(i) Overview
Although from an early stage the Commission had taken the view that Articles
81 and 82 EC apply to banking and insurance,275 there have in fact been
few cases in the area of financial services and it was not until 2005 that the
Commission focused its attention on it by launching sector inquiries in banking
and insurance.276 There are clearly distinct elements in the financial services
sector.277 First, the banking sector, as the recent credit crunch has poignantly
reminded us, plays a crucial role in the national economy by providing credit,
facilitating payments, and ensuing liquidity. Banking may thus be better viewed
not as a sector but as an essential transversal service which underlies all sectors
of the economy. Secondly, there is, as a structural feature of the sector, a higher
degree of coordination and interdependency between market players than in
other sectors. This is necessary, for example, in order to operate a payments
system or provide settlement and trading of securities transactions. Thirdly,
from the point of view of free movement, there is a sharp imbalance between
the wholesale sector, which operates at the European and global level, and the
retail sector which remains largely national in character. Finally, the application
of competition law cannot be seen in isolation from the liberalization
programme pursued by the Commission which, since the launch of the Finan-
cial Services Action Plan in 1998 has seen the adoption of more than 40
275 This view was confirmed by the ECJ. See Case 172/80 Zuchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank
[1981] ECR 2021; Case 45/85 Verband der Sacheversicherer [1987] ECR 405.
276 See Commission Communication, Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC)
1/2003 on retail banking, COM (2007) 33 final, Brussels 31 January 2007 and full Report at
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/financial_services>; and
Commission Communication, Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on
business insurance (Final Report), COM(2007) 556 final, Brussels, 25 June 2007 and full Report,
SEC (2007) 1231.
277 For a general discussion, see S Ryan, E Martinez Rivero, and A Nijenhuis, Chapter 11
on Financial Services in J Faull and A Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (2nd edn, Oxford,
2007).
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measures.278 Indeed, competition law aspects of financial services have been
somewhat suppressed because the policy agenda has been dominated by the
objective of liberalization which is crucial in facilitating the integration of
financial markets in the EU.
Within the broader area of financial services, competition law concerns have
arisen in relation to banking, insurance, and the securities markets. The detailed
examination of these concerns falls beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to
make here a few selective remarks regarding the application of the rules of the
Treaty on banking and financial markets.
Already in the 1970s, in Zuchner,279 the Court rejected the argument that by
reason of the special nature of services provided by banks and their vital role in
transfers of capital, they should be exempted from the competition rules of the
Treaty or they should be considered simpliciter as providing services of general
economic interest.
The most important case decided so far by the Community courts in banking
is the Lombard Club case.280 There, the CFI had the opportunity to examine the
application of Article 81 on the Austrian banking system. The importance of
the judgment lies not so much on the novelty of the pronouncements made by
the CFI, since it was a clear case of violation, as in that it brought the message
home, making it clear that competition law applies on the banking sector. The
Commission had imposed fines on eight Austrian banks for their participation
in a long-established cartel. The participating banks operated a system of regular
meetings through a complex mechanism of multi-tiered committees. At the apex
of the structure stood the so-called Lombard Club, bringing together senior
executives of the participating banks who discussed coordination of banking
conduct on a wide range of issues, including interest rates and advertising. In
addition, there were many other regional, product-based, and sector-based
committees within the group and the Commission had found that, within the
period between 1994 and 1998, at least 300 meetings had taken place in Vienna
alone. In upholding the Commission’s findings, the CFI held that there was an
agreement in principle between all the banks participating in the cartel to
eliminate price competition in relation to a wide range of retail and corporate
banking services. The Commission was correct to consider that the committee
meetings amounted to a single overall cartel: they were part of an overall plan
278 Commission, Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action, COM (1998) 625 and
Commission Communication of 11 May 1999 ‘Implementing the framework for financial mar-
kets: action plan’ COM (1999) 232. See the FSAP Evolution Chart at <http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/061003_measures_en.pdf>. The chart identifies
45 measures but these do not include all the level 1 and level 2 measures currently adopted by the
Community institutions under the Lamfalussy process.
279 Case 172/80 Zu¨chner v Bayerische Vereinsbank [1981] ECR I-2021.
280 Joined Cases T-259/02-T-264/02 and T-271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG and
others v Commission (Lombard Club Case), Judgment of 14 December 2006. Cf Joined Cases
C-215/96 and C-216/96 Bagnasco and others v Banca Popolare di Novara [1999] ECR I-135.
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with an identical object and the fact that the documents cited do not explicitly
refer to all the banking services covered by the various meetings, or to all the
committees, did not affect that conclusion.281 In view of the complexity of
the network, the Commission enjoyed discretion in determining which of the
various concerted practices and committees it considered more significant. The
CFI also confirmed that the Commission may take account of the potential
cumulative effect of all the committees in order to determine whether the cartel
as a whole is capable of affecting trade between Member States. The question
therefore whether each of the committees in isolation was capable of affecting
trade between Member States was not relevant. Also the capability of the com-
mittees to affect interstate trade did not presuppose that any particular concerted
practice involved services of a cross-border nature.
Although few cases have reached the courts, the Commission has pursued
an increasingly active enforcement policy focusing on two areas, price-fixing
agreements and card payment systems.282 In the 2000s, the Commission
advocated a more proactive competition policy resulting into two sector inqui-
ries on banking and insurance.283 In its banking sector inquiry, the Commission
pointed out that a number of indicators such as market fragmentation, price
rigidity, and lack of customer mobility suggested that competition in the EU
retail banking market does not work effectively. It stressed the need for con-
tinuous monitoring of the sector and also the need for both competition law and
regulatory-based remedies.284 Following the liquidity crisis of September 2008,
the Commission’s priorities have inevitably been adjusted. The prevailing eco-
nomic climate favours State intervention, and the Commission’s focus has
shifted towards ensuring that national rescue packages can be effected with as
little disruption as possible to the rules of State aid. It is clear that, at least in the
short term, the regulatory paradigm has changed. Liberalization, only until
recently hailed as a panacea, is now viewed as a fallen angel, a victim of its own
success, with political actors on both sides of the Atlantic recognizing the need
for a stronger presence of government on market economy. The long-term effect
that this may have on the liberalization agenda remains to be seen.
(ii) Securities Markets
In the field of financial markets, the Commission’s avowed policy is that, in
principle, competition law applies to securities and capital markets ‘in the same
way as to any other industrial or services sector’.285 Whilst it recognizes that
financial institutions have special responsibilities which are regulated appropriately,
281 Lombard Club case, op cit, paras 111–121. 282 See Ryan et al, op cit, at 1309.
283 See above.
284 See Commission Report on Competition Policy 2006, COM (2007) 358 final, Brussels,
25 June 2007, para 38.
285 See the official Commission website: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_
services/capital_markets.html>.
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the Commission considers that this does not place them beyond respecting com-
petition rules.286 The Commission focuses its efforts on two areas. It seeks to
enforce the competition rules of the Treaty and also to promote the integration of
pro-competitive measures in other legislative initiatives related to the internal
market. The Commission has stated that the interdependency between the internal
market and competition policies is particularly clear in the financial services sector,
where both policies go hand in hand. In general terms, the internal market legis-
lation aims at ensuring a level playing field by making it possible for companies to
compete on their own merits without being protected by artificial barriers. On the
other hand, the application of competition law ensures that companies will not
behave in a manner that hampers the good functioning of the internal market.287
The Commission’s approach appears to contrast with that of the US Supreme
Court which, in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Billing,288 held that the
federal securities laws implicitly preclude the application of anti-trust law. A group
of investors had brought an action against investment banks acting as underwriters
alleging that their sales practices in relation to initial public offerings violated anti-
trust law. They claimed, in particular, that the investment banks had agreed not to
sell newly issued securities unless the buyer also agreed to purchase less attractive
securities (‘tying’), committed to purchase additional securities in the secondary
market at higher prices (known as ‘laddering’), and also agreed to pay unusually
high commissions on subsequent security purchases from the underwriters. The
Supreme Court dismissed the claim on the ground that there was a ‘clear repug-
nancy’ between securities law and anti-trust rules, in the sense that the two sets of
rules were incompatible with each other. It held that federal securities regulation
precluded the application of anti-trust laws on the basis of the following con-
siderations: (a) there existed a regulatory authority in the securities law field in the
form of the Securities and Exchange Commission; (b) there was clear evidence
that that authority exercised supervision in practice; (c) there was a risk that, if
both anti-trust and securities law applied, they would give rise to conflicting
requirements; and (d) the possible conflict between securities and anti-trust laws
affected practices which fell within the regulatory scope of the former.289
286 Ibid. 287 Ibid. 288 127 S Ct 2383 (2007).
289 The SC found that to permit anti-trust actions such as that in issue threatens serious secu-
rities-related harm. It pointed out that a fine, complex, detailed line separates activity that the SEC
permits or encourages from activity that it forbids and that the SEC has the expertise to distinguish
what is forbidden from what is allowed. Also, reasonable but contradictory inferences may be
drawn from overlapping evidence that shows both unlawful anti-trust activity and lawful securities
marketing activity. Further, there is a serious risk that anti-trust courts, with different non-expert
judges and different non-expert juries, will produce inconsistent results. The SC also held that any
enforcement-related need for an anti-trust lawsuit is unusually small. For one thing, the SEC
actively enforces the rules and regulations that forbid the conduct in question. For another,
investors harmed by underwriters’ unlawful practices may sue and obtain damages under the
securities law. Finally, the fact that the SEC is itself required to take account of competitive
considerations when it creates securities-related policy makes it somewhat less necessary to rely on
anti-trust actions to address anti-competitive behavior.
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The judgment makes it more difficult for investors to reach the Court and, in
this respect, fits in with other recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court in
securities regulation which benefit defendant corporations rather than activist
investors.290 In relation to competition law, the judgment is important because
it encourages a shift towards entrusting control of competition policy to spe-
cialized agencies which are likely to provide for a different priority setting than
the anti-trust regulator itself.291 Although the differences between US and EU
securities regulation should not be overlooked and the case should be seen on its
facts, the reasoning of the SC in Credit Suisse would point against, at least the
unfettered, application of competition law on ECB action.
B. Issues of Clearing and Settlement
As part of its efforts to facilitate the integration of national securities markets,
the Commission has taken a number of initiatives in relation to clearing and
settlement. In 2001, the Lamfalussy Report identified the vital importance of
ensuring the smooth functioning of European clearing and settlement systems as
a prerequisite for the efficient functioning and integration of national securities
markets.292 The Report pointed out the need of consolidation in the clearing
and settlement market but took the view that it should be left principally in the
hands of the private sector. Public intervention, by contrast, should focus on
ensuring compliance with competition law and removing barriers which inhibit
consolidation.293
The problems associated with cross-border clearing and settlement arrange-
ments were thoroughly explored by the Giovannini Group.294 The first Gio-
vannini report,295 delivered in 2001, identified 15 barriers to the integration of
EU post-trading systems and concluded that the EU financial market was highly
fragmented and, as a result, failed to perform its functions effectively.296 The
290 See Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v Scientific Atlanta Inc, SC Judgment of 15 January
2008; Tellabs Inc v Makor Issues and Rights Ltd, SC Judgment of 21 June 2007.
291 See R C Picker, ‘Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Anti-trust’ (2007) Supreme Court
Review 161 at 171.
292 See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities
Markets, Brussels, 15 February 2001, p 17. 293 Op cit, 15–17.
294 The Giovannini Group was formed in 1996 as a group of financial market participants under
the chairmanship of Alberto Giovannini, Deputy General Manager of Banca di Roma. Its role was
to advise the Commission on financial market issues and, especially, propose solutions to improve
market integration in the light of the introduction of EMU.
295 The Giovannini Group, Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the Eur-
opean Union, Brussels, November 2001, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
financial-markets/docs/clearing/first_giovannini_report_en.pdf>.
296 The Report classified the barriers under three categories as follows: barriers related to tech-
nical requirements and market practice, barriers related to taxation, and barriers related to legal
certainty. Barriers related to technical requirements and market practice include: (1) national dif-
ferences in information technology and interfaces; (2) national clearing and settlement restrictions
that require the use of multiple systems; (3) differences in national rules relating to corporate
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second report,297 delivered in 2003, put forward a detailed strategy of the action
to be undertaken for the elimination of barriers identified in the first report. It
proposed essentially that the establishment of an efficient pan-European clearing
and settlement infrastructure in European financial markets was to be made up
of two ingredients. First, a concerted system of initiatives designed to replace the
15 barriers identified in the first report with standards and regulations to ensure
an efficient and barrier free market. Secondly, adequate regulatory and super-
visory structures which would ensure that the benefits of a barrier-free market
would be made available to all market participants through low-cost and safe
post-trading services.
Following various other developments,298 in May 2006, DG Competition
released an Issues Paper on competition in securities trading and post-trading for
consultation.299 In the aftermath of the consultation exercise, the Commission
actions, beneficial ownership and custody; (4) absence of intra-day settlement finality; (5) practical
impediments to remote access to national clearing and settlement systems; (6) national differences
in settlement periods; (7) national differences in operating hours/settlement deadlines; (8) national
differences in securities issuance practice; (9) national restrictions on the location of securities;
(10) national restrictions on the activity of primary dealers and market makers. Barriers related to
taxation include: (11) domestic withholding tax regulations serving to disadvantage foreign inter-
mediaries; (12) transaction taxes collected through a functionality integrated into a local settlement
system. Barriers related to legal certainty include: (13) the absence of an EU-wide framework for
the treatment of interests in securities; (14) national differences in the legal treatment of bilateral
netting for financial transactions; and (15) uneven application of national conflict of law rules. The
Report drew a distinction between barriers which could be addressed by the private sector alone
and those that could be addressed only on the basis of government intervention. There was a
consensus within the Giovannini Group that the EU clearing and settlement landscape could be
significantly improved by market-led convergence in technical requirements and market practice
across national systems. This would provide for inter-operability between national systems and
could deliver considerable benefits within a significantly shorter timeframe than that required for
full system mergers. On the other hand, the removal of barriers related to taxation and legal
certainty was identified as being the responsibility of the public sector.
297 The Giovannini Group, Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements
Brussels, April 2003, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/
clearing/second_giovannini_report_en.pdf>.
298 In July 2005, the Commission investigated possible predatory pricing by Euronext when it
appeared to reduce temporarily its prices in response to new market entry by London Stock
Exchange in the trading of Dutch equities. Following a thorough investigation, the Commission
established no violation. See Greenaway in the Competition Policy Newsletter, 2005 no 3, 69–71 at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2005_3.pdf>. Also, in June 2005 the Com-
mission published a report on ‘Securities trading, clearing and settlement in EU 25’ detailing the
structure and organization of the securities industry in the Member States. The report concluded
that vertical arrangements in clearing and settlement were pervasive throughout the EU and that,
contrary to banks’ preferences, there was little or no choice in the location of clearing and settlement.
See <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/securities/report_june_2005_en.pdf>.
299 Commission Working Document, Competition in EU securities trading and post-trading,
Issues Paper, Brussels, 24 May 2006 available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_
services/securities_trading.pdf>. On 23 May 2006, the Commission also published a draft working
document on post-trading activities. The Report concluded that a reduction in post-trading costs
has a consistent impact on liquidity and thus on GDP. A more efficient post-trading system, leading
to a lowering of transaction costs of between 8 per cent and 17 per cent could result in a higher level
of GDP on average between 0/2 per cent and 0.6 per cent, see p 48 of the Report, available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/draft/draft_en.pdf>.
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decided not to adopt legislation but proceed through non-binding guidelines in
the form of a voluntary Code of Conduct.300 It was felt that this choice was
more in keeping with related private sector developments and built on existing
momentum generated by those initiatives.301 The Commission considers that
the Code has been a success and that the industry has, so far, lived up to its
commitments.302
C. The Clearstream Decision
The Commission had the opportunity to visit anti-trust aspects of the securities
clearing and settlement industry in the Clearstream decision.303 The Commis-
sion found that Clearstream International SA breached Article 82 of the Treaty
by refusing to supply cross-border clearing and settlement services and by
charging discriminatory prices to Euroclear Bank SA. Notably, the case origi-
nated in an ex officio investigation launched by the Commission rather than any
specific complaint received by it. It is pertinent here to examine the decision in
some detail as it brings to the fore the interplay between settlement systems and
competition law.
Clearstream Banking AG was Germany’s only CSD. It was part of the
Clearstream group which also included Clearstream Banking Luxembourg SA,
one of only two ICSDs operating in Europe. The Clearstream Group was
wholly owned by the Deutsche Bo¨rse group to which the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange also belonged. Euroclear Bank was based in Brussels and was the other
300 For the text of the Code, see <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/
code/code_en.pdf> and <http://www.fese.eu/_lib/files/European_Code_of_Conduct_for_
Clearing_and_Settlement.pdf>. The Code of Conduct is accompanied by terms of reference
adopted on July 2008 which outline how infrastructures having signed the Code of Conduct for
clearing and settlement will report on (i) their compliance with the service unbundling and
accounting separation part of the Code and how external auditors will assess this compliance and
(ii) their compliance with the Code in general. For the terms of reference, see <http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/financial-markets/docs/code/terms_of_reference_en.pdf>. The Code of Conduct
is also accompanied by an access and interoperability guideline adopted on 28 June 2007:
see <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/code/guideline_en.pdf>.
301 See the speech by Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and
Services on Clearing and Settlement: The Way Forward Economic and Monetary Affairs Com-
mittee of the European Parliament Brussels, 11 July 2006, SPEECH/06/450, available at <http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/450&type=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. In July 2008, the Commission formally mandated CESR to
provide technical advice on post trading, in particular (i) to map out Member States’ regulatory
and supervisory arrangements (set at national, regional, and/or local level) relating to the setting up
of links between post-trading infrastructures and (ii) to advise the Commission—in relation to
existing link requests made under the aegis of the Code of Conduct—on how best to address
any potential differences in such arrangements that the mapping exercise may uncover. See <http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/2008_07_28_cesr_mandate.pdf>.
302 See the Third Progress Report to Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) on the
implementation of the Code, presented by the Commission in March 2008, <http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/ecofin/20080311_ecofin_en.pdf>.
303 Commission Decision of 2 June 2004, Case COMP/38.096, C (2004) 1958 final.
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European ICSD. It had originally been set up under the patronage of Morgan
Guarantee Trust Company of New York but, in 2000, the link with Morgan
Guarantee terminated and, subsequently, Euroclear merged with a number of
European CSDs.
As Germany’s only CSD, Clearstream Banking was in a very strong position.
According to Article 5 of the Depotgesetz, all securities held in collective safe
custody in Germany, which amount for the overwhelming majority of securities,
have to be held in a recognized Wertpapiersammelbank (CSD). As a result, more
than 90 per cent of German securities were deposited with Clearstream. Its
dominance was reinforced by the rules governing stock exchange transaction.
Under paragraph 16(2) of the Rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Bo¨rse-
nordnung), the condition of orderly settlement of transactions imposed by the
Bo¨rsengesetz (Exchange Act) was fulfilled if the applicant for admission to trading
conducted the settlement of its transactions through Clearstream.
The dispute concerned access by Euroclear to the clearing services offered by
Clearstream. To understand the case, it is fundamental to draw a distinction
between primary and secondary clearing and settlement.304 Primary clearing and
settlement refers to the final transfer of ownership in a security and can only be
effected by the issuer CSD, ie the entity with which securities have been
deposited in final custody. Under German law, settlement of transactions in
securities kept in collective safe-keeping occurs by book entry without any
physical movement of the securities. Responsibility for effecting the book entry
falls on the issuer CSD. Such primary settlement occurs whenever there is a
change in the position of the securities accounts held with the issuer CSD and
takes place through a transfer of a fraction of the collective ownership which can
only be performed by the issuer CSD.
Secondary clearing and settlement is performed by intermediaries at a
downstream level. Intermediaries, such as banks, ICSDs, and other CSDs, hold
securities with the issuer CSD in their name and on behalf of their customers,
either via segregated accounts, ie separate accounts for each of their customers,
or using a so-called ‘omnibus’ account reflecting all the positions of the inter-
mediary with the issuer CSD.305 If a transaction occurs between customers of
the same intermediary, it can be internalized, ie it can be settled within an
omnibus account held by an intermediary without entailing any change in its
position vis-a`-vis the issuer CSD, and there is no need for primary clearing. If it
cannot be internalized, then primary clearing which mirrors the secondary
clearing within the intermediary’s account must take place.306 Since inter-
mediaries are unlikely to be able to internalize all potential trades, it is clear that
they must have a contractual relationship with the issuer CSD in order to be able
304 See Clearstream, op cit, para 29 et seq. 305 See Clearstream, op cit, para 34.
306 op cit, para 35.
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to provide clearing and settlement services to their customers. The issuer CSD
thus becomes an unavoidable trading partner.
(i) The Relevant Market
The Commission identified the relevant market as being the market in clearing
and settlement of transactions relating to securities issued according to German
law, in particular in relation to cross-border transactions.307 It drew a distinction
between clearing and settlement, on the one hand, and safe-keeping, on the
other hand. Whilst all the above services are connected, since clearing and set-
tlement can only take place in securities which are kept in safe custody, custody
services remain distinct from transaction-based ones and are not part of the same
market.308
In relation to the relevant market, the Commission made three important
findings. It held that there is a group of providers of clearing and settlement
services for whom indirect access to the issuer CSD is not a substitutable alter-
native for direct access. Secondly, it held that the provision by the issuer CSD of
primary clearing and settlement to banks is in a separate market to the provision
of primary clearing and settlement to CSDs and ICSDs. Thirdly, it held that for
customers requiring primary clearing and settlement in order to be able to
provide efficient services to their customers, secondary clearing was not an
economically viable alternative. Each of these findings needs to be explained.
The Commission drew a distinction between direct and indirect access to an
issuer CSD. Direct access occurs where a CSD, an ICSD, or a bank obtains
contractually a direct link to the communication channels of the issuer CSD
through which instructions and information relating to a transaction are
exchanged. Indirect access exists where an entity does not have a direct account
with the issuer CSD but uses an intermediary which has such an account. Pro-
viders of secondary clearing and settlement will choose direct or indirect access
to the issuer CSD depending on their requirements as a user, such as the
volumes to be processed or the level of service that they offer to their customers.
However, for customers requiring direct access, indirect access presents a num-
ber of disadvantages which do not make it a viable alternative. In the case of an
indirect link, deadlines are poorer, the risk is greater, and the costs are higher,
given that the intermediary will charge a mark-up for its involvement. Also,
using an intermediary creates potential conflicts of interest. Furthermore, for
307 Clearstream, para 136. According to the case law and the Commission’s standard practice a
relevant product market comprises all those products or services which are regarded as inter-
changeable or substitutable by the customer, by reason of the product’s characteristics, their prices,
and their intended use: See Case 27/76 United Brands Co v Commission [1978] ECR 207; Case
T-30/89 Hilti [1991] ECR II-1439, on appeal, Case C-53/92P [1994] ECR 1-667, and Com-
mission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition
law, [1997] OJ C372/5. 308 Clearstream, para 137.
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CSDs and ICSDs to be able to deliver collateral in TARGET, direct access to
the issuer CSD is an ECB requirement.309
The importance of Clearstream in this regard is that the Commission used the
mode of access to the issuer CSD to determine the relevant market and, fol-
lowing the judgment in Hugin,310 determined that a specific type of supply,
namely direct access, was a separate market.
As regards its second finding, the Commission held that the issuer CSD
provided to CSDs and ICSDs different services from those provided to banks.
Services to banks were provided on the basis of standard terms and conditions
whilst services to CSDs and ICSDs were based on individually negotiated
agreements, leading to large price differentials, and required a modified technical
infrastructure.311 By contrast, the Commission did not accept the submission
that Clearstream provided additional services to ICSDs which it did not provide
to CSDs since Clearstream was unable to explain what these additional services
were.312
In relation to its third finding, the Commission confirmed that secondary
clearing was no viable substitute for primary clearing. Internalized clearing and
settlement within the books of an intermediary can only occur on an incidental
basis if both the seller and the buyer happen to be customers of the same
intermediary. However, none of the providers of secondary clearing is in a
position to settle transactions with all potential counterparties in their own
books so that access to the services of the issuer CSD becomes indispensable
since it is the only pool in which transactions with all potential counterparties
can be settled.313
It followed that both demand-side and supply-side substitutability were non-
existent. From the demand side, intermediaries that provided cross-border ser-
vices on processing of securities could not readily use other suppliers of primary
clearing and settlement services and were dependent on Clearstream as the issuer
CSD. Nor could CSDs and ICSDs dealing with significant transaction volumes
use as a substitute the services available to non-CSD customers or indirect access
to the issuer CSD. From the supply side, no other company was in a position to
offer in the foreseeable future primary clearing and settlement services.314
The Commission determined the relevant geographical market on a national
basis.315 Securities issued according to German law were in practice kept in final
309 Clearstream, para 139 et seq. 310 Case 22/78 Hugin [1979] ECR 1869.
311 Cleastretam, paras 149 et seq. 312 op cit, para 133 et seq.
313 Clearstream, op cit, para 162 et seq. 314 op cit, para 200.
315 According to established case law, the relevant geographic market comprises the area in
which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply of products or services, in which the
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous, and which can be distinguished from
neighbouring areas because conditions of competition are appreciably different: see Case 27/76
United Brands Co v Commission [1978] ECR 207; Case T-30/89 Hilti [1991] ECR II-1439, on
appeal, Case C-53/92P [1994] ECR 1-667.
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custody in Germany whilst securities issued in accordance with the law of other
Member States were in practice kept in final custody with the respective issuer
CSD. There was, therefore, practically no competition between different
national CSDs for the deposit and final custody or safe-keeping of securities.316
(ii) Dominant Position
The Commission had no difficulty in establishing that Clearstream enjoyed a
position of de facto monopoly as a result of a series of legal and factual con-
siderations. The vast majority of securities issued under German law were kept in
collective safe custody. Under the law, only a CSD was authorized to keep
securities in collective safe custody in Germany and Clearstream was the only
CSD in the national territory.317 It followed that primary clearing and settlement
of securities issued and held in collective safe custody in accordance with German
law was only carried out by Clearstream. There was no actual competition and,
whilst in theory it would be possible to set up another CSD in Germany, this was
unlikely to occur as there were high economic, legal, and technical barriers to
entry and no interest by market participants for another entrant.318
(iii) Abuses
The Commission identified two types of abuse. First, by denying Euroclear
direct access to its communication infrastructure, it refused to supply it with
primary clearing and settlement services for registered shares. Secondly, it
charged Euroclear discriminatory prices compared to the prices that it charged
to other customers for the provision of similar services.
Echoing Commercial Solvents,319 the Commission held that Clearstream was
a de facto monopolist and, as such, an unavoidable trading partner of Euroclear.
316 Clearstream, op cit, para 197. 317 See above.
318 This is for the following reasons (see Clearstream, op cit, para 209 et seq): (a) to achieve
economic viability, the new entrant would need to become the issuer CSD for a large number of
German securities. Since there cannot be two issuer CSDs for the same security, this would mean
that Clearstream would no longer be the issuer CSD for the securities for which the new entrant
would be the issuer CSD. In practice, however, it would be very difficult to erode Clearstream’s
dominance. Economic reality showed that the position of an issuer CSD in any Member State has
never been challenged by a new CSD. (b) The rules of the German stock exchanges stipulated that
the condition of orderly settlement set by the Borsengesetz (Exchange Act) was fulfilled, where an
applicant for admission to trading conducted the settlement of its exchange transactions through
Clearstream. Although the wording of the rules did not explicitly exclude other possibilities for
orderly settlement, the fact was that any new entrant would have to obtain recognition by the
Frankfurt Exchange and other exchanges. (c) As Deutsche Borse had itself stressed, offering an
exchange platform and offering settlement services is functionally connected. Usage in the market
suggested that the majority of customers is interested in these services being provided by one
source. (d) A potential new entrant would have to set up complex and costly systems, without
having an assurance that it could provide orderly or economically viable services. Establishing an
alternative CSD would require substantial investment in IT development and human resources
running at an estimate of 156 million euro.
319 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR 223.
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Clearstream had behaved in a dilatory manner by refusing to supply Euroclear
with services for a period of almost two years whilst access could be, and had
been, supplied to other CSDs within a period of four months. Thus, in this
case the refusal to supply was closely connected with discrimination although
the Commission classified it as a single infringement.320 The fact that Clear-
stream eventually granted Euroclear access to its computerized settlement
platform did not undo the refusal to supply. It was the unjustified delay in
doing so, combined with the unreasonable linking of access to unconnected
issues, which amounted to an abusive refusal to supply contrary to Article
82(c) EC.321
By refusing to supply, Clearstream harmed innovation and competition in
the provision of cross-border clearing and settlement within the single market.
In effect, it prohibited non-issuer CSDs and ICSDs from offering a one-stop
shop to their clients without having to have recourse to local agents in the
various Member States.322 Furthermore, the Commission found that Clear-
stream had abused its dominance by applying a differential tariff for the provi-
sion of primary clearing and settlement services to Euroclear from the tariff
applied for the same services to certain national CSDs without any objective and
cost-based justification. In fact, Euroclear had much larger transaction volumes
than those CSDs and their level of automation was higher, thus resulting in
lower staff costs per transaction.
Clearstream indicates that the Commission is prepared to take a robust
approach in relation to the application of competition law on securities clearing
and settlement. A distinct feature of this case is that the Commission proceeded
with the adoption of its decision despite the fact that, meanwhile, the violation
had ceased. Also, despite finding a violation, it decided not to impose a fine on
Clearstream on the grounds that there was no Commission or court case law
dealing with the application of competition law in the area and there had been
long-ranging debate within many institutions and fora in order to define better
the role and obligations of the various actors in the clearing and settlement
industry. Whilst the decision not to impose a fine may appear somewhat gen-
erous, the Commission’s stance suggests that it saw the decision as an oppor-
tunity to clarify the law and indicate its future policy in relation to the clearing
and settlement of securities transactions. Thus, in relation to securities law,
Clearstream had the character of a path finding decision, a policy statement that
the Commission means business. Perhaps the most important aspect of the
case, however, is the narrow market definition adopted by the Commission, in
320 Clearstream, para 216. 321 op cit, 249.
322 The Commission attributed particular importance to the fact that Euroclear was in fact the
only ICSD in the EU apart from CBL, which is a sister company to CBF and a subsidiary of CI.
The facts and other elements of the case considered in context, made it clear that that CI/CBF
intended to exclude Euroclear from the market. See Clearstream, op cit, para 300.
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particular, its finding that for CSDs and ICSDs indirect access to the issuer CSD
is not a substitutable alternative for direct access. Whilst the Commission’s
objective was to trigger the development of a market in interstate settlement
services, its findings appear to be a serious intrusion on contractual freedom
which can withstand judicial scrutiny only on the basis of an extensive and
thorough economic analysis of the market.
D. Competition Law and Target 2-Securities
(i) Overview
As stated above, the ECB is not bound directly by the competition rules of the
Treaty but by the general postulate of Article 105(1) to observe the principle of
open market economy with free competition. One of the obligations arising
from this provision is to comply with the substantive requirements of Articles 81
to 87 EC applicable mutatis mutandis and taking account of the ECB’s wide
discretion to act in the public interest in pursuance of the tasks assigned to it by
the Treaty.323
The application of competition law on T2S on the basis outlined above does
not contradict the public law functions of the ECB and the ESCB. Core aspects
of the ECB, such as the fixing of interest rates or action to support the exchange
rate of the euro, are exempted from competition law altogether. However, not
every action that the ECB, or a public agency on its behalf, may validly undertake
is beyond the reach of the competition rules of the Treaty. This analysis is
compatible with the approach of the ECJ in defining the concept of an ‘under-
taking’ for the purposes of the application of Articles 81, 82, and 86 EC.
The definition of an ‘undertaking’ is broad. It encompasses any entity
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in
which it is financed.324 Economic activity is any activity which consists in
offering goods and services in a given market.325 To determine whether an
economic activity is carried out, one must have regard to the nature and aim of
the activities.326 Whilst a profit making motive is not essential, the activity must
be one which could, at least in principle, be carried out by a private undertaking
in order to make a profit.327
323 See above.
324 See eg Case C-41/90 Ho¨fner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21; Joined Cases C-264/01,
C-306/01, C–354/01, and C–355/01 AOK-Bundesverband and others [2004] ECR I-2493,
para 46.
325 Case C-118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, para 7; Aeroports de Paris v Commission
[2000] ECR II-3929, para 107.
326 See Bellamy and Child, European Community Law of Competition (6th edn) 94.
327 See op cit, and Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Pourcet v Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, per
Tesauro AG, para 8.
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State or international bodies which act in the performance of public law
functions are not undertakings.328 However, the crucial criterion is not the
status of the body but the nature of the activity that it carries out. It may thus
be possible for a public body to be an undertaking in relation to some activities
but not in relation to others.329 As the Court held in Cali & Figli v SEPG,330 a
distinction is drawn between a situation where the State acts in the exercise of
official authority and that where it carries on economic activities of an indus-
trial or commercial nature by offering goods or services on the market. It thus
becomes necessary to establish whether the public body acts in the performance
of ‘a task in the public interest which forms part of the essential functions of
the State’.331 The precise boundaries are not always easy to specify. The Court
seeks to draw a balance between, on the one hand, respect for the regulatory
and public law autonomy of the Member States and, on the other hand, the
need to ensure that the competition rules of the Treaty are not undermined by
State action. The difficulties of the judicial inquiry are compounded by the fact
that the boundaries of public law are not static. Not only do they differ from
State to State but they evolve over time. Within the last 20 years, the
boundaries of the State have shrunk as successful economies have tended to
keep the State at arm’s length from the levers of the economy. The Court
adopts in effect a functional, comparative criterion: the issue is often deter-
mined by reference to whether the activities in question could be carried on
only by a public agency or they are activities which ‘have not always been, and
are not necessarily, carried on by . . . public bodies’.332 Thus the fact that an
328 The Treaty rules on competition do not apply to an activity which, by its nature, its aim, and
the rules to which it is subject does not belong to the sphere of economic activity, see Joined Cases
C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, paras 18–19, (concerning the
management of the public social security system). Case C-343/95 Diego Calı` & Figli [1997] ECR
I-1547, paras 22 and 23, (concerning anti-pollution surveillance of the maritime environment). In
Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43 it was held that an international
organization which had been set up to provide air traffic control services and had power to collect
route charges from airlines was not caught by Articles 82 and 86 EC. Its activities were not of an
economic nature but derived from the power of the contracting States to supervise and control air
space, were financed by State contributions, and were carried out in the public interest of furthering
air safety.
329 See eg Case T-128/98 Aeroports de Paris v Commission [2000] ECR II-3929, para 108; Case
T-155/04 SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission [2007] 4 CMLR 372, para 61.
330 Case C-343/95 Cali & Figli v SEPG [1997] ECR I-1547, para 16; Case 118/85 Commission
v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, para 7. The Treaty provisions on competition are applicable to the
activities of an entity which can be severed from those in which it engages as a public authority:
C-107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paras 14–15. On this basis in Case T-128/98
Ae´roports de Paris v Commission [2000] ECR II-3929, the CFI held that the provision of airport
facilities to airlines by a public corporation in return for a fee freely fixed by the latter and the
management of those facilities are economic activities even though they are carried out on publicly
owned property. Confirmed on appeal: Case C-82/01 P Ae´roports de Paris v Commission [2002]
ECR I-9297. 331 Cali and Figli, op cit, para 22.
332 Case C-475/99, [2001] ECR I-8089; Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glo¨ckner [2001] ECR
I-8089, para 20.
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activity may not be offered by any private enterprise at a given moment does
not necessarily exclude it from being a commercial activity if, in principle, it
can be carried out commercially.333 On this basis, the provision of locomotives
and access to the railway infrastructure,334 the management of public tele-
communications equipment and its availability to operators for a fee,335 and
the provision of employment procurement by a public body which had the
exclusive right to provide such services336 have been held to be economic
activities.337 By contrast, anti-pollution surveillance and environmental pro-
tection services,338 the collection of special taxes on behalf the State imposed to
finance the decommissioning of nuclear plants,339 and the performance of
funeral services where it is by law entrusted to local communes340 have been
held not to constitute an economic activity.341
On the basis of this analysis, it is arguable that, if a national public body
established a settlement platform similar to T2S, it would qualify as an eco-
nomic activity and would thus be subject to the competition law rules of
the Treaty. It should be noted in this context that Articles 81 and 82 are
intended to apply first and foremost to anti-competitive conduct by private
economic actors. They apply to State measures only by reflection. The case law
has derived from the duty of solidarity provided for in Article 10 EC an
obligation on public authorities not to maintain in force legislative or reg-
ulatory measures which may render ineffective the competition rules of
the Treaty. A Member State may not require or favour the adoption of
anti-competitive agreements nor may it reinforce their effects.342 Also, a
Member State may not deprive its own legislation of its official character by
delegating to private parties responsibility for taking decisions affecting the
333 T-155/04 SELEX, op cit, para 89.
334 Case T-229/94 Deutsche Bahn v Commission [1997] ECR II-1689.
335 Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873.
336 See C-41/90 Ho¨fner [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR I-7119.
337 Also, in Ambulanz Glo¨ckner, op cit, health organizations providing services on the market for
emergency and ambulance services were held to carry out economic activities.
338 Case 343/95 Cali & Figli v SEPG [1997] ECR I-154.
339 Case C-207/01 Altair Chimica v ENEL [2003] ECR I-8875.
340 Case 30/87 Bodson v SA Pompes Fune`bres des Re´gions Libe´re´es [1988] ECR 2479, para 35.
341 Cf Case C-244/94 Fe´de´ration franc¸aise des Socie´te´s d’assurance v Ministre de l’Agriculture
[1995] ECR I-4013. In that case, a non-profit making body managing an optional supplementary
old age pension fund was found to be an undertaking because it operated according to the principle
of capitalization. Benefits depended on the level of contributions paid and the financial results of
investments made, and the scheme competed with private life assurance companies. The crucial
distinction appears to lie not so much on whether affiliation to a scheme is compulsory or optional
as on the method of calculation of benefits and on whether it competes with insurance companies.
This is reiterated by the judgment in Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bed-
rijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Judgment of 21 September 1999, paras 81–87.
342 A national measure reinforces a private agreement where it incorporates the terms of the
agreement and requires, or at least encourages, compliance with it: Case 267/86 Van Eycke [1988]
ECR 4769, para 18.
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economic sphere.343 This case law has developed mainly in relation to national
regulations which fix prices in specific service sectors. However, the application
of Articles 81 and 82 on State action via Article 10 appears to be relatively
benign.344 The reason for this is that the Treaty has specific provisions for anti-
competitive State action, namely Article 86 and the chapter on State aids.
Since the ECB intervenes as a public body, it should therefore be, by analogy,
Article 86 that should be the main focus of attention.345
In addition to being bound by the principle of free market economy with
free competition under Article 105(2), and thus requirements similar to those
imposed by Articles 81, 82, and 86 EC, the ECB, as a Community institution,
is also bound to respect the freedom to carry out a trade or profession.346 This
freedom has been recognized as a fundamental economic right by the ECJ but,
according to the general formula used in the case law, it is not an absolute
prerogative and must be viewed in the light of its social function.347 It may be
restricted provided that two conditions are met: the restrictions imposed must
correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community; and
they must not ‘constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference,
impairing the very substance of the right’.348 It should be noted that, so far,
on no occasion has the ECJ found that the freedom to exercise a professional
activity has been violated. Where Community legislation seriously threatens
such rights the Court prefers to address the claim on different grounds such as
breach of the principle of equality, as for example in Codorniu,349 or of the
343 Case C-2/91 Meng [1993] ECR I-5751, para 14; Case C-245/91 Ohra [1993] ECR I-5851,
para 10; Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 21
September 1999, para 65.
344 This appears to be the tenor of the case law since Case C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801.
See also for an earlier example Case 311/85 VVR v Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke
Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR I-3801.
345 The very fact of granting monopoly rights may itself be a violation. In Case C-179/90 Merci
[1991] ECR I-5889, the ECJ held that although the simple fact of creating a dominant position by
granting exclusive rights is not incompatible with Article 86, the granting of rights which induce or
lead to the undertakings committing abuses is incompatible. In Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993]
ECR I-2533, the Court reversed the burden of proof by suggesting that exclusive rights are prima
facie illegal unless they are objectively justified or fulfil the criteria of Article 86(2). However, the
Court seems to have retreated from that position. In Case C-323/93 Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077,
it held that a Member State contravenes the Treaty only, if in merely exercising the exclusive right
granted to it, the undertaking cannot avoid abusing its dominant position.
346 See Fernadez Martin, op cit, fn 25.
347 Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491; Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR
3727; Case 240/83 Procureur de la Re´publique v ADBHU [1985] ECR 531, para 12. This is the
general formula used by the Court in relation to all fundamental rights. See eg in relation to the
freedom of expression: Case C-219/91 Ter Voort [1992] ECR I-5485, para 38.
348 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, para 78; Case 265/87 Schra¨der v
Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, para 15; Case C-177/90 Ku¨hn v Landwirtschaftskammer
Weser-Ems [1992] ECR I-35. For recent confirmation, see eg Joined Cases C-37 and C-38/02 Di
Lenardo Adriano and Dilexport v Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero, Judgment of 15 July 2004,
para 82. 349 Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853.
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protection of legitimate expectations, as in the milk quota cases.350 It is thus
submitted that, in the present context, the invocation of the right to trade does not
add anything to the framework of analysis based on the application of competi-
tion law. In other words, for our purposes, the obligation of the ECB to respect
the freedom to trade does not impose on it more onerous obligations than those
imposed by the analogical application of Articles 81, 82, and 86.
There are two aspects which should be examined in this context, namely, the
legal framework of T2S and the relationship between T2S and national
CSDs.351 Both aspects are inter-related and should be examined by reference to
Articles 81, 82, and 86(2). It should be noted however that the analysis of
Article 81 is closely linked to that of Article 82. To the extent that the T2S may
be viewed as an essential infrastructure and the Eurosystem may find itself in a
dominant position, it will be under heightened obligations and the agreements
entered into with CSDs could not be justified under Article 81(3) unless Article
82 considerations are also taken into account.352 It is thus Article 82, as it
applies to public bodies via Article 86, rather than Article 81 which should
provide the main focus of enquiry.
(ii) Article 81
It is expected that T2S will be based on an ECB guideline addressed to the
national central banks belonging to the Eurosystem and be accompanied by
complementary arrangements. It appears that the establishment of T2S will have
some impact on the market. Participating CSDs will agree on a common pricing
mechanism. They will also, in effect, have no incentive to build or maintain
their own settlement platform. It may thus be said that the establishment of T2S
will lead directly or indirectly to the fixing of prices or any other trading con-
ditions and also to limiting investment within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.
It is submitted however that it would be possible to justify such anti-competitive
effects by analogical application of Article 81(3) EC.353
350 See Case 120/86 Mulder I [1988] ECR 2321; Case C-189/89 Spagl [1990] ECR I-4539. See
further for a discussion, Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 315–316.
351 See ECB Legal assessment, op cit, 12.
352 In Case T-51/89 Tetra-Pak v Commission [1990] ECR II-309, paras 28–29, the CFI held
that the grant of an exemption to an agreement under Article 81(3) does not render inapplicable
Article 82. See also Joined Cases C-395 and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v
Commission [2000] ECR I-1365. If it were otherwise, an exemption under Article 81(3) would in
effect also operate concurrently as an exemption to Article 82 which would be inconsistent with the
notion of abuse. Also, the principle of hierarchy of legal norms prohibits the grant of an exemption
under secondary Community legislation from taking precedence over an Article of the Treaty. This
is recognized by a number of block exemptions which expressly state that the benefit of the
exemption under their provisions does not preclude the applicability of Article 82. See eg the block
exemptions on air transport: Regulations 2671/88, 2672/88, and 2673/88. It follows that, where
the granting of an individual exemption is being considered, the Commission must take account of
the characteristics of the agreement which would also be relevant in applying Article 82.
353 ECB Legal Assessment, op cit, 12–13.
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Article 81(3) lays down four conditions that must be fulfilled in order for an
exemption to be granted. The agreement:
1. must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress;
2. must allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;
3. must not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
4. must not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
These conditions must be fulfilled cumulatively.354 As already discussed, T2S
presents distinct advantages. By offering DvP settlement in central bank money,
it will increase the liquidity of financial markets and promote cross-border trade.
It will also offer the most secure and effective form of settlement thus improving
market stability.355 T2S will also increase interstate competition. It will offer to
CSDs for the first time the possibility of providing settlement services for
securities which are issued and held in another CSD not belonging to the same
group.356 It can thus be expected to contribute to increasing competition among
CSDs. It will make settlement more efficient since it will take place in a single
platform rather than in multiple platforms as is currently the case, where the
cash leg of a securities transaction is settled in TARGET 2 and the securities leg,
in some cases, in two different CSDs. The efficiencies which T2S can be
expected to offer should be stressed here. As the First Giovannini Report pointed
out,357 ‘inefficiencies in clearing and settlement represent the most primitive and
thus most important barrier to integrated financial markets in Europe. The removal
of these inefficiencies is a necessary condition for the development of a large and
efficient financial infrastructure in Europe.’ T2S is fully in conformity with the
Giovannini Group recommendations and contributes towards addressing the
barriers to trade identified therein.
It would therefore appear that, in principle, the conditions of Article 81(3)
may be met. The establishment of T2S contributes to improving securities
trading and promoting technical or economic progress whilst allowing con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. The requirement of proportionality
as exemplified in the third and fourth conditions of Article 81(3) also appears to
be met on the basis of the above considerations. It will be noted in this context
that T2S will not be the only settlement platform and CSDs will not be forced
to use it. CSDs will continue to have access to central bank money through the
TARGET 2 interfaces and, in addition, third parties may continue to offer
settlement in commercial bank money.
354 Joined Cases T-528, 542, and 543/93 Metropole Television v Commission [1996] ECR
II-649. 355 See ECB, legal assessment, op cit, 13.
356 Ibid. 357 See the First Giovannini Report, op cit, 2.
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By the establishment of T2S, the ECB and the ESCB will offer CSDs the
possibility to provide DvP settlement in central bank money. The specific
conditions under which access to T2S will be offered to CSDs, eg the specific
services provided, price, and mutual rights and obligations, will be implemented
through contractual arrangements between the Eurosystem and individual
CSDs. In the context of Article 81, such arrangements are best viewed as vertical
agreements and for the reasons stated above, they would in principle be eligible
to be exempted on the basis of Article 81(3).358
Although the establishment of T2S does not appear to necessitate direct
agreements between participating CSDs, which would be horizontal restraints,
the existence of a series of identical agreements between, on the one hand, the
Eurosystem and, on the other hand, individual CSDs may arguably give rise to
the existence of a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81.359 To the
extent that the individual agreements concluded by the Eurosystem or an agency
acting on its behalf can be exempted under Article 81(3), the same would also
apply in principle to the concerted practice among the CSDs unless it is possible
to identify any additional restrictions on competition not justified by the ben-
eficial pro-competitive effects identified above.
(iii) Article 82
In relation to the provision of T2S services, the Eurosystem may find itself in a
position comparable to an undertaking in a dominant position within the
meaning of Article 82. The T2S platform is likely to be an essential infra-
structure since it will be the only one which will offer real time DvP settlement
in central bank money. In view of its characteristics, and in the light of the
narrow definition favoured by the Commission, such settlement is likely to be
considered as a separate relevant market.360 In the event that T2S is not con-
sidered to be an essential infrastructure, the question whether it is in a dominant
position will depend on whether CSDs representing a sufficiently large share of
the settlement market agree to participate.361 This can be expected to be the case
358 ECB Legal Assessment, op cit, 15.
359 See eg Case 86/82 Hasselblad v Commission [1984] ECR 883.
360 The ECB takes the view that T2S is an essential infrastructure: see ECB Legal Assessment, op
cit, 16. Settlement in commercial bank money is less secure and does not appear to be a viable
substitute.
361 In its classic definition in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461,
paras 38–39, the ECJ defined dominance as a position of economic strength enjoyed by an
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its compe-
titors, its customers, and ultimately consumers. The existence of dominance is derived from a
combination of structural and behavioural factors each of which taken separately may not be
determinative. A market share of above 40 per cent would be important in assessing dominance
depending on its stability over time, the market share of the nearest competitor, and other factors
indicating dominance. See United Brands, op cit, For a full analysis, see Bellamy and Child, op cit,
923 et seq.
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since market participants are closely involved in the setting up process through
the consultation exercises carried out by the ECB and the governance structure
of T2S, and the successful launching of the platform itself depends on the par-
ticipation of a substantial number of CSDs. Thus, even if T2S were not to be an
essential infrastructure, it might be in a dominant position in the light of its
market share.
It may be helpful here to discuss in more detail the concept of essential
infrastructure. The ‘essential facilities doctrine’ suggests that the owner of a
facility which is essential for the conduct of trade is required, under certain
circumstances, to allow access to that facility to other market participants. In
Bronner362 the Court held that, for a facility to be considered as essential, the
following conditions must be fulfilled. First, refusal to allow access to a service
must be likely to eliminate all competition on the part of the firm requesting
access; secondly, the refusal must be unjustified; and thirdly, the service must in
itself be indispensable for carrying on business, ie there must be no actual or
potential substitute for the service, access to which is denied. The criterion of
indispensability is difficult to satisfy. In Bronner, Mediaprint, the defendant in
the main proceedings, was a press undertaking which controlled more than 40
per cent of the Austrian daily newspaper market and operated the only nation-
wide newspaper home delivery scheme. Bronner, the plaintiff, owned a news-
paper whose share of the market was less than four per cent. It argued that, by
reason of the small circulation of its newspaper, it was unable to set up and
operate its own home-delivery service and that Mediaprint’s refusal to allow it
access to its service was an abuse of dominance. The Court held that:363
. . . in order to demonstrate that the creation of such a system is not a realistic potential
alternative and that access to the existing system is therefore indispensable, it is not
enough to argue that it is not economically viable by reason of the small circulation of
the daily newspaper or newspapers to be distributed.
For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispensable, it would be necessary at
the very least to establish . . . that it is not economically viable to create a second home-
delivery scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers with a circulation comparable to
that of the daily newspapers distributed by the existing scheme.
The judgment in Bronner demonstrates that the essential facilities doctrine may
apply only in exceptional circumstances.364 Overall, the Court’s approach
appears more vigorous than that of the Commission which, traditionally, is
362 Case C-7/97 Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791.
363 op cit, paras 45–46.
364 See also Case T-504/93 Tierce´ Landbroke v Commission [1997] ECR II-923 and the earlier
judgment in Joined Cases C-241 and 242/91P RTE and ITP v Commission (Magill case) [ 1995]
ECR I-743. Notably, a narrow interpretation of Magill has also been followed by English courts.
See Philips Electronics NV v Ingman Ltd [1999] FSR 112.
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more readily prepared to give priority to freedom of competition. An essential
facility may be, for example, a port, an airport, a telecommunications network,
or a computer reservation system for airlines. In European Airways v Sabena,365
the Commission imposed a fine on Sabena for refusing access to its computer
reservation system to European Airways, a low cost airline which competed with
Sabena on the London to Brussels route. The Commission found that Sabena
intended to recoup any losses arising from competition in air traffic by charging
European Airways for access to its reservation system and requiring it to entrust
Sabena with the handling of its aircraft.
Notably, in the SWIFT case,366 the Commission found that a banking elec-
tronic network for the transfer of funds was an essential facility. In March 1997,
the Commission initiated proceedings against SWIFT (Society for Worldwide
International Financial Telecommunications), a cooperative owned by 2,000
banks which manages an international telecommunications network specializing
in the supply of data transmission and processing services to financial institu-
tions around the world. La Poste, a French public undertaking, had complained
that it had been refused access to the network. The Commission considered that
SWIFT enjoyed a monopoly as the sole operator on the international networks
for transferring payment messages and the only network to supply connections
for banking establishments anywhere in the world. It therefore constituted a
basic infrastructure in its own right. Its refusal to supply La Poste amounted to a
de facto exclusion from the market for international transfers. It constituted
abuse since SWIFT had laid down unjustified admission criteria relating to the
general conditions for the exercise of the financial activities of its members and
applied these criteria in the case of La Poste in a discriminatory manner.367
Thus, under the case law, an undertaking which controls an essential infra-
structure abuses its dominance where it denies to a competitor access to the
infrastructure without good justification, or where it grants access subject to an
excessive price, or unfair terms, or under discriminatory conditions and thereby
prevents competitors from offering their services effectively.368 As the Com-
mission pointed out in Clearstream, a de facto monopolist has a special
responsibility not to allow its conduct to stifle the smooth operation of com-
petition within the common market.369 The actual scope of the dominant firm’s
special responsibility must be considered in relation to the degree of dominance
held by that firm and to the special characteristics of the market which may
365 London European-Sabena [1988] OJ L272/27; [1989] 4 CMLR 662.
366 See Case No IV/36.120-La Poste/SWIFT + GUF, [1997] OJ C335 discussed in Commis-
sion, XXVII Report on Competition Policy—1997 SEC(98) 636, Luxembourg 1998, para 95.
367 The Commission suspended proceedings and did not make a formal finding of violation as
SWIFT formally undertook to provide access to its facilities to any financial entity which met the
criteria laid down by the European Monetary Institute for admission to domestic payment systems.
368 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223; Case 311/84
CBEM [1985] ECR 3261. 369 See Clearstream, op cit, para 300.
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affect the competitive situation.370 In its decisional practice, the Commission
has found that, even where it is of a short duration, eg two months, a mono-
polist’s refusal to grant access to its network is an abuse.371
Whether denial of access is objectively justified will need to be considered on a
case by case basis. In the case of T2S, the public service obligations of the Euro-
system suggest that the operation of T2S must comply with the following principles:
(a) Access to T2S must be universal, ie it must be made available to all market
participants which fulfil certain, objective criteria (universality of access);372
(b) such access must be made on the basis of non-discriminatory conditions to
all participants (equality of access);
(c) the criteria governing access and, more generally, the obligation of the
parties and the conditions for the operation of T2S must be transparent
(transparency);
(d) T2S should operate on the basis on a full cost recovery principle basis.
As the ECB itself has pointed out, integration of the settlements infrastructure
through the introduction of T2S entails access to the same services for all users
and under the same, objective, conditions irrespective of their location.
(iv) Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI)
Article 86(2) EC provides for a limited exception from the application of the
rules of the Treaty on grounds of public interest objectives. The exception
applies especially, but not exclusively, to the rules of competition law.373 An
undertaking may take advantage of that exception provided that the following
conditions are fulfilled:
370 See Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International S.A v Commission [1994] ECR II-755, paras 114,
115, and 155, as confirmed on appeal: Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak [1996] ECR I-5951.
371 See eg the London European/Sabena, Decision of 4 November 1988, [1988] OJ L317/47;
and Clearstream, op cit.
372 The intention of the ECB is to make T2S services available to all securities settlement systems
covered by Directive 98/26 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems,
[1998] OJ L166/45: See ECB Legal Assessment, op cit, 16. This limitation to access should be
considered as objectively justifiable. Only settlement systems which qualify for the level of pro-
tection offered by the Directive may be said to satisfy the requirements for adequate legal protec-
tion of finality transfer orders and the risk of insolvency. Note that in March 2008 the Commission
put forward a proposal for the amendment of the Directive. The main purpose of the proposal is to
bring the Directive into line with the latest market and regulatory developments by extending its
protection to night time settlement and to settlement between linked systems and by broadening
the scope of the protection to include new types of assets (ie credit claims eligible for the col-
lateralization of central bank credit operations) in order to facilitate their use throughout the
Community.
373 Although Article 86(2) is particularly relevant in relation to the competition rules, it is a
general escape clause which permits derogations from all rules of the Treaty pertaining to the
internal market, including the four freedoms: see, eg in relation to the freedom to provide services,
Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France SA v Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova Coop
[1998] ECR I-3949, para 59.
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(a) It is an undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest (SGEI) or having the character of a revenue-producing
monopoly;
(b) the application of competition rules obstructs the performance, in law or in
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to it;
(c) the exemption of the undertaking from the rules of the Treaty does not
affect the development of trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the
interests of the Community.
The concept of a service of ‘general economic interest’ is to be defined by Com-
munity law rather than by national law and is, clearly, a dynamic one. It is influ-
enced by political and economic considerations and, not least, by technological
development. The Court has regarded as such services, among others, water dis-
tribution,374 basic postal services,375 services in the field of telecommunications,376
television broadcasts,377 maintenance of waterway navigability,378 port mooring
services,379 the management of waste,380 the operation of the national public
electricity supply,381 and the provision of supplementary pension schemes.382
The Commission defines services of general economic interest as ‘market
services which the Member States or the Community subject to specific public
service obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion’383 but this definition
is, in fact, less helpful than it appears. The European Advisory Group on
Competition Policy (EAGCP) has defined SGEIs as economic activities that
public authorities identify as being of particular importance to citizens and that
would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) if there
were no public intervention.384 Universality is here of the essence. A service
which is only available to certain undertakings cannot be regarded as an
SGEI.385 The body in question must have undertaken ‘universal service obliga-
tions’, namely obligations to provide its services at an affordable cost and guar-
anteed quality to all. This is not to say however that the service must benefit the
whole of the population. It suffices that it benefits a sector of the economy.386
374 Case 96/82 IAZ v Commission [1983] ECR 3369.
375 Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533.
376 Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873.
377 Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409.
378 Case 10/71 Luxembourg v Muller [1971] ECR 723. 379 Corsica Ferries, op cit.
380 C-209/98 Copenhagen [2000] ECR I-3743.
381 Almelo case, op cit, Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699.
382 See Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; and more recently Joined Cases C-264/01 etc
AOK Bundersverband [2004] ECR I-2493, per Jacobs AG at para 87 of the Opinion.
383 See Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe of 19 January 2001,
[2001] OJ C17/4 updating the earlier communication of 11 September 1996, [1996] OJ C281/3.
384 See Services of General Economic Interest Opinion Prepared by the State Aid Group of
EAGCP, 29 June 2006, available from <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp.html>.
385 See Bellamy and Child, European Community Law of Competition (6th edn) 1064.
386 Bellamy and Child, op cit, at 1065.
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In Zuchner, the ECJ rejected the argument that banks should be considered as
organizations entrusted with the performance of SGEIs.387 This pronounce-
ment, however, must be seen in the light of the facts of the case. It is not correct
to suggest that banks are entrusted with such services in general but it might be
otherwise if a specific credit institution has expressly been entrusted by a national
measure with the performance of certain tasks. In any event, it is clear that
central banks are in a distinctly different position. It is also clear that Member
States enjoy discretion in defining services in the general economic interest and
it is not a requirement for legitimate recourse to Article 86(2) that there has to
be a complete market failure. In the light of the attributes of T2S, it is submitted
that it has the characteristics of an SGEI. T2S may be described as a service of
general economic interest in view of its effect on market liquidity, efficiency, and
stability and its contribution to avoiding disruptions in the clearing process.388
This does not mean that the competition rules of the Treaty do not apply.
Article 86(2) has been interpreted strictly. It sanctions a restriction on compe-
tition only in so far as it is indispensable in the sense that the beneficiary
undertaking would be unable to fulfil a task of general economic interest in the
absence of such restriction.389 In interpreting Article 86(2), the case law applies
a strict test of proportionality, the effect of which is to favour liberalization and
open up to market forces activities traditionally reserved to public authorities.
The judicial interpretation of this provision has been anything but static
reflecting, in part, evolving concepts of European supranational governance and
also, in part, the evolution of economic and political thinking as regards the
relationship between public services and market economy. The application of
Article 86(2) requires a market analysis. The burden of proving that the appli-
cation of the competition rules of the Treaty obstructs the operation of services
of general economic nature rests with the undertaking in issue. The mere fact
that the performance of its functions is hindered or becomes more difficult by
exposure to competition is not sufficient to exclude the rules of the Treaty. A lot
depends on the nature of the service in issue.
In our case, the classification of T2S as a service of general economic interest
serves to stress that any anti-competitive effects that may arise could be justified
387 See above.
388 See D Russo, T L Hart, and A Scho¨nenberger, The Evolution of Clearing and Central
Counterparty Services for Exchange Traded Derivatives in the United States and Europe: A Compar-
ison, ECB Occasional Papers Series, September 2002. The authors point out that disruptions in the
clearing process have both systemic and non-systemic implications. Systemically, ‘they might
prevent market participants from receiving timely funds that they had intended to use to make
other payments. As a result, the risk of bottlenecks in the payment systems would be very large and
could substantially affect financial markets.’ Non-systemic implications may occur on ‘(i) the
financial condition of individual regulated firms, (ii) the protection of individual customers using
and holding derivatives positions through the clearing and settlement infrastructure and (iii) the
functioning of the market for its intended purposes, i.e. price discovery and risk transfer’.
389 Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409; Hofner, op cit, para 24; Case T-260/94 Air Inter v
Commission [1997] ECR II-997, para 135.
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provided that that the requirements of universality of access, equality, trans-
parency, and full cost recovery are satisfied.
An undertaking may take advantage of the exception of Article 86(2) only
where it has been entrusted with the operation of an SGEI. Such entrustment
requires a specific and express act of public law such as a law, a regulation, or a
decision by a public authority.390 In other words, the grant of the concession
must be governed by public law391 and the particular tasks assigned to the
undertaking in question must be specifically circumscribed therein. In Com-
mission v France, the Court also held that the obligations imposed on under-
takings entrusted with an SGEI must be linked to the subject-matter of the
SGEI and designed to make a direct contribution to satisfying that interest.392
The requirement of specific endowment by a public act is made clear in the
Eurocheques decision,393 which also illustrates the Commission’s approach to
Article 81(3) in the field of clearing. The Commission rejected the argument that
the system for the clearing of eurocheques was a service of general economic interest
within the meaning of Article 86(2) both on procedural and substantive grounds.
On the procedural front, the Commission stated that the eurocheque system had
been set up on the initiative of private financial institutions. Neither those institu-
tions nor the bodies established by them to govern the clearing system were at any
time entrusted with the operation of an SGEI by a measure adopted by a public
authority. The fact that the eurocheque system operated with the express approval
of competent authorities and, in some countries, there was an express legal act in
favour of the system did not suffice. On the substance, the Commission took the
view that, even if the eurocheque system had been entrusted by public authorities
with the provision of an international means of payment, the application of the
competition rules of the Treaty would in no way obstruct fulfilment of that hypo-
thetical special assignment.394 It did not however elaborate further on this aspect.
The Commission found that the arrangements of the eurocheque system
which came into force in May 1981 entailed a restriction on competition within
the meaning of Article 81(1). Under those arrangements, banks belonging to the
eurocheque organization agreed on uniform conditions for the payment and
clearing of eurocheques made out abroad in local currency specifying, among
others, the maximum amount of a cheque, the conditions for its acceptance by
the payee bank, and the commission to be charged by the clearing centre of the
payee bank. The Commission held that those arrangements, which had as their
object the fixing of the price of a service, represented restrictive practices expli-
citly caught by the general prohibition contained in Article 82(1) EC.
390 See Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815, paras 65–66; Case 127/73
BRT v SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 313, para 20; Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and
Others v Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlautteren Wettbewerbs [1989] ECR 803, para 55.
391 Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others v Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij [1994] ECR I-1477, para 47.
392 Commission v France, op cit, para 68.
393 Commission Decision 85/77, [1985] OJ L35/43. 394 See paras 29–30.
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The Commission however took the view that the conditions for exemption
specified in Article 81(3) were met because the restrictive arrangements provided
for an improved interstate payment system, benefited users, and were indis-
pensable to the proper functioning of the system. In particular, the eurocheque
system contributed to improving payment facilities within the common market
since cheques were guaranteed, could be drawn outside the country of the
issuing bank, and cashed in local currency at banks established in several
Member States. These uniform eurocheques were paid in full by the payee bank
without deduction of any commission which makes them more acceptable to the
trading sector. The Commission placed particular importance on the fact that
centralized clearing made it easier for the payee banks to obtain reimbursement
of foreign eurocheques.395
The users of eurocheques obtained a fair share of the resulting benefit.
Consumers could draw cash from credit institutions in other Member States and
also use them to pay the trading sector directly. They enjoyed a period of interest
free credit and could in principle obtain a better exchange rate. Also, the com-
mercial activities of traders were stimulated by the possibility of direct payment
by eurocheques. They benefited from the guarantee by the drawee bank and had
the assurance that uniform eurocheques would be reimbursed to them in full by
banks in their country.
The Commission found that the restrictions on competition were indis-
pensable to the proper functioning of the eurocheque system. By accepting
cheques issued by banks situated abroad, the payee banks provided a service to
persons who were not their customers. When such a service is provided collec-
tively by all the banks in one country to the customers of banks in other
countries, it is indispensable that the conditions for accepting and clearing the
cheques concerned must be determined in common between the issuing and the
accepting institutions. The uniform determination of the remuneration for this
service was inherent in, and ancillary to, the cooperation between the banks and
their national clearing centres and between the clearing centres. Variations in
commissions from one bank to another would imply bilateral negotiations
between the 15,000 banks which were parties to the scheme so that each
accepting bank could agree with each issuing bank the remuneration it wished to
receive. Any centralized clearing would thus be made impossible and the cost of
processing eurocheques would substantially increase.396 Similarly, the uniform
fixing of the maximum guaranteed amount in a given country was indispensable
to effect clearing. The system would be unworkable if every person accepting a
uniform eurocheque—in the banking sector and particularly in the non-banking
sector—had to make sure each time that the specific maximum amount guar-
anteed by the issuing institution concerned had not been exceeded.
395 op cit, para 37 of the Commission Decision. 396 op cit, para 39.
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The Commission however imposed two caveats. First, it pointed out that its
decision did not cover any national agreements between banks or decisions by
national banking associations to fix the level of commission that individual
issuing institutions in the country concerned should charge to their customers.
Such national agreements or decisions would eliminate residual competition
between institutions issuing uniform eurocheques and could not in any cir-
cumstances be regarded as indispensable. Secondly, to ensure transparency and
freedom of choice for consumers, it was necessary that customers be precisely
informed of the procedure for, and cost of, using eurocheques abroad.
VII. Conclusion
The conclusions of this study may be summarized as follows. The smooth
operation of clearing and settlement systems is of vital importance to the inte-
gration and efficient functioning of securities markets. As the First Giovannini
Report pointed out, inefficiencies in clearing and settlement represent the most
important obstacle to integration. The introduction of T2S is designed to bring
about several positive results. It can be expected to lead to a more efficient post-
trading environment, generate more cross-border activity, increase liquidity, and
enhance market stability. The intervention of the ECB in the post-trading sector
through the introduction of T2S is to be welcomed. It is fully in conformity
with the Giovannini recommendations and the Commission’s avowed policies
whilst keeping legislative intervention to the minimum. The institutional
structure of T2S may conceivably take several forms, including the establish-
ment of an independent agency at EC level or the setting up of an EEIG. It is
submitted that the best solution would be to establish an EC agency. It will be
more in keeping with the public law nature of the ECB’s intervention, be less
dependent on national law, ensure greater control by the Eurosystem, and
reduce legal complications. A legal basis for such an agency can be found in
Article 22 of the ECSB Statute.
The growth of independent administrative agencies at EC level has been one
of the most remarkable developments in Community public law. In its judg-
ment in Meroni, the Court set out a number of constraints on the authority of
the Community institutions to delegate their powers which have been reiterated
in subsequent case law. The Meroni principle has proved one of the most
enduring in Community law. For a case decided even before the primacy and
direct effect of Community law were established, it has shown an unusual degree
of resiliance.
The Meroni constraints apply equally to the ECB. It is submitted that, as a
general rule, the power of the ECB to set up agencies should be subjected to the
same conditions and limitations as those applicable to other Community insti-
tutions. It seems possible that an agency established to run T2S can conform to
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the Meroni criteria without prejudicing the functionality, tasks, and objectives of
T2S which, after all, is only intended to be a technical platform.
In the field of financial services, the policy agenda was dominated, at least
until the financial crisis of autumn 2008, by the objective of liberalization. The
Community institutions have directed their efforts in implementing the
Financial Services Action Plan through the Lamfalussy process. The Commis-
sion has focused its attention on the application of competition law relatively
recently but takes the view that the competition rules of the Treaty apply to
securities markets in the same way as in any other sector. Notably, although
clearing and settlement is identified as a key area for the development of an
integrated securities market, the Commission has opted for a minimalist
approach proceeding through the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct
rather than legislation. The Clearstream decision indicates that, in the field of
clearing and settlement, the Commission takes competition law concerns ser-
iously. The most important aspect of the case is the narrow definition of the
relevant market: the Commission held that indirect access to the issuer CSD is
not a substitutable alternative for direct access, thus encouraging the competitive
position of non-issuer CSDs and ICSDs.
Whilst some functions of the ECB, such as the fixing of interest rates, clearly
fall beyond the scope of competition law, not every action that the ECB, or a
public agency on its behalf, may validly undertake is beyond the reach of the
competition rules of the Treaty. It is submitted however that the ECB is not
bound directly by those rules but by the general postulate of Article 105(1) to
observe the principle of open market economy with free competition. One of
the obligations arising from this provision is to comply with the substantive
requirements of Articles 81 to 87 EC applicable mutatis mutandis and taking
account of the ECB’s wide discretion to act in the public interest in pursuance of
the tasks assigned to it by the Treaty. Any anticompetitive effects of T2S should
be examined on this basis.
According this view, the substantive norms of Articles 81 to 87 must guide
action undertaken by the ECB but the latter is not subject to the Commission’s
enforcement powers. This view appears to be more in conformity with the
principle of institutional balance. It should be noted, however, that both the
ECB and the Commission are bound by the duty of sincere cooperation laid
down in Article 10 EC and, arguably, that duty imposes an obligation on the
ECB to consult the Commission where the former’s intervention into the
market to pursue public policy objectives might have anti-competitive effects.
In general, it may be said that ECB action which restricts free trade is lawful
where it satisfies cumulatively the following requirements: (a) it must be justified
in the general Community interest. The definition of the Community interest
must be guided by the tasks and objectives of the ESCB and, ultimately, the
Community. It should be recognized in this context that the ECB enjoys dis-
cretion in defining what is appropriate action in pursuance of the objectives
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assigned to it by the Treaty; (b) it must be proportionate, ie must not restrict
market freedom beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives; (c) it must be
intended to promote competition; (d) it must satisfy the requirements of
equality, objectivity, and transparency.
It is possible that the establishment of T2S will have some anti-competitive
effects. Participating CSDs will agree on a common pricing mechanism and
also, in effect, have no incentive to build or maintain their own settlement
platforms. In relation to the provision of T2S, the Eurosystem may find itself in
a position comparable to an undertaking in a dominant position within the
meaning of Article 82. The T2S platform is likely to be an essential infra-
structure since it will be the only one which will offer real time DvP settlement
in central bank money. In view of its characteristics, and in the light of the
narrow definition favoured by the Commission, such settlement is likely to be
considered as a separate relevant market.
It is submitted, however, that T2S may be described as a service of general
economic interest in view of its effect on market, liquidity, efficiency, and sta-
bility and its contribution to avoiding disruptions in the clearing process. In the
light of its advantages and contribution to market integration, efficiency, and
stability, it would appear that any restrictions on competition may be justified
provided that T2S complies with the following principles: (a) access to T2S
must be universal, ie it must be made available to all market participants which
fulfil certain objective criteria (universality of access); (b) such access must be
made on the basis of non-discriminatory conditions to all participants (equality
of access); (c) the criteria governing access and, more generally, the obligation of
the parties and the conditions for the operation of T2S must be transparent
(transparency); (d) T2S should operate on the basis on a full cost recovery
principle basis.
All in all, the introduction of T2S appears a welcome initiative which can be
accommodated with the existing EC Treaty structure.
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